=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION - POLITICAL COMMITTEE - DRAFT INTERIM R. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= FROM STOCKHOLM TO BUDAPEST: CSCE AND THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE WORKING GROUP ON THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER Draft Interim Report Mr. Loic BOUVARD (France) Mr. Bruce GEORGE (United Kingdom) Co-Rapporteurs* International Secretariat October 1993 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Co-Rapporteurs. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 2 II. FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION 4 A. Arms Control, Disarmament, and Confidence- and Security-Building 4 B. Security Enhancement and Co-operation 7 C. Conflict Prevention 9 III. SEARCHING FOR PERSONNALITE 11 NOTES 14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The role of the CSCE is proving a complex issue for policymakers, parliamentarians, and historians alike: how can an organization of 53 diverse North American, European, and Eurasian states, with no mandate to attempt to prevent or settle crises other than by peaceful means, and which must operate by consensus, take on a "central role in fostering and managing change" whether on its own collective initiative or as a regional "arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter? This is the central question the Working Group on the New European Security Order has been exploring since its creation in 1990. The present Draft Interim Report focuses on three dimensions: (1) peaceful settlement of disputes; (2) the Forum for Security Co-operation; and (3) future CSCE directions following the December 1992 Stockholm CSCE ministerial meeting. The results of the October 1992 Geneva Experts' Meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes provided a mandatory third-party conciliation and optional arbitration regime, which also placed CSCE on a partial legal footing for the first time. However, only states can avail themselves of these techniques, which are, of course, available elsewhere, such as with the International Court of Justice. Possible future steps could move in the direction of mandatory arbitration if conciliation fails. The Forum for Security Co-operation is examining new directions in arms control, security enhancement, and risk reduction. The latter two categories are also dealt with by the Committee of Senior Officials and its Vienna Group. The overriding challenge is to avoid the principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and the rights of people belonging to national minorities from coming into violent confrontation. The Forum is undertaking pioneering work in this urgent area and further eroding the principle of non- interference in internal affairs. It remains to be witnessed what new measures nations may agree, and whether enforcement measures can be implemented. The appointment of a CSCE Secretary General is intended to assist in the oversight of the growing roster of CSCE preventive diplomacy missions. The High Commissioner on National Minorities is intended as a tool of early warning. The CSCE has also prepared for its first peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, with operational planning conducted in the Conflict Prevention Centre. The Co-Rapporteurs query, however, whether these missions may not command full credibility because CSCE deliberately lacks enforcement powers except under the direction of the United Nations Security Council. They also raise the issue of whether a military counterpart to the Committee of Senior Officials may be required to support CSCE operations, and whether CSCE should have its own Security Council deciding enforcement issues by majority voting. INTRODUCTION "The CSCE has always been instrumental in promoting changes; now it must adapt to the task of managing them....In approaching these tasks, we emphasize the central role of the CSCE in fostering and managing change in our region. In this era of transition, the CSCE is crucial to our efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems and to prevent, manage and settle conflicts peacefully by appropriate means." Helsinki Summit Declaration July 1992 1. The role of the CSCE is indeed proving a complex issue for policymakers, parliamentarians, and historians alike: how can an organization of 53 diverse North American and European states, with no mandate to attempt to prevent or settle crises other than by peaceful means, and which must operate by consensus, take on a "central role in fostering and managing change" whether on its own collective initiative or as a regional "arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter? This is the central question the Working Group on the New European Security Order has pursued since its creation at the 1990 Annual Session in London. 2. The present Draft Interim Report examines three dimensions of the CSCE process that emerged since the Helsinki Summit: (1) the October 1992 Geneva experts' meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes which, after 17 years of CSCE efforts, produced a mandatory third-party conciliation regime and also placed CSCE on a partial legal footing; (2) the Forum for Security Co-operation in Vienna launched in September 1992; and (3) future CSCE directions following the December 1992 Stockholm CSCE ministerial meeting. 3. The Report has been very helpfully informed by the second Assembly-sponsored Special Interparliamentary Conference on European Security and the CSCE held in February 1993, the June 1993 visit of the Sub-Committee on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to the CSCE Secretariat in Prague, and by the second session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Helsinki in July 1993. We also highlight the contributions of our Associate Co-Rapporteurs, Mr. Yevgeni Kozhokin of Russia and Mr. Longin Pastusiak of Poland, who provide further insights into the puzzle of the new European security order with their respective Special Reports. I. