; draft-zhang-rpki-roa-bcp-00
Network Working Group                                      H. Zhang  
Internet-Draft                                             CNNIC  
Intended status: Best Current Practice                     H. Zou  
Expires: 11 April 2026                                     CNIC  
                                                           L. Zhang
                                                           X. Yang
                                                           CNNIC
                                                           D. Ma
                                                           ZDNS
                                                           Y. Li
                                                           CNIC
                                                    8 October 2025
       Best Current Practice for ROA Issuance Restrictions in RPKI
      
Abstract
   This document specifies best current practices for Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI) operators regarding Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs). It mandates that a parent Certification 
   Authority (CA) MUST NOT issue ROAs for Internet number resources 
   delegated to a child CA. RPKI certification authorities(CA software)
   and relying party software are required to enforce this restriction
   by rejecting or flagging invalid ROAs issued outside of resource 
   allocations.
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Table of Contents
   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Best Current Practice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  Special Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.  Introduction
   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]  provides a
   framework to secure the Internet routing by associating IP address 
   blocks with public key certificates.  Route Origin 
   Authorizations(ROAs) [RFC9582]  allow the holder of an IP prefix to
   authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
   prefix.
   In the RPKI hierarchy, IP resources are delegated from a parent
   Certification Authority (CA) to a child CA, transferring exclusive
   authority over those resources. However, some RPKI implementations
   permit parent CAs to issue ROAs for delegated resources, leading to
   conflicts and undermining the RPKI trust model.
   This document establishes a Best Current Practice (BCP) to specify
   that only the entity holding the resource certificate with effective
   authority for a prefix may issue ROAs for that prefix. Effective
   authority is transferred to the child CA upon delegation, and the
   parent CA MUST NOT issue ROAs for those resources.
2.  Terminology
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.
3.  Problem Statement
   When a parent CA delegates resources to a child CA, authority over 
   those resources is exclusively transferred. According to the RPKI 
   architecture [RFC6480], the parent CA relinquishes operational 
   control and MUST NOT issue ROAs for delegated resources. However, in
   practice, some RPKI systems permit this leading to the following 
   issues:
   o  Competing ROAs [RFC8211]: Multiple ROAs may exist for the same IP
      prefix, issued by both parent and child CAs.
   o  Validation ambiguity: Relying party (RP) software cannot
      prioritize between competing ROAs, including all valid ROAs in 
      validated ROA payloads(VRPs). This may lead to routing decisions
      that conflict with the delegation model(e.g., a parent CA's ROA 
      for 192.0.2.0/24 authorizing AS1, and a child CA's ROA for the
      same prefix authorizing AS2).
   o  Security risk: A malicious or compromised parent CA could issue 
      ROAs to hijack routes or disrupt legitimate routing.
   These issues directly affect the security and stability of the 
   Internet routing system, as RPKI data is used to validate route 
   origins and influence routing decisions.
4.  Best Current Practice
   To ensure consistency, security in the RPKI ecosystem, the following
   practices are RECOMMENDED:
   o  Parent CAs MUST NOT issue ROAs for resources delegated to a 
      child CA. If legacy ROAs exist, the parent CA SHOULD revoke them
      in coordination with the child CA to minimize disruption.
   o  RPKI CA software MUST reject ROAs issued for resources outside
      the issuer's certified resources, defined as those resources in
      the CA's active certificate, excluding delegated portions.
   o  Relying party (RP) software SHOULD flag ROAs issued by a parent  
      CA for resources delegated to a child CA, issuing warnings during
      validation. The detection rule is:verify if a parent CA's ROA 
      prefix overlaps with resources delegated to a child CA.
   o  It is RECOMMENDED that only leaf CAs(CAs that have not delegated 
      resources further) issue ROAs. Restricting ROA issuance to leaf
      CAs clarifies authority, prevents overlapping or competing ROAs
      between parent and child CAs, and reduces risks of
      misconfiguration or misuse that could lead to routing
      incidents. If a non-leaf CA issues a ROA, RP software triggers an
      warning during validation. This recommendation is consistent with
      the above restriction on parent CAs and extends the principle by
      specifying that only CAs without further delegation (leaf CAs) 
      should perform ROA issuance.
