| Internet-Draft | Security for IPv6 over OWC | October 2025 |
| Choi & Choi | Expires 23 April 2026 | [Page] |
IEEE 802.15.7, "Short-Range Optical Wireless Communications" defines wireless communication using visible light. It defines how data is transmitted, modulated, and organized in order to enable reliable and efficient communication in various environments. The standard is designed to work alongside other wireless communication systems and supports both line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) communications. This document describes security considerations for short-range optical wireless communications (OWC) using IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) techniques.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.¶
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to a significant increase in the number of wireless communication technologies utilized for real-time data collection and monitoring in various industrial domains, such as manufacturing, agriculture, healthcare, transportation, and so on. This trend highlights the importance of wireless communication in facilitating real-time data exchange and analysis, ultimately contributing to enhanced operational efficiency and decision-making processes across different industrial sectors.¶
Optical Wireless Communications (OWC) stands as one of the potential candidates for IoT wireless communication technologies, extensively applied across various industrial domains. The IEEE802.15.7 standard outlines the procedures for establishing bidirectional communications between two OWC devices. Furthermore, IEEE 802.15.7 delineates a comprehensive OWC standard, encompassing features like Visible Light Communication (VLC), Short-Range Communication, Line-of-Sight (LOS) and Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Support, High and Low Data Rates, Energy Efficiency, and Secure Communication.¶
This document describes security considerations for IPv6 over Optical Wireless Communications.¶
Optical Wireless Communication (OWC) systems have unique security considerations arising from their directional and line-of-sight (LOS) or non-line-of-sight (NLOS) operation and from the physical characteristics of optical media. These characteristics may lead to signal leakage, environmental interference, fragmentation-related vulnerabilities due to small-MTU PHYs, and limited support for multicast transmission.¶
This section summarizes the main security considerations for IPv6 transmission over OWC, particularly in 6LoWPAN-based deployments using IEEE 802.15.7.¶
OWC communications may be susceptible to interception when the line-of-sight (LOS) or non-line-of-sight (NLOS) optical path is unobstructed or partially reflective. Signal leakage through transparent or reflective surfaces can expose transmitted data to unauthorized observation.¶
Mitigation techniques include the use of directional transmission, end-to-end encryption, and optimized transmission power to reduce unintended optical exposure. Beam steering, adaptive modulation, and narrow beam divergence can further enhance confidentiality by limiting signal spread beyond the intended receiver's field of view.¶
OWC networks may experience service disruption caused by high-intensity optical interference, physical obstruction, or excessive background illumination. Such conditions can reduce link availability or, in severe cases, lead to a denial of service.¶
To maintain network availability, OWC devices should detect abnormal interference, adjust modulation parameters, or reroute traffic through alternate multi-hop paths when optical links are impaired.¶
Unauthorized participation or message manipulation within an OWC network can compromise network trust and stability. Mutual authentication using IPv6-based Datagram Transport Layer Security [RFC9147] and device identity verification based on IEEE 802.15.7 link-layer addresses should be implemented to ensure that only legitimate devices can join and exchange IPv6 traffic.¶
Address registration and Neighbor Discovery procedures must be protected against spoofing, replay, and unauthorized modification. Proof of address ownership and link-layer binding are recommended in multi-hop topologies to prevent address hijacking or impersonation.¶
OWC devices often operate under strict energy constraints, so security mechanisms must minimize computational and transmission overhead while maintaining the required protection level.¶
Lightweight cryptographic protocols, such as authenticated encryption schemes and reduced-overhead DTLS 1.3 handshakes [RFC9147], are recommended for low-power microcontrollers to reduce processing cost without compromising data confidentiality or integrity.¶
When designing for constrained nodes, the general principles for limited-resource environments should be applied so that protocol complexity does not exceed available power or processing capacity. Adaptive adjustment of security parameters, including encryption strength or key lifetime, can help maintain an effective balance between energy efficiency and security robustness throughout network operation.¶
In multi-hop OWC networks, the integrity and authenticity of routing information must be preserved to ensure reliable data forwarding. Attacks on intermediate nodes or routing control messages can cause packet loss, route manipulation, or network partitioning. Routing protocols should authenticate participating nodes and validate routing updates to prevent the injection of false routes or unauthorized relays.¶
OWC devices are expected to apply lightweight security mechanisms that verify routing information while minimizing processing and energy overhead.¶
Although OWC operates primarily in the optical domain, practical deployments often coexist with RF-based wireless systems in the same environment.¶
In such mixed conditions, high-intensity optical signals or strong RF emissions may interfere with OWC transceivers, causing service disruption or degraded performance. OWC systems need mechanisms to detect and respond to abnormal interference levels-such as adaptive modulation control, alternative routing, or temporary link isolation-to maintain network availability.¶
When interference is detected, recovery procedures should restore normal operation without compromising ongoing secure sessions or data integrity.¶
None.¶
We are grateful to the members of the IETF 6lo Working Group.¶