/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents File: 1387polc.win Document 1387 8th November 1993 WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Political Committee (2) by Mr. Wintgens, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM presented by Mr. Wintgens, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. The activities of the WEU Forum of Consultation III. The significance of creating various groups and associations of certain Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Warsaw pact and of the Soviet Union (i) The Visegrad group (ii) The Central European initiative (iii) The Black Sea economic co-operation area (iv) The Hungarian Carpatas Tisza plan (v) Baltic co-operation (vi) Romania and Moldova (vii) Bulgaria (viii) Slovenia (ix) Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece (x) Developments in the CIS IV. Consequences to be drawn for WEU's future policy V. Conclusions APPENDIX Summary of the electoral position of Central European countries in the WEU Forum of Consultation ---------------- Draft Recommendation ==================== on WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries The Assembly, (i) Reiterating its constant commitment to the establishment of a new order of security and stability throughout Europe as attested by the many reports it has prepared on this problem since the fall of the Berlin wall; (ii) Recalling in particular its Recommendations 511, 516, 526 and 528; (iii) Welcoming the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation in which nine countries of Central Europe are participating; (iv) Noting, nevertheless, that the great majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe still consider that they have no firm security guarantees; (v) Aware of the risk of division of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into two groups of states, one of which would have the benefit of membership of western institutions, the other remaining outside; (vi) Deploring the inadequacy of information provided by the Council on specific co-operation implemented in the framework of the forum and on the political aims it is pursuing in that body; (vii) But welcoming the operational co-operation between WEU and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria for implementing the blockade on the Danube; (viii) Fearing, nevertheless, that fighting on the territory of former Yugoslavia might spread to neighbouring areas; (ix) Dismayed at the refusal of the Greek Government to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; (x) Disturbed also by the unstable situation in several regions of the CIS and the uncertainty surrounding the foreign policy of Russia; (xi) Concerned by the ambiguity of Ukraine's policy, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons and its hesitation about ratifying the Start I Treaty and the nuclear non- proliferation treaty; (xii) Inviting all the Central European countries in the Forum of Consultation to settle their problems of neighbourliness by peaceful means using the good offices of the appropriate European, Atlantic and worldwide institutions for crisis-management and peace-keeping; (xiii) Emphasising the importance of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting insofar as it must redefine the transatlantic partnership between allies and also establish a partnership of a new type with the countries taking part in NACC; (xiv) Stressing the importance of parallelism between the approach of the European Union and of WEU to the development of their relations with the Central and Eastern European countries after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Define without delay the nature of its future relations with Austria, taking into account its relations with the Visegrad countries, Finland and Sweden, in view of their role in the Baltic region, candidates for membership of the European Union, offering them means of co-operation corresponding to the specific situation of each one; 2. Study forthwith whether and to what extent circumstances allow Slovenia to be associated with the work of the Forum of Consultation; 3. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it reaches on the two questions mentioned above; 4. Remind the member countries of WEU of the joint decision taken by the Twelve on 2nd May 1992 to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 5. Urge Greece to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without further delay; 6. Intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation by giving it a specific programme of work including, inter alia, the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment; 7. Offer the Central European countries which are partners in the Forum of Consultation the possibility of taking part in the work of the Western European Armaments Group and all forms of European armaments co-operation; 8. Determine: - the areas in which these countries can be associated with the activities of the WEU satellite centre; - the conditions in which they can take part in meetings of WEU chiefs of staff and the work of the planning cell; 9. Examine what security guarantees it can give Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in face of the risks these countries are running because of the blockade on the Danube and study the possibility of granting them appropriate financial compensation; 10. Intensify its political dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Albania. ----------------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Wintgens, Rapporteur) I. Introduction ================ The subject entrusted to your Rapporteur is particularly difficult to handle for several reasons: - first the situation in Russia is still unstable even after the removal of the principal leaders of the conservative opposition to President Yeltsin in the wake of the failed coup in Moscow on 3rd and 4th October 1993. Likewise, it is difficult to identify a coherent and rational foreign and security policy within Russia; the most recent indications emanating from the leadership are extremely varied and at times contradictory; - second, there is a growing impression that the period of grace that followed the end of the cold war and of the communist system is giving way to a feeling of growing perplexity regarding the path to be followed to give Europe a security architecture satisfactory to all concerned; - third, the victory in the elections on 19th September last by the successors of the former communist parties in Poland, one of the Visegrad group of countries considered to be the closest to Western European institutions, arouses uncertainty regarding the future policy of that country and the consequences of this ballot for other countries in the region, Hungary for instance, where elections are to be held at the beginning of 1994. To complicate even further your Rapporteur's task, the Assembly has not yet received the thirty-ninth annual report from the Council of WEU and the Secretary-General has stopped sending his letter of information. The Assembly is therefore not aware of the Council's activities in the evolution of its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe since the publication of its Bonn declaration of June 1992 (3) which reported on its meeting with the states of Central Europe and the Rome communique on the meeting with the WEU Forum of Consultation held at ministerial level on 20th May 1993 (4). The present report is nevertheless especially important, because it will indicate the direction in which the Assembly must move and consolidate its position following the series of reports that the committee has produced since 1991 on relations with Central and Eastern Europe and the enlargement of WEU (5), and also, because it should be considered in the context of the preparation of the next NATO summit meeting, dealt with in the report presented by Mr. Baumel, and of the relations the European Union will develop with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. II. The activities of the WEU Forum of Consultation ==================================================== It should first be recalled that in June 1992 the Council of Western European Union decided to select the following eight countries to start an institutionalised dialogue with Central Europe: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. With the division of Czechoslovakia into two states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are now nine countries with which WEU is conducting regular consultations in the WEU Forum of Consultation. With the backing of the Assembly, the Council therefore decided not to follow the example of the North Atlantic Co- operation Council which extended its dialogue to all the countries of the former Warsaw Pact plus the members of the Community of Independent States. By limiting the number of Central European participating states, WEU thus decided to follow the course set by Maastricht and establish relations with countries that might be expected sooner or later to join the European Union (6). To implement this policy the ministers of WEU member states and those of the countries of Central Europe that make up the Forum of Consultation took the following decisions inter alia (7): "The focus of consultations will be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in particular the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the 1992 Vienna Document. Developments in Europe and neighbouring regions will be of particular interest to the participants." ... - Foreign and Defence Ministers will meet once a year. Additional meetings at ministerial level may be convened if circumstances require. - A Forum of Consultation will be established between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned. It