   o  In cases where a parent CA, such as a Regional Internet 
      Registry (RIR), operates its own network and needs to issue ROAs
      for the resources it directly holds (i.e., resources not delegated
      to child CAs), it is RECOMMENDED that the parent CA create a 
      dedicated subordinate CA for those resources. ROAs should then be
      issued from this subordinate CA, maintaining clear separation 
      between allocation and operational roles.
   o  Operators of RPKI CAs SHOULD implement monitoring to detect ROA 
      misconfigurations, with automated alerts for unauthorized 
      issuance.
   o  Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and other certification
      authorities are encouraged to update their RPKI documentation and
      user interfaces to clearly communicate these restrictions to end
      users.
5.  Security Considerations
   Failure to enforce ROA issuance restrictions can lead to serious
   security consequences, including:
   o  Route hijacking: An compromised parent CA could issue ROAs to
      redirect traffic.
   o  Routing blackhole: If a parent CA issues an ROA for a delegated 
      prefix (e.g., 192.0.2.0/24 authorizing AS1) and the child CA, 
      holding the same prefix, does not issue an ROA but announces via
      AS2, the route may be marked "Invalid" per [RFC6811], causing
      traffic to be dropped and resulting in a routing blackhole.
   o  Erosion of trust: Ambibuities in ROA authority reduce confidence
      in RPKI.
   Strict enforcement at both the CA and relying party levels is
   essential to maintaining the integrity of the global routing system.
   This document reinforces the principle of least authority within the
   RPKI hierarchy.
6.  Iana Considerations
   This document has no IANA actions.
7.  Special Considerations
   In some operational environments, organizations may delegate
   resources internally to subsidiaries or business units.  In such
   cases, the parent organization may still need to issue ROAs that
   cover subsidiary resources. The recommended practice is to avoid
   using the parent/child CA model for this purpose. Instead, the parent
   and subsidiary should share a common CA certificate within the same
   administrative domain, and implement internal controls to ensure that
   ROAs are issued according to IP allocation rules. This prevents
   conflicts and ensures compliance with the principle of least
   authority within the global RPKI framework.
8.  References
   8.1.  Normative References
      [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
                 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
                 .
      [RFC9582]  Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., D. Kong, and 
                 S. Kent,
                 "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", 
                 RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, May 2024, 
                 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582
      [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
                 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
                 DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
                 .
   8.2.  Informative References
      [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
                 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480,
                 DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012,
                 .
      [RFC6811]  Bush, R., "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
                 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
                 .
      [RFC8211]  Kent, S. and A. Chi, "Adverse Actions by a 
                 Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in 
                 the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 
                 RFC 8211, DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
                 .
Authors' Addresses
Heng Zhang
CNNIC
Building 4, No.9 Beijing Auto Museum West Road 
Beijing
100070
China
Email:zhangheng@cnnic.cn
Hui Zou
CNIC
CAS Informatization Plaza No.2 Dong Sheng Nan Lu
Beijing
100083
China
Email:zouhui@cnic.cn
Likun Zhang
CNNIC
Building 4, No.9 Beijing Auto Museum West Road 
Beijing
100070
China
Email:zhanglikun@cnnic.cn
Xue Yang
CNNIC
Building 4, No.9 Beijing Auto Museum West Road 
Beijing
100070
China
Email:yangx@cnnic.cn
Di Ma
ZDNS
21/F, Building B, Greenland Center, Building 7, Wangjingdongyuan Zone 4
Beijing
100102
China
madi@zdns.cn
Yanbiao Li
CNIC
CAS Informatization Plaza No.2 Dong Sheng Nan Lu
Beijing
100083
China
Email:lybmath@cnic.cn