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES "The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice....For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties." Principle V CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1975) 4. For many years, the CSCE principle of peaceful settlement of disputes (PSD), which also features as Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, remained just that. The Soviet Union adamantly refused third-party involvement, although it was unclear whether some Western nations were themselves any more willing to accept such assistance.1 Regardless, during the 1986-89 Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting the Soviet Union began to revise its position. As a result, in January-February 1991 an experts meeting in Valletta agreed on a "mechanism" whereby any state could request third-party assistance, irrespective of the nature of the dispute. 5. However, the Valletta mechanism was probably fatally flawed in that the nature of this assistance was limited to mere "comment or advice". Moreover, any state could refuse third-party assistance if that state itself judged that the dispute affected: territorial sovereignty; national defence; title to land; or jurisdiction over maritime and airspace. Since a reasonable presumption could be made that third-party "comment or advice" would be most helpful precisely on the very same issues excluded under the Valletta mechanism, it is not surprising that the mechanism has never been used. 6. Within less than two years, however, some rather important steps were achieved. The 12-23 October 1992 Geneva PSD experts' meeting, mandated by the July 1992 elsinki Summit, produced three new procedures: (1) a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, established through a Convention - the first CSCE entree into international law; (2) a Conciliation Commission; and (3) "directed conciliation", whereby the Council or Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) may direct any two participating states to seek conciliation through the Conciliation Commission - the so-called "consensus-minus-two" principle, yet another CSCE acquis. 7. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, proposed by France and Germany, envisages, as the name denotes, two procedures. The first, conciliation, enables any state to submit to a conciliation commission "any dispute" with another state party. The only reservation a state may make is, at the time of signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration, "in order to ensure the compatibility of the mechanism of dispute settlement...with other means of dispute settlement resulting from international undertakings applicable to that State". A direct participant explained this exception as allowing "some room for mischief, but not too much. The undertakings which may form the object of a reservation must refer to more than mere negotiations, such as a bilaterally agreed-upon conciliation procedure". The phrase was intended to improve upon the Valletta mechanism, whereby third-party assistance can be refused by mere undertakings to negotiate or by just a possibility to do so. 8. Of course, conciliation results simply in a final report containing proposals for how the parties might settle their dispute. Therefore, the parties to the convention may also, albeit by mutual agreement, bring their dispute to binding arbitration. However, the parties may make a reservation which "may cover all disputes or exclude disputes concerning a State's territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to jurisdiction over other areas". It is difficult, then, to understand why the arbitration court is necessary in light of other existing means, such as the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, although the idea was that CSCE might act more rapidly than other means: "This will work more quickly than the International Court in The Hague", according to Swedish Foreign Minister and CSCE Chairman-in-Office Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas on 15 November 1992.2 9. At the Stockholm Council Meeting 29 states - far more than the 15 or so that were expected to do so - signed the Convention, including Russia, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Ukraine. The United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, and the Netherlands did not sign on account of, inter alia, the general applicability nature of the conciliation procedure.3 As of this writing (15 July 1993) 34 states have signed, but less than the required 12 have ratified. 10. Outside the legally-binding convention, states may also resort to a Conciliation Commission. Unlike the Valletta mechanism, the dispute may be brought only by agreement of the parties. Nevertheless, conciliation goes beyond "comment or advice" and the parties may agree to accept the recommendations as binding. The Conciliation Commission is also the venue for "directed conciliation" by the Council or CSO, but this procedure retains the Valletta exceptions. 