will meet at the seat of the WEU Council at least twice a year. - These meetings will provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals for the inclusion of other fields of co- operation. - Consultations at ministerial and WEU Permanent Council/ambassador level on security issues may be complemented by meetings with an ad hoc WEU troika at senior official level. - The following initiatives will be continued and encouraged: - Regular exchanges of documents and information; - Growing co-operation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the corresponding bodies in the countries concerned. an increasing number of seminars and colloquia will be organised. The programme of scholarships will be continued." Ministers also advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned (8). In the absence of information from the Council on the specific work undertaken by the Forum of Consultation, the Committee is merely aware, through a publication on the "WEU's security role in post-cold War Europe", circulated by the Secretary-General in September 1993 (no specific date), that "WEU member states consider that the twice-yearly meetings ... have a dual objective: to explain WEU's role, objects and activities in the evolving framework of European security architecture on the one hand and, on the other, to understand more fully the security concerns of Central European countries." According to the Rome Communique of 20th May 1993, the Ministers in the WEU Forum of Consultation subsequently agreed: "on the setting up of a Counsellors Group in Brussels, composed of senior representatives in the delegations of the WEU member countries and Embassy Counsellors of the Consultation Partners. This group, would meet at least three or four times a year, would hold more detailed exchanges of view and would prepare the meetings of the Forum of Consultation." The communique in question also contained the following statement: "The Ministers warmly welcome WEU's initiative on the Danube to assist and co-operate with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in the strict implementation of the sanctions provided for in UN Security Council Resolutions 820, 787, 757, and 713. They welcomed the signature of three Memoranda of Understanding in Rome to this effect. Ministers stressed that the Danube mission, which was of a civilian character, represented a concrete example of co- operation between WEU and certain of its Consultation Partners." In point of fact the WEU Council of Ministers had already taken a decision in Luxembourg (9) on 5th April 1993 to propose that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania be offered specific non- military assistance in order to strengthen their means of enforcing compliance with the embargo against Serbia on the Danube. Thus police and customs officers of the WEU member countries would co-operate with their counterparts from the three countries bordering the Danube in monitoring river traffic - with the aid also of some ten or so high-speed patrol boats - in intercepting, as necessary, vessels suspected of trying to break the embargo. The three countries concerned having accepted this offer, the operation has been organised since June 1993 on the basis of memoranda of understanding signed in Rome between WEU and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In the opinion of the German Government, this action constitutes a precedent in two respects: - it shows that operational co-operation exists between WEU and certain countries within the Forum of Consultation, - and that the operational role of WEU is not limited to military action. Without knowing the content of the annual report of the WEU Council on this subject, it seems necessary to emphasise how much the WEU Assembly appreciates the commitment these countries have made in their decision to assist WEU and the international community in implementing the sanctions imposed on Serbia by the United Nations. The Assembly is well aware that the implementation of the embargo is very costly to these three countries, not just in purely economic terms but also politically, because some of them, Romania for example, have traditionally had friendly relations with Serbia, and because others, like Hungary, fear Serbian reprisals and have no guarantee of security from western nations. Apparently Hungary is already suffering Serbian reprisals and during the Committee's visit to Hungary an official of the United Nations department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs asked whether it might be possible to organise WEU patrols in the Serbian controlled waters of the Danube. It appears that Bulgaria may be worst hit by the economic fallout of the embargo. Regarding the future development of WEU relations with the member states of the Forum of Consultation as a whole, the Rome Communique provides insufficient information to enable one to form an idea of the essential security concerns of the Central and Eastern European countries belonging to the WEU Forum of Consultation. The communique merely states that the ministers "reaffirmed the importance of intensifying these relations as a valuable contribution to the emergence of a more stable and peaceful order in Europe based on partnership and co-operation." Regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic states, the communique refers to the declaration adopted at the 1992 Helsinki summit meeting and the CSCE Council meeting in Stockholm. The ministers also declared that: "The development of WEU's relations with its consultation partners would continue to reflect increasingly close relations between the countries of Central Europe and the future European Union and its member states with the aim of extending the area of stability and security in Europe." What is the particular significance of the interest shown in this communique for an exchange of views on peace-keeping? If WEU wishes to avoid duplicating what has already been achieved in the framework of NACC, it should provide more detailed information on the aims of such an undertaking. This is of interest to the Forum countries and the Assembly too. However, regarding the fundamental question of how WEU can respond to the aspirations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to live within a security architecture that meets the satisfaction of all concerned, the Council has not yet indicated the guidelines it intends to follow. During the meeting with the Permanent Council, held in Brussels on 5th October 1993, the Secretary-General confined himself to defining the tasks that await us. The true security concerns of the countries in question are yet to be determined; also whether we have to give them security guarantees. The impression is often that these concerns relate to a regional context and consequently it may be difficult to find answers. III. The significance of creating various groups and associations of certain Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union ========================================================== The Petersberg Declaration is precise in its definition of the group of states with which WEU has entered into a Forum of Consultation as the "States of Central Europe" (and not Eastern Europe). Similarly the Rome Communique of 20th May 1993 refers to "Central European consultation partners". If this title seems entirely justified given the states participating in the Forum of Consultation, the present report would not be complete if it did not also consider the evolution of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which lie to the east of Central Europe, namely Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, together with that of the Balkan states not directly involved in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Developments taking place in all these regions will be of vital importance for the future security architecture of the entire continent of Europe. The present report rightly, therefore, takes as its subject-matter WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. (i) The Visegrad group In Visegrad, near Budapest, on 15th February 1991, the Presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland met to exchange views on the risks of destabilisation in Eastern Europe, to co- ordinate their approaches to association with the European Community and to organise regular meetings between their countries in order to co-operate more closely in political, economic and cultural matters. The Visegrad Group had long been considered to have made the most progress in reforms and democratisation and it therefore seemed possible to envisage a privileged status of association with European integration and the Atlantic and Western European security systems. After Czechoslovakia split into two independent states, the European Commission, on 24th June 1993, initialled new agreements of association with the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic taking up, in the main, the contents of the agreement already concluded between the European Community and Czechoslovakia. For some time, there has been discussion in the Atlantic Alliance about opening NATO to the Visegrad countries and preparing decisions in this respect for the NATO summit meeting to be held on 10th January 1994. The pace of this discussion increased after the visits by the Russian President to Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia at the end of August 1993 during which he made no objections to the wish of these countries to draw closer to NATO. The discussion however took a new turn when at the end of September the Russian President reversed his position in messages addressed to the signatories of the treaty on the final settlement of the German situation (2 + 4 Treaty). On this occasion the Russian President declared himself opposed to any eastward enlargement of NATO, instead proposing that NATO and Russia should together guarantee the security of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances and in view of the fact that the situation within Russia remains unstable in the wake of the attempted coup of 3rd and 4th October, it is hardly probable that the NATO summit meeting will reach firm decisions on its possible enlargement. It should be noted that the now four Visegrad countries decided, at a meeting in Krakow at the beginning of September, to co-operate further in armaments questions and to give priority to the compatibility of their equipment with NATO systems. The deputy defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff of the four countries reached agreement on the exchange of military equipment and spare parts and the assistance they could afford each other at the level of maintenance. A final document and several bilateral agreements were signed at the close of the meeting. According to information gleaned from this document, the replacement of certain equipment now used by the Polish forces will promote compatibility with NATO equipment and particularly with its command systems. A further meeting of this type is to be held in Hungary in September 1994 (10). It cannot be considered, however, that the division of Czechoslovakia will not be without repercussions on the foreign policy of the two newly-created countries and the position of the Visegrad Group as a whole. It can be seen that the foreign policy of the Czech Republic is intended to bring that country into close association with the West as swiftly as possible, priority being given to a close partnership with the countries of Western Europe, the United States and Germany. On the other hand, it seems that co-operation with its neighbours such as Poland, Hungary, Austria and Slovakia is based rather on bilateral relations, whereas the importance of co-operation in the framework of the Visegrad Group and of the Central European initiative would take second place. Certain negative declarations about the usefulness of co- operation between the Visegrad countries made by Prime Minister Klaus and his sceptical remarks about the Maastricht process have caused some irritation. However, it was at the beginning of September during the meeting of the Union of European Democrats in Budapest that the Czech Prime Minister made the most surprising statement, affirming that his country would not be interested in joining the Atlantic Alliance since it was not threatened and one had to calculate the high cost of incorporating his country's armed forces in the western security structures (11). During his recent visit to Prague, your rapporteur was reassured by the representatives of the Czech Government that the remarks by the Prime Minister were misunderstood and that the Czech Republic's wish to adhere to all the political, economic and defence institutions of the West is so clear that further repetition is unnecessary. Moreover, they confirmed that Visegrad co-operation no longer seemed to be primordial at political level for co-ordinating the rapprochement of the four countries with Western Europe. It almost seems that the Czech Republic, having thrown off certain problems which are now the sole responsibility of Slovakia, and aware that its economic situation is not of such great concern as that of some of its Visegrad partners, feels that it can stand on its own feet and possibly thus join up with the structures of Western Europe. The separation of Czechs and Slovaks was no doubt a painful operation which made it necessary for the two newly-created countries to allow themselves time to redefine their positions and their policies. It is undoubtedly for Western Europe to make sure that neither of the two countries feels that it is being isolated, and particularly Slovakia. This small country of some 5 million inhabitants, with significant Hungarian, Czech, Ukrainian and Ruthenian minorities, not counting a large number of gypsies, is surrounded by far more powerful neighbours such as Poland, Ukraine, Hungary and Austria. Its problems are not easy to solve. Weighed down by its past as a faithful ally of Germany during the second world war, this country's task is not limited to establishing an equitable policy with regard to its minorities: it also has differences with Hungary over the consequences of building the Gabcikovo dam. Furthermore, the domestic situation is delicate because the Prime Minister has to rely on the backing of a minority government. The country's economic problems are worsened by its dependence on steel exports and its large armaments industry which in the past was one of the pillars of Czechoslovakia's military power in the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The armaments export market has collapsed and the European Community has reduced its quotas for the importation of steel and Slovak agricultural products. It is all the more important to take note of the decisive progress this country has made in making its structures democratic because of its very firm determination to settle questions of minorities, in particular the problem of the Hungarian minority, to the satisfaction of all concerned; one may therefore hope that these problems will be progressively depoliticised, including the disputes with Hungary over the Gabcikovo dam. It should also be noted that all the political parties are unanimously in agreement with the government about joining the process of integration with the political, economic and military structures of the West. The Slovak Government is therefore very reserved towards the Ukrainian proposal to create a special security zone between the Baltic countries and the Black Sea that it considers as a kind of safety belt which does not improve the security of Slovakia. Yet the image of Slovakia is not without blemish in certain western political circles nor in some of its neighbouring countries. It is interesting to note that some politicians and editorialists do not even mention Slovakia when they speak of possibly accelerating the accession of the Visegrad Group to NATO (12). It is certain that the Slovak Republic has an interest in establishing firm relations with its powerful neighbours to the East, particularly with Ukraine and Russia, but your Rapporteur believes it would be dangerous to give the Slovaks the impression that they would no longer be welcome in the West after their separation from the Czech Republic. It is still too soon to say what foreign policy the new Polish Government will pursue after the 19th September 1993 elections, although the three victorious parties have given to understand that a Polish government, even one dominated by the left, would wish to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance at the earliest opportunity. So far, Poland has been one of the most active countries in drawing closer to the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, but at the same time it is trying to improve its security by concluding bilateral military co-operation agreements with its eastern neighbours (except Belarus). Its signing of these agreements was above all a question of strengthening confidence between partners. In this context the fact should not be overlooked that a substantial Polish minority live in Lithuania (forming approximately 7% of the population). Poland's future position within a European security structure will depend largely on the evolution of its relations with Ukraine, whose role is not entirely unambiguous as will be seen in a subsequent chapter of this report. Since May 1992, relations between Poland and Ukraine have developed considerably with reciprocal visits by the Heads of Government of the two countries and the signing of many bilateral agreements. Russia cannot remain aloof from this insofar as it might consider the development of such relations with Poland as an attempt to increase Russia's isolation. In this respect, a more detailed study will have to be made of Ukraine's policy which officially is one of neutrality and non-membership of alliances, be they eastern or western. However, this did not prevent Ukraine from making a proposal to establish a security area including the Baltic countries, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Austria (13). The idea of including the member countries of the Visegrad Group in the Atlantic Alliance will most certainly arouse some concern in Kiev, where it is feared that Ukraine will be isolated between Russia and a western alliance which is not concerned with this matter: one more reason for the West to define more clearly the future architecture of European security. Indeed, the danger of the Central and Eastern European countries being divided into two groups, one of which would have the benefit of acceding to western institutions and the other remaining outside, is a matter of growing concern in certain capitals of Eastern Europe. Turning to Hungary, the Political Committee's visit on 20th and 21st October 1993 was a particularly fruitful experience, yielding a wealth of information and likely to lead to numerous exchanges of views. However this visit also revealed the seriousness of the difficulties experienced by neighbouring countries that Hungary currently has to deal with and which are unlikely to make any easier the task of restoring stability in the unsettled region at the centre of which Hungary lies. However before a more thorough investigation of the problems, it should be recalled that it was Hungary that broke through the iron curtain in 1989 and instigated the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Hungary was the first