11. The regime is, of course, imperfect. It is hardly, as the Helsinki Summit instructed, "comprehensive and coherent". Moreover, only states can avail themselves of these techniques, not minority groups or other non-state actors. Nevertheless, the regime provides additional tools to assist CSCE in conflict prevention, the change in national positions since the Valletta meeting must be considered encouraging, and the Convention is the first direction for CSCE toward a legally-binding basis. Moreover, according to Ambassador Lucius Caflisch, Chairman of the Geneva PSD Meeting, at the NAA CSCE interparliamentary conference, "we are not at the end of what the evolution of PSD should be", and he held up the model of the Swiss-Polish Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration which provides that all disputes arising after its entry into force are subject to conciliation, and if conciliation proves unsuccessful the dispute goes to arbitration,"point fini": "Thus, while the new Convention makes notable progress in the field of conciliation, it scarcely advances the cause of arbitration. As a result, [CSCE] States wishing to resort to a mandatory arbitration procedure will have to continue to conclude bilateral treaties on this point." II. FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION 12. A fresh opportunity to rationalize post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe began in Vienna on 22 September 1992. The then-51 CSCE participating states (minus Serbia-Montenegro) launched the "Forum for Security Co-operation" (FSC). Hosting a task unprecedented in scope, its work is grouped around three broad fields: (1) arms control; (2) security enhancement and co-operation; and (3) conflict prevention. 13. The overall aim is equally ambitious: "to contribute to the strengthening of security and stability and the establishment of a just and lasting peace within the CSCE community of States." The agenda covers no less than fourteen points. A. ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING 14. The first point concerns the "harmonization" of obligations between the CFE and CSBM agreements, in particular concerning the exchange of information, verification and force levels. The results would be reflected in either a single, binding document or set of declarations. One area of difficulty has concerned whether the CFE provision for notification of reserve call-ups will be accepted by the traditionally neutral countries, concerned about setting any precedents for constraining their mobilization system. 15. Special regional arrangements might also be undertaken. For example, on 22 September 1992 Hungary proposed that CFE-type limits be applied to the former Yugoslavia - which the NAA endorsed in Resolution 238 (1992). However, with Serbia and Montenegro having been temporarily suspended from CSCE, even the arms control dimensions of a UN peace plan were discussed in the UN/EC, and not CSCE, framework. It may be that the Ukrainian-Russian difficulties in dividing the Black Sea Fleet and theissue of control over its former Soviet bases could also lend itself to CSCE mediation. 16. The second point concerns the development of the Vienna Document 1992 on CSBMs, with a view to a "Budapest Document 1994" by the time of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting beginning in October that year. General consensus exists that a new generation of CSBMs is required for crisis management. These new measures may not necessarily be agreed by all participating states, but rather take the form of a "catalogue" of measures that may be imposed, such as the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, a pioneering contribution by the Visegrad countries plus Ukraine on 31 March 1993 called for "possibilities for concerted action in cases of non-compliance", and for application of the consensus-minus-one principle to cases of clear, gross, and uncorrected violations "of CSCE commitments concerning military aspects of security". Because these commitments are not limited only to "military-technical" CSBMs but existing and future CSCE principles of inter- and intra-state behaviour, this opened up a wide vista indeed - provided, of course, that consensus-minus-one in future could apply to sanctions beyond mere political declarations. 17. The third point is "new stabilizing measures and confidence-building measures related to conventional armed forces, including...measures to address force generation capabilities of active and non-active forces" and those of a "constraining kind". The work on this point and that on CSBMs, above, is largely the same. Recall that NAA Resolution 238 called upon the CSCE governments: "...to pursue energetically the tasks outlined in the Helsinki Document for the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation...including with a view to adopting a new generation of CSBMs applied to crisis situations aimed at stabilizing and reversing possible escalation - such as a ban on out-of-garrison activity applied to all parties concerned and drawing from the innovative measures decided at the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia." 18. On 21 April 1993 NATO tabled a proposal, also sent to Geneva in November 1992 for the information of the UN/EC Conference, intended "for temporary application...to reduce tension and to prevent the outbreak of fighting in crisis situations at regional level", co-ordinated with peacekeeping operations and monitor/fact-finding missions, and possibly involving the mediating function and authority of a third-party. The application of these measures would be based on the decision of the CSCE Council or CSO. It is unclear whether states or "parties" as well would negotiate their application and who would decide that issue, points left deliberately vague because of traditional concerns about interference in internal affairs. Nevertheless, the measures included: - prior notification of military activities within clearly defined areas of application of lower ceilings, increased frequency, and different timescale compared to the Vienna Document 1992; - notification of supply and plans for supply by all CSCE participating states of major weapon and equipment systems to parties involved in crisis situations; - measures of constraint, such as demilitarized and no-fly zones, disbandment of irregular forces, and limits or bans on military activities altogether; - co-operative measures, such as exchange of liaison teams, direct communication links between the parties, and "Joint Crisis Management Teams" to clarify and settle ambiguous and controversial situations; and - monitoring of compliance and evaluation, such as monitoring of heavy weapons and inspections. 