country to see Soviet troops withdraw from its territory. Moreover, while it was still a member of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary had already sought a rapprochement with WEU, the European Community and NATO, and its Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the WEU Assembly in 1990. The integration of Hungary in the European Community and its membership of European and Atlantic security stuctures appeared to pose fewer difficulties than was the case for certain other countries of Central Europe. Hungary's co-operation in the Visegrad framework was given new impetus with the conclusion of a Central European free trade agreement in December 1992. Hungary, however, also seems to feel that the Visegrad Group still has some political importance which might help it to draw closer to Eastern Europe. However, during the various talks we had with our Hungarian colleagues it became very clear that the presence of 3.2 million Hungarians within neighbouring countries (2 million of them in Romania and some 600 000 in Slovakia) is a political consideration which raises difficulties for Hungary's bilateral relations with its neighbours, especially Slovakia and Romania. Despite parliamentary representatives' repeated allusions to "Hungary's traditional borders" the Hungarian authorities and first and foremost the Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly demonstrated their determination not to wish to alter existing borders but to seek, in co-operation with neighbouring countries, to ensure that the collective and individual rights of the Hungarian minorities should prevail and be safeguarded. The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in particular said that the fact that the Hungarian Government accepted responsibility for all ethnic Hungarians did not mean that Hungary was seeking to re-establish its traditional borders, nor that it intended to exercise a form of political control over Hungarian minorities living in other countries. The Hungarian Parliament has, moreover, adopted exemplary legislation guaranteeing very wide rights and freedoms for foreign minorities living in Hungary in the hope of obtaining a similar status for its own minorities abroad. However, as the discussions during the Council of Europe summit meeting in Vienna on 8th and 9th October last demonstrated, the problem of defining the rights of "national minorities" remains a controversial issue throughout Europe; Germany, supported by Austria and Hungary, wishes to go a long way in this direction, imposing very high standards based on the collective rights, while France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy all share the apprehension that this issue might pave the way for demands for regional autonomy and prefer to think in terms of individual rights (14). All things considered, it can be said that the will exists in Hungary, and in its neighbouring countries (with the exception of Serbia), to reach a satisfactory settlement of problems between neighbouring countries and in particular minorities so as to avoid these disputes interfering with regional security. Recent talks between the Hungarian and Romanian Foreign Ministers are an encouraging sign in this direction; however, a rapid decision on the inclusion in the bilateral treaty currently in preparation of a form of words attesting to the fact that Romania and Hungary did not intend to pursue any claim to each other's territory, would constitute a truly decisive step. While differences between Hungary and Slovakia over minorities and over the Gabcikovo dam appear to be becoming less politicised, tension persists in Hungarian-Serb relations Hungary being concerned over the fate of the large Hungarian minority in Voivodina. Despite Serb reprisals against Hungarian patrol boats on the Danube and the economic loss Hungary has suffered, that country is participating fully in the embargo measures in co-operation with WEU; it has also opened its air space to NATO AWAC aircraft. Although the proximity of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the risk of involvement is a source of extreme concern to Hungary, its wish to be integrated at the earliest opportunity into Western security structures - a point made forcefully by Hungarian representatives to the members of the Political Committee - dates back much further in time and derives from a profound feeling that the country is part of the West. In this connection it was very moving to hear the Hungarian Foreign Minister's impassioned warning to Western politicians that they must in no under any circumstances yield to pressure to adopt a new policy of appeasement towards Russia. Certain Hungarian representatives even went so far as to state that in point of fact Russia had already accepted the idea of the Central European countries joining the Atlantic Alliance. After all, it must be noted that circumstances are not the same for the various countries of the Visegrad Group and for some time their interests have appeared to diverge. It is difficult therefore for the security and defence authorities of Western Europe, and particularly of WEU, to determine whether they ought to continue to count on this group as a stabilising factor with which continued co-operation is worthwhile in order to facilitate a joint rapprochement of its members with the structures of western security or whether they should give preference to a piecemeal approach whereby, for instance, the Czech Republic might be considered as the only country fulfilling all the required conditions. It is perhaps still too soon to make a final assessment, but your Rapporteur believes Western Europe should avoid anything that might fan the flames of rivalry between these four countries, but should on the contrary encourage anyone who may wish to continue to use this group as a useful instrument for co-operation and rapprochement with the West. (ii) The Central European initiative Created in 1989 by Italy as pentagonal co-operation for developing co-operation between the countries of South-Eastern Europe with a view to strengthening joint structures in transport, telecommunications, the environment, culture and science, this group has been enlarged in the meantime to include nine member countries, i.e. Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. At the last annual summit meeting of the group in Budapest, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was accepted as the tenth member. Although the purpose of this forum is not to deal with questions that are of primary interest to WEU, it contributes to regional stability insofar as it aims to encourage a better climate of European relations and to carry forward the Helsinki process. This forum also provides an opportunity for working groups to discuss bilateral problems and harmonise various points of view on questions of mutual interest with particular regard to the consequences of the fighting in former Yugoslavia for refugees and minorities. This group is important because of its composition, which includes Italy as a member of the EC, NATO and WEU, neutral countries and former members of the Warsaw Pact and countries of former Yugoslavia. The interest expressed by several other countries, such as Belarus, Ukraine and Romania in the activities of the Central European initiative has so far involved the participation of their experts in the various working groups. (iii) The Black Sea economic co-operation area Economic co-operation between Black Sea countries was started in Istanbul on 25th June 1992 in order to examine how to strengthen economic co-operation between participating countries. This initiative includes Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Greece and Albania. This co-operation can also help to stabilise a difficult region in which partners defending very different interests co-habit. Bilateral contacts in the context of the first conference, for instance, led to Russia agreeing for the first time to envisage withdrawing, in the long term, the 14th army stationed in Moldova. Bulgaria is to organise a meeting of 11 ministers for foreign affairs of this group in Sofia on 9th December 1993. (iv) The Hungarian Carpatas Tisza plan Considering that the growing porousness of frontiers in Europe might lead to stronger solidarity between frontier regions, the President of the Hungarian Republic in July 1990 launched an initiative called Carpatas Tisza grouping the frontier regions of Hungary, Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia. The plan, drawn up on 14th February 1993, brought out a certain community of interests between the regions concerned, particularly in economic problems, and obtained the support of their governments. Moreover, it is set in a Euroregion type of framework and does not therefore rule out participation by the Romanian regions. (v) Baltic co-operation The future of the Baltic countries, which were called upon by the heads of state in a joint declaration adopted at the European summit meeting in Copenhagen on 2nd June 1993 to start negotiations for association with the European Community before the end of 1993 should also be of interest to the European security authorities including WEU, with which the three countries are co-operating in the Forum of Consultation. At the Helsinki summit meeting on 10th July 1992, the CSCE had asked for the rapid and full withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Baltic countries. However, Lithuania was the only one of the three Baltic countries from which all Russian soldiers were withdrawn on 31st August 1993. Lithuania, governed by former Communists, has a Polish minority (7% of the population). Troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) being withdrawn from the former German Democratic Republic are currently crossing Lithuanian territory - a process scheduled for completion by 31st August 1994. Lithuania is uneasy, however, about a major Russian military presence in the Russian enclave in the Kaliningrad region (the northern part of former East Prussia) and has already demanded the demilitarisation of this region several times. Moreover the emergence of a small ultranationalist armed faction hiding out in the forest areas of Lithuania to pursue the "struggle against the Communists" has caused the government considerable embarrassment. That apart, there is free movement of persons and goods between Russia and the Kaliningrad region within Lithuanian territory, based on an agreement between Russia and Lithuania reached on 29th July 1991. The Russian minority in Lithuania is relatively small (about 8%). Elections were held in Latvia on 5th and 6th June 1993; Latvia's Way obtained about a third of the votes and thirty-six seats out of the hundred in the Saeima. This led to the formation of a centre-right coalition headed by Mr Anatolijs Gorbunovs, formerly responsible for ideology in the local Communist Party. Most people of Russian origin, i.e. 35% of the population did not have the right to vote and this aroused strong protests in Russia. True-born Latvians represent only just over half of the population. However, in spite of this, the ultranationalists of the National Independence Movement of Latvia (LNNK) and the Fatherland and Freedom Party obtained respectively only 13.5% and 5.5% of the vote (15). Unlike Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia has not yet been admitted to the Council of Europe because it still has not presented satisfactory legislation governing citizenship and the rights of foreigners. The protracted presence of Russian troops in the country and particularly Russia's insistence on maintaining its antimissile early warning system at Skrunda is a matter of concern for the country. It remains to be seen whether the agreement concluded on 1st February 1992 between Latvia and Russia for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvian territory before the end of 1994 will be carried out. According to Latvian sources, on 23rd April 1993 a contingent of some 23 000 men was still on Latvian territory (about 17 000 according to the Military Balance 1993/94 published in October 1993). Estonia has a Russian-speaking minority that accounts for 38% of a population of some 1.6 million inhabitants. In 1940, before the country was annexed by the Soviet Union, the proportion was 8.2%. The Russian population is principally concentrated in the towns of Narva and Tallin and in a referendum organised at Narva on autonomy for this region 97.2% of the inhabitants of that town voted in favour. However the turn-out was only 54%. The Estonian authorities immediately declared the referendum "illegal" and its relations with Russia have since been difficult because of the latter's displeasure at the new law defining the rights of foreign citizens, which makes it difficult to obtain Estonian citizenship, and also because of the delay in the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonian territory. About 7 000 troops are still there (16). The Russian authorities imposed the following conditions for the withdrawal of their forces from the Baltic countries: (i) grant legal status to the armed forces there in the interim so as to ensure their normal functioning, (ii) accept Russia's strategic installations for the time being, (iii) drop compensation claims for the damage inflicted upon their territories by the USSR from 1940 to 1991, (iv) help construct housing in Russia for the departing troops, (v) guarantee transit rights for military cargoes going to Kaliningrad, (vi) provide compensation for the land and property vacated by the troops, (vii) guarantee social security (including pensions) and human rights for Soviet officers retired in the Baltic states and their families, (viii) alter laws that infringed upon the political and economic rights of the Russian-speaking population, and (ix) drop territorial claims on land annexed by Russia from the Baltic states after world war II. As matters now stand, the impression is that the Baltic States have not yet adopted a coherent position on a firm direction for their foreign policies. Moreover there is no close co-ordination between the three countries, whose relations with Russia are all still quite delicate and this should not be discounted when studying ways and means of bringing the Baltic States closer to Western European structures. In any event, it is impossible to talk of a Baltic Unity for the three countries. It has been suggested that the Baltic countries might act as a bridge between Russia and Western Europe, a course which Lithuania in particular seems to be following, but in the longer term all these countries see themselves as being finally anchored to the latter region. Their aspirations are therefore concentrated on co-operation with the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, which has succeeded in obtaining European Community recognition for incorporating the free-trade treaties it has concluded with the three Baltic countries, in the framework of Sweden's accession to the European Community. To sum up, it may be said that none of the abovementioned regional groupings can offer an alternative to the determination of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to be integrated into western institutions. They should be considered rather as a means of directing the efforts of their members towards the West, which has not yet found a strategy for a new European security architecture at the level of the historical challenge constituted by the collapse of the Soviet bloc. (iv) Romania and Moldova In this context, account must be taken of the fact that some of these countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania, may be considered as second zone countries in terms of their present relations with the West, in spite of their participation in the embargo on the Danube, NACC and the WEU Forum of Consultation. The visits made by the committee at the end of March/beginning of April 1993 to these two countries provided an excellent opportunity to become better acquainted with the problems and concerns specific to these countries and to intensify the dialogue with them. Since the admission of Romania as a full member of the Council of Europe at the beginning of October 1993 and after the encouraging results of the talks between the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministers last September with a view to acheiving a satisfactory settlement of the problems that exist between the two countries - in particular the issue of minority rights and recognition of existing borders - it is to be hoped that Romania will gradually feel less at a disadvantage in comparison with other countries of Central Europe in terms of its connection with the structures of Western Europe. Many problems still remain, however. In terms of domestic policy, the left to centre-left coalition in government hardly seems stable, even though, should it fall, it has no obvious successor. The 1989-90 revolution now seems to have been more of a sudden, sharp change in the majority than a complete break with the previous regime. The removal of the old leadership has therefore been only very partial and many members of the old Communist Party have retained high office and now seem to be loyally serviing a different policy. According to recent information in the British Press a growing trend has been observed among a number of Romanian political partparticular of "conspiring" with the Hungarian government. Romanian legislation on minority rights has recently been supplemented by laws to improve the condition of minorities. However it appears that these elicited the traditionally extremely negative reactions among the population at large to fellow-citizens belonging to ethnic minorities. Economic difficulties, particularly in agriculture, industry, transport and foreign investments are still giving cause for concern. In his speech to the WEU Assembly on 1st December 1992, Mr. Melanescu, Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, emphasised that relations with the Republic of Moldova had a special place in Romanian policy, "practical objectives in Romania's relations with this country being economic integration and the creation of a common space, and freedom of movement of individuals, capital and services". However, in the debate, the minister did not hide his personal convictions that "the reunion of Moldova and Romania is a process which will unfold concurrently with the integration of Romania and the Republic of Moldova in the European Community." (17). Indeed, the population of Moldova which declared its independence on 27th August 1991, is about 64% Romanian, the remainder being Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian. Moldova, initially a member of the CIS, refused to sign the charter of that organisation in January 1993. On the other hand, it asked to join the Council of Europe and would wish to establish permanent relations with WEU and NATO. Furthermore, the parliament has decided to organise early elections on 27th February 1994. The possible reunification of Moldova and Romania, which raises some hope in the two countries separated as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, will necessarily affect Romania's relations with Russia which has its 14th army in the Transdnestr region. This region raises special problems because its population has a large proportion of Russophiles nostalgic for the former Soviet regime which, with the backing of the 14th army, constituted the Moldovan