19. Already, measures of this kind were agreed by the CSCE "Minsk process on Nagorno-Karabakh" on 3-4 June 1993 and were sent to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the "parties involved in the conflict in that region" for agreement. During a 60-day "interruption of military activities" following a ceasefire and the beginning of withdrawal from the Kelbajar district, a ban would be applied upon the use of any type of weapon for military purposes and all military manoeuvres, operations, and movements (except those relating to withdrawal or reintroduction of lightly armed security personnel into the Kelbajar district). This "complete ceasefire" would be monitored by a 60-man CSCE verification mission, followed by the deployment of 600 unarmed military monitors. 20. Curiously, however, this mission, delayed following the June 1993 coup against President Elchibey of Azerbaijan, is being undertaken "for the practical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 822". Might this suggest that the international credibility of CSCE, despite its "central role", has yet to be established? 21. Fourth, the parties will exchange military information regarding CFE categories of equipment and of personnel, as well as equipment acquisition, on a global basis, not just within the CSCE zone. 22. Fifth, the parties will co-operate with respect to non-proliferation. Security Forum, therefore, could serve as another means to resolve the strategic nuclear issue in Ukraine and adopt principles regarding conventional arms transfers. On 18 November 1992, Iceland, on behalf of the NATO nations and joined by Bulgaria, the (then) Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Romania, and Sweden, tabled a proposal on "non-proliferation and arms transfers". It called upon all CSCE states to: - become parties to the NPT treaty and agree to its indefinite extension; - abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime; - ratify the Chemical Weapons and Biological and Toxic Weapons Conventions; - commit to full operationalization of the UN Register of conventional arms (which appears to be encountering serious difficulties) with the right of other states to request clarification of information provided; - exchange information about national policies on arms exports and national arms export control legislation; - seek agreement on common principles for arms transfers, promote due restraint in exports and imports, and study measures to reinforce the effectiveness of CSCE decisions with respect to arms embargoes (for example, one idea might be to apply consensus-minus-one to a state violating or refusing to apply an embargo). Moreover, an EC proposal of 28 April 1993 calls upon states to act in accordance with considerations such as the existence of tensions or internal armed conflicts in considering proposed transfers and whether arms would be used other than for legitimate defence and security requirements (hardly clear cut guidelines to difficult choices such as the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina). It would also require exchange of information about national practices to control transfers. 23. Sixth, provision is made for regional measures. Although this has thus far excluded the former Yugoslavia, and whereas countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey have already negotiated bilateral CSBM agreements, an early test might be the Baltic region. B. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION 24. There are six items under "track B": force planning (transparency regarding INTER ALIA defence policy, doctrines, budgets, and forces); co-operation in defence conversion; co-operation in non-proliferation (regarding issues not ripe for negotiation under track A); military co-operation and contacts, particularly concerning training and organization of armed forces; regional security issues; and security enhancement consultations. 25. Regarding military co-operation and contacts, recall that the US Head of Delegation Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, addressing the Political Committee in Brugge on 16 November 1992, noted that "Our major task is no longer going from agreement to agreement but to expose the military and defence organizations of all the new CSCE participating states to democratic societies". However, Ambassador Hansen has also noted that the US European Command supervised over 300 contacts in 1992 in several states in Central and Eastern Europe, including the sending of small military liaison teams working in host countries for periods up to one year. There is also the active NACC programme regarding military contacts under the Military Committee, the Group on Defence Matters under the Defence Planning Committee, and co-operative verification activity for those 30 NACC countries who are party to the CFE treaty. Hence, although one might question why this agenda item requires further elaboration, new provisions could also help serve to provide an agreed point of reference for these activities and encourage CSCE states that have not been as active to do so. 26. Much attention within this track concerns "security enhancement consultations", primarily the "Code of Conduct". Apparently based on a German initiative to strike a compromise between the French desire for a pan-European security treaty and those countries who preferred to refer to this idea by its acronym, PEST, the Code is intended to set out in a single document relevant principles governing relations in the field of security. 