Soviet socialist republic of Transdnestria virtually separate from Moldova. The situation in this respect might change, however, insofar as the leaders of Transdnestria rallied to the Moscow rebels during the events on 3rd and 4th October last. Western Europe and particularly WEU therefore have many reasons to attach great importance to the evolution of this country and its relations with Romania. This matter also affects relations between Romania and Ukraine, which includes part of Northern Bucovina separated from Romania in 1940 after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Recently, Romanian and Ukrainian media and authorities have accused each other of discriminatory practices towards their minorities. Even if the Romanian nation as a whole does not insist on territorial claims, it is concerned about the occupation of Moldova by the Russian 14th army and a fortiori the evolution of Russia and Ukraine, their relations and claims to re-establish order in the CIS, including in Moldova. Faced with such uncertainty, Romania is waiting for guarantees from the West. Moreover, the Romanian army seems to be very ill-equipped for any modern military operation and little is being done to change this situation. Considering WEU's future relations with Romania, it should be recalled that this country is firmly turned towards the West and any impression of being rejected by the West might have unforeseeable consequences for political developments in that country. The application of the blockade on Serbia and Montenegro is very expensive for Romania because it is cutting off an important source of trade for the Romanian economy and is also putting an end to joint Romanian-Yugoslav ventures on Romanian territory resulting in very large financial and economic losses and considerable unemployment in the frontier regions. Romania is appealing to the solidarity of Western European Union to offset these losses and has the impression that its appeal is falling on deaf ears. (vii) Bulgaria In spite of its participation in the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria is trying to keep out of the fighting in the Balkans insofar as possible. It is determined to take no part in any intervention abroad and not to place its territory at the disposal of any such operation. Its bilateral relations with neighbours such as Romania, Ukraine and Greece raise no special problems as now also with Turkey and its minorities living on Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria sees its relations with neighbouring countries as a factor of stabilisation in the region. However, the Bulgarian authorities have frequently affirmed that they considered they had always been closer to Western Europe than to Russia in spite of their historical and cultural links with that country. Bulgaria is interested in joining NATO (and the European institutions), but when its Minister of Defence met his German colleague in Bonn at the end of September, the Bulgarian minister said that his country would make no such request before having completed its evolution towards a stable democracy. Indeed, it seems that a growing polarisation is developing in the domestic political life of the country and many are speaking of early elections for the beginning of next year. In that event, however, it is not impossible that socialists emerging from the former communist party might win these elections. Bulgaria recognised the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 14th January 1992 and was thus one of the first countries to do so; it has a pragmatic approach to that country which it criticises for pursuing something of an anti-Bulgarian policy. However, to avoid the Bosnian conflict extending to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it is strongly insisting on Serbia and particularly Greece recognising that country. It has therefore agreed to a detachment of 300 American soldiers being stationed on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the framework of United Nations preventive action. (viii) Slovenia Slovenia, which at the present juncture no longer feels directly concerned by the conflict in former Yugoslavia, has recently intensified its efforts and initiatives to draw closer to the institutions of Western Europe. Thus, it has started negotiations with the European Community for an association that should result in full accession not earlier than in five years' time. Slovenia is also negotiating with the Visegrad group of countries for the conclusion of a trade agreement. After President Kucan announced at the end of September his country's intention to join WEU and NATO, on 26th October 1993, the Slovenian parliament adopted a resolution according to which it would ask for the status of permanent observer in WEU and that of associated national delegation in the North Atlantic Assembly. Certain politicians in Slovenia consider a resumption of hostilities between Serbs and Croats to be inevitable and consequently wonder, in that event, where the West will fix the peace line within which it will afford its protection. (ix) Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece The relations of Albania, which is also trying to draw closer to NATO and the European Community, with its neighbours are fairly complicated. This is particularly so for its relations with Greece after the recent expulsion of a priest who was believed to be a leader of disturbances among the Greek minority in Albania. Albania is also concerned about the situation in Kosovo where there are about 100 000 Serb soldiers and also about its relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A large Albanian minority is present in both countries. The Albanian point of view is that the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has not yet managed to overcome the prejudices of Macedonians against Albania and Albanians. Even more alarming were the comments that the new Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, who, in presenting his government's programme to parliament on 23rd October 1993, declared that his defence policy would be based on the concept of a united Hellenic space including Cyprus, the Aegian, Greek Macedonia and Epirus (the Greek province on the Albanian frontier). Turkey would always be the enemy number one and Greece would never recognise a state bearing the name of Macedonia or one of its derivatives (18). He also said that military expenditure of 7% of the GDP compared with 3% and less in the other countries of the European Community would be reduced once the balance of forces was ensured in the region. Such a speech from the leader of a country that has signed a protocol of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty cannot be without repercussions on the procedure for ratifying that protocol in the member countries of WEU. The fact that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs recently assured the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that France would have to reconsider the question of recognising that republic is quite significant in this respect. (x) Developments in the CIS Without prejudging the outcome of the power struggle in Russia, it is clear that no European or Atlantic concept for a European security architecture can be validly worked out without defining the place of Russia and, a fortiori, the CIS in this architecture. Several factors should be taken into consideration. It is still difficult to assess the consequences of President Yeltsin's final victory over his conservative (and nationalist) opponents with the decisive assistance of his army which was very hesitant about intervening in this constitutional conflict. The position of the army will certainly be strengthened because of its decisive role in halting the putsch on 3rd and 4th October last as certain information gives us to believe. The organisation of legislative elections to be held on 12th December 1993 is proving difficult since the democratic parties have very little time to conduct an electoral campaign that might reach the population. Discussion of constitutional questions also proved to be extremely complicated. President Yeltsin's recent announcement of his intention to remain at his post until the end of his term of office after having promised to hold presidential elections next year merely increases doubts about the coherence of his policy. The ban on certain opposition newspapers decreed by the government and the Russian President's severe criticism of his government regarding its inability to put down the rebellion on 3rd and 4th October and to take effective economic decisions are also signs that the situation inside the country is far from being consolidated. Regarding developments within the CIS as a whole, there are signs that Russia is taking more and more initiatives to resume control of the composite parts of the former Soviet Union and to bring order to regions it considers to be close neighbours abroad. The presentation of what might be called a Russian Monroe doctrine in the United Nations, Azerbaijan and Georgia joining the CIS, dominated by Russia, and Russia's request to amend some of the provisions of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe to allow it to deploy additional forces in the Caucasus are examples. The announcement of a new Russian military doctrine should be examined carefully in this changed context. This latter development will inevitably have repercussions on Russia's relations with Turkey, particularly in regard to the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Caucasus region in general. It is not therefore surprising that Turkey is opposed to any revision of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe. Furthermore, it is important to note that on 7th September 1993, six CIS states - Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia - signed an agreement on the principle of creating a rouble zone of a new type. The significance of a single currency for the future political relations of the participating countries still has to be assessed, but it may be important. It should also be noted that on 24th September 1939, nine CIS members - Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, together with Moldova - signed a framework agreement intended to lead to an economic union. Ukraine and Turkmenistan have asked for associate status. Belarus, whose capital, Minsk, is the seat of the CIS and whose government, in the hands of former communists, has practically no credible opposition, has so far taken no noteworthy initiatives to give itself an identity of its own in face of its Russian neighbour. Relations between the two countries are therefore free of major problems and at its national level, Belarus has not hesitated to ratify the Start I Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, it has shown no intention of wishing to accede to the status of nuclear power and had no objection to the nuclear missiles stationed on its territory being placed under Russian control before being transferred to that country. Conversely, relations are far more difficult between Russia and Ukraine whose evolution is still arousing serious concern. There is considerable uncertainty regarding the future evolution of Ukraine. The ambiguities of its foreign and security policy (policy of neutrality, on the one hand, and the proposal for a safety belt from the Baltic through to the Black Sea on the other), its differences with Russia over the problem of its nuclear weapons and the Black Sea fleet, its economic problems and the difficulties with its domestic policy call for closer study which your rapporteur wished to make on the basis of a visit to Kiev which has not yet proved possible. The proposal to invite the Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs to speak at the next ordinary session of the Assembly is therefore of particular interest. After the resignation of the Ukrainian Prime Minister at the end of September 1993, President Kravchuk attempted to put an end to the rivalry between parliament and the executive; parliament has to prepare legislative and presidential elections for next year. The economic situation in the country is still deteriorating. The most disturbing factor is the ambiguity of Ukraine's policy in regard to nuclear weapons. Ukraine has still not ratified the Start I Treaty nor has it subscribed to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Even after the recent meetings between the United States and Ukrainian foreign ministers, information is confusing. There have been reports that a bilateral agreement on dismantling Ukrainian nuclear missiles would be concluded in exchange for American financial assistance (19). Other reports say that Mr. Christopher obtained no clear assurance from Ukraine regarding its future accession to the abovementioned treaties. Ukraine at present has 1 600 nuclear warheads and 174 intercontinental missiles, including 130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24s (20). Statements in parliament and that of the Ukrainian President on the need to retain SS-24 missiles for the time being and Ukraine's insistance on obtaining security guarantees before disarming its nuclear means illustrate the difficulty of the situation. All these uncertainties betray Ukraine's fear of not being able to maintain its independence vis-a-vis a Russia that has not yet clearly revealed whether or not it will accept the emergence of new states resulting from the breaking up of the Soviet Union and, consequently, accept the new frontiers that will ensue. IV. Consequences to be drawn for WEU's future policy ===================================================== Many questions are raised for WEU: first, what will be the consequences of discussions on the possible enlargement of NATO towards the East in the framework of preparing the forthcoming NATO summit meeting and the reaction of Russian leaders to these discussions for the future evolution of WEU's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and particularly with those taking part in the Forum of Consultation? WEU's policy towards these countries is not affected directly by these discussions but there is an indirect effect insofar as WEU intends to be the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU must not overlook the fact, however, that the modified Brussels Treaty accords it specific responsibilities allowing it to draw conclusions in an independent manner and take decisions corresponding to its vocation. In this respect, mention should be made of the message our former President, Mr. Soell, addressed to all the countries concerned during his visit to Romania in the spring of this year, a message which is still very topical: "What enabled Western Europe to develop an efficient security system is the homogeneity of its states and peoples. None would have undertaken to help its neighbours in the event of an attack from outside without being certain that its neighbours would not use the additional power afforded them by the alliance for the pursuit of specific aims. The texts of treaties are not enough to give this assurance which is based above all on the continuity of a policy backed by democratic practices in each nation. Countries wishing to benefit from the guarantees offered by NATO and WEU must provide proof of internal stability, the deep-rooted backing of the majority of the population for democratic practices, the continuity of foreign policy that takes precedence over national ambitions, however legitimate they may be, and the requirements of maintaining and consolidating peace in Europe." Through peaceful settlement, solutions have to be found to the problems of relations between neighbouring countries with particular regard to minorities and frontiers. Implementation of the Balladur plan for a European stability pact based on a series of bilateral agreements between the countries concerned might prove to be useful in this respect. Such an approach under the aegis of the Twelve (and not in the framework of the Council of Europe or of the CSCE) would have the advantage of revealing to the countries concerned the ultimate aim of the undertaking: to prepare their association with the institutions of Western Europe. WEU would not be following a good policy if it had privileged relations with one or other of the countries of the WEU forum. Consequences must be drawn, however, from the existence of special operational co-operation with three countries of the forum, i.e. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in the framework of the embargo on the Danube. These three countries are co-operating loyally with WEU and NATO without being compensated by any kind of protection or guarantee against possible reprisals from the countries against which the United Nations has imposed sanctions. It is not possible to disregard such a shortcoming for ever and WEU should take firm steps to give these three countries security assurances corresponding to the risks they are having to face. In addition, greater use should be made of the contacts that can be established in the framework of the Forum of Consultation for giving participants the opportunity to explain their perception of the threat in order to work out a joint approach and solution. It is possible, for instance, that the Baltic countries, the Czech republic and also other countries concerned, particularly Ukraine, will not assess the threat in the same manner. Another factor of crucial importance is that the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1st November 1993 which means that WEU has become an integral part of the European Union. It is therefore necessary to ensure that there is parallelism between the approach of the European Union and that of WEU in regard to the development of their external relations. So far, the European Community has concentrated its political dialogue and negotiations of association on six countries of Central Europe, i.e. the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and Romania. No association agreements or formal negotiations with the European Community yet exist for the Baltic countries. Conversely, considerable progress has already been made on negotiations on the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland (and Norway) to the Community. This evolution cannot be without consequences for the corresponding activities of WEU which should give serious thought to redefining its relations with the the latter three countries. Furthermore, it should study carefully what its future relations with Slovenia should be and recommend that all member states recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In practice, the activities of the Forum of Consultation should be increased considerably. To this end, the subsidiary organs of WEU should be associated more closely with its work, including the Institute for Security Studies which has already played a useful role; the Council should also study whether and to what extent it would be possible for countries of the forum to take part in some of the work of other subsidiary organs. Regarding WEU's relations with the CIS countries and particularly with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, it is mainly a question of increasing confidence on the basis of practical co- operation, a good example of which is the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. The political dialogue with these countries, however, should be the principal means of increasing understanding, confidence, stability and co-operation. V. Conclusions =============== The more the partners of WEU and of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe develop their co-operation in specific areas, the more the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will succeed in the peaceful settlement of problems and disputes with their neighbours; the more Russia and the other members of the Community of Independent States are associated with a broader process of dialogue and co-operation, the less will feelings of isolation and threat prevail and the less will security guarantees be foremost in the minds of all concerned. It is thus for all European and Atlantic bodies to strengthen co-operation with their partners in the East with a view to promoting the feeling of confidence and solidarity that will enable them jointly to face up to future challenges, which may be of a quite different kind. ------------------------ APPENDIX Summary of the electoral position of Central European countries in the WEU Forum of Consultation BULGARIA Form of Government: Parliamentary republic. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a term of five years. Head of State: Jelio Jelev, elected 1st August 1990 and re- elected in the first direct election of a Bulgarian Head of State on 19th January 1992. Head of Government: Lyuben Berov, who replaced Filip Dimitrov on 30th December 1992. Last elections: October 1991: Union of Democratic Forces: 110 seats; Bulgarian Socialist Party (former communists): 106 seats. The MRF ethnic Turkish minority party holds the balance of power. The crisis in the country was resolved in December 1992 with the appointment of Lyuben Berov as head of a "government of experts". The parliamentary setbacks experienced by the former Prime Minister, Filip Dimitrov, had a variety of causes, but were the result of profound disagreement between a head of state who was determined to rule by consensus politics, on account of the very considerable influence still wielded by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and a head of government opposed to any form of compromise. ESTONIA Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy. Head of State: Lennart Meri, elected on 5th October 1992, replacing Arnold Ruutel, President of the Supreme Council of Estonia. Head of Government Mart Laar, who succeeded Triit Vahi on 21st October 1992. On 23rd January 1992 the severe economic crisis in Estonia forced the Prime Minister, Edgar Savisaar, to resign. He was replaced by an administrator, Triit Vahi, who launched an unadventurous reform programme. On 28th June 1992 over 90% of the Estonian electorate voted in favour of the new Constitution, drawn up not without difficulty by an assembly, 50% of whose membership was drawn from the Soviet-style supreme council and members of the Citizen's Congress - an assembly elected solely by those who traced their Estonian citizenship back to the prewar period, or their direct descendants. On 20th September 1992 parliamentary elections were held that resulted in victory for Isamaa (the centre-right nationalist grouping). On 5th October 1992 parliament elected Lennart Meri as President. HUNGARY Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy since 1990. The Head of state appoints the Prime Minister who has the responsibility of forming the government. Head of State: Arpad Goencz, elected President of the Republic by Parliament on 3rd August 1990. Head of Government: Jozsef Antall, from 3rd May 1990. Last elections: 25th March and 8th April 1990. Result: Coalition led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) (centre-Right). The emergence of a new ultra-nationalist trend has led to the risk of a radicalisation of politics. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) is the main party in the ruling coalition. The Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESz) is the only party to escape the fall in popularity of all parties, while the former communist party has made a notable come-back on the political scene. As the 1994 parliamentary elections draw closer, political struggles have intensified; in December 1992, members of parliament failed to pass a long-awaited law on the media which would have allowed privatisation of the radio and television networks. June 1993: split-up of the MFD to exclude its extreme right- wing elements and the leadership of the liberal wing. LATVIA Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy Head of State: Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic, who replaced Anatolijs Gorbunovs (Former President of the Supreme Council) on 4th July 1993. Head of Government: Valdis Birikavs, who replaced Ivars Godmanis on 7th July 1993. Last elections: 5th and 6th June 1993, resulting in a victory for Latvian Way which obtained a third of the votes, and leading to the formation of a centre-right coalition. LITHUANIA Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy. Head of State and President of Parliament: Algirdas Brazauskas, President of the Republic, who replaced Bronisolvas Lubys on 10th March 1993. Last elections: 25th October 1992 resulting in the DLP (former communist party) winning 72 of Parliament's 141 seats. POLAND Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy. Head of State: Lech Walesa, elected on 9th December 1990. Last elections: 19th September 1993. Representation in the Sjem (percentage of votes) 1. Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 20.4% 2. Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) 15.4% 3. Democratic Union (UD) 10.6% 4. Labour Union 7.3% 5. Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 5.8% 6. Non-partisan bloc in support of 5.4% reform (BBWR) The new government under Waldemar Pawlack (PSL) is based on a coalition between the SLD (former communists) , the PSL (Polish Peasant Alliance) and the UP (Labour Union). The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Oleszewski, belongs to the non- partisan bloc in support of reform (BBWR). The new Defence Minister, Mr Kolodziejczyk has no political affiliation. ROMANIA Form of government: Parliamentary but with strong presidential powers. Head of State: Ion Iliescu was elected on 20th May 1990 for a two-year term of office. Head of Government: Nicolae Vacaroiu, since 4th November 1992. The parliamentary and presidential elections held on 27th September and 4th October 1992 led to the re-election of Ion Iliescu as Head of State, to the great disappointment of the democratic opposition. The democratic candidate, Emil Constantinescu, although unknown to the majority of the electorate, managed to attract 34% of the votes in the second round. These elections brought about a degree of fragmentation of the political scene since a parliamentary majority could not be formed, particularly after the split in the National Salvation Front in July 1992 as a result of differences between supporters of Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, the former Prime Minister. SLOVAKIA Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy Head of State: Michal Kovac, elected on 15th February 1993 Prime Minister: Vladimir Meciar (HZDS). A split occurred in the party currently in power, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) which had lost a great deal of its popularity, resulting in the departure of its second-in-command, Milan Knazko, and his supporters. Thus it became the minority party in the Slovak National Council and had to make new alliances. At the beginning of November 1993, the HZDS and the Slovak National Party (SNS) formed a coalition. The next legislative elections are to be held in 1996. THE CZECH REPUBLIC Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy Head of State: Vaclav Havel, elected 26th January 1993 Prime Minister: Vaclav Klaus After much hesitation Vaclav Havel agreed to stand as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, supported by the right-wing goverment in power which regarded him as the "least of all possible evils"; he was elected by a very slim majority. The next legislative elections are to be held in 1996. ----------------------- 1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg (Alternate: Marshall), Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Agnelli, Alegre (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kittelmann, de Lipkowski (Alternate: Baumel), Polli, Mueller, Pecriaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soell, Vincon, Ward (lternate: Godman), Wintgens, Zapatero. 3. Document 1322, 29th June 1992 4. See Document A/WEU/DG [93] 14, 24th May 1993 5. See especially Documents 1263, 27th March 1991, 1309, 13th May 1992 and 1370, 24th May 1993 6. Document 1342, 6th November 1992, paragraph 76 7. See Document 1322, 29th June 1992 8. See in this connection the report presented by Mr. Ward on the enlargement of WEU, Document 1340, 6th November 1992. 9. See Declaration on the implementation of sanctions imposed on former Yugoslavia by the United Nations, Document A/WEU/DG (93) 9, 5th April 1993. 10. Agence France Presse, 8th September 1993. 11. NZZ, 7th September 1993. 12. International Herald Tribune, 8th September 1993, "NATO opens up routes to the East European Democracies". Mr. Klaus Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, in a radio interview on 5th September 1993. 13. Jan J. Brezinski, Survival, Volume 35, No. 3, autumn 1993, page 31. 14. Le Monde and Le Figaro, 8th October 1993. 15. Echos de Russie et de l'Est, No 14, June-July 1993. 16. The Military Balance 1993/94, page 79. 17. Thirty-eighth ordinary session, official report of debates, December 1992. 18. Le Monde, 26th October 1993. 19. Le Monde, 27th October 1993. 20. Le Figaro, 27th October 1993. A French version of this report may be obtained upon request.