27. Whether it can be seen as the precursor to what the 1967 NATO Harmel Report envisaged as "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees" remains to be seen. Nevertheless, once again CSCE is exploring new ground in the link between security and intra- as well as inter-state affairs. A UK/EC/Canada/Iceland/Norway proposal of 16 December 1992 refers to local autonomy for minorities, whereas a Polish proposal of 18 November 1992 includes a provision for "possibilities for concerted action in defence of" democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. As importantly, on 5 May 1993 Austria, Hungary, and Poland proposed that relevant CSCE bodies be able to "recommend a course of action to remedy a situation resulting from a violation of the code of conduct", including by consensus-minus-one. 28. The Code could directly assist the realization of the "European Stability Pact" proposed by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur at the 20-21 June EC Summit in Copenhagen. The pact would consist of several agreements - "codes of good conduct" - among countries aspiring to join the EC but which at present confront minority and frontier challenges. The Twelve, based on the work of the CSO, would formulate a draft declaration reaffirming the principles regarding borders and minorities, list border and minority problems justifying the creation of negotiating tables, and list EC incentives for implementation of principles agreed by this European Security conference (for details see the Draft Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union by Senator Maurice Blin of France). The European Council is examining the proposal and will consider a report in December 1993 "with a view to convening a preparatory conference [among the Twelve] on the pact."4 C. CONFLICT PREVENTION 29. Whereas tracks A and B are within the remit of a Special Committee, the third dimension, "Conflict Prevention", is considered by the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre. It is charged with developing "relevant techniques", such as a "risk reduction mechanism" Estonia proposed on 19 May 1993 permitting states the right to request at any time additional military information on foreign military forces on its territory (at present this data is exchanged only once a year). 30. At the December 1992 Council Meeting in Stockholm the ministers "tasked the Conflict Prevention Centre to take rapid steps to strengthen its ability to provide operational support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peacekeeping activities". The CSO, on 28 April 1993, then tasked its Vienna Group (which meets more frequently than the CSO, at least weekly, and resulted from US initiative) "with further consideration of the CSCE's current activities and future potential in the field of preventive diplomacy". 31. The CSO also reaffirmed "the importance of further exploring ways by which the CSCE can work closely in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping with the United Nations and with European and transatlantic organizations or institutions such as NATO, WEU and the EC, and, as circumstances warrant, other international institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)". 32. As early and concrete manifestations of these two directives, beginning in April 1993, a representative of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office participated in the work of NATO's Ad Hoc Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping (although a permanent NATO "chair" at CSCE meetings on this issue has still proved, astoundingly, elusive). In addition, Finland, Sweden, and Austria were participating in the NATO Working Group by the end of June 1993. 33. Work earlier that month was also well underway at the CPC on the sending, as earlier mentioned, of a 60-person verification mission to be followed by a 600-person military monitoring mission, albeit unarmed, to Nagorno-Karabakh - in effect the first CSCE foray into peacekeeping. This development flowed from the decision in February 1993 to create an "operational section" to the CPC, but officials cautioned that preventive diplomacy will be CSCE's primary area of concern. Recall that Ambassador Anders Bjurner, CSO Chairman, informed the NAA Second Special Interparliamentary Conference on European Security and the CSCE in February 1993: "In the months since Helsinki the discussion and action within CSCE has been on the lower end of the spectrum, more on diplomacy and less on military missions, more on limited observer efforts than on large-scale efforts. In my view, this is a pattern that will likely persist at least for the near future, both for practical and political reasons. It is not a failure to admit that prospects for a successful role of the CSCE are better if participating states are in a position to intervene at an early stage. It could be argued that if some of the steps now contemplated in the early stages of other conflicts had been taken in the Balkans long ago, we might not have ended up where we are in that conflict." 34. It is, of course, perhaps somewhat of a stretch of the imagination to believe that fact-finding missions would have had the slightest effect on Serbia's reaction to the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. Nevertheless, there are multiple potential flashpoints throughout the CSCE region, not all of which need unravel as events did in former Yugoslavia, and we point to the apparent success of the efforts of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in resolving the Estonian-Russian dispute over the Estonian citizenship law.5 An impending test of CSCE preventive diplomacy may well concern Skopje, where in June 1993 the CSCE Spillover Mission warned "an explosion in Kosovo is inevitable, sooner or later". 35. The second dimension, and the final item on the Programme for Immediate Action, is co-operation in the field of verification through training, exchanges and participation in evaluation and inspection teams, in the implementation of the verification provisions of arms control agreements - which could help save costs and enhance efficiency and transparency. NATO commenced in early 1993 such a co-operative programme for CFE inspections, via the NATO Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, and for inspection training at Oberammergau. 36. At Stockholm ministers urged "greater use of the Forum for Security Co-operation as a place for negotiation and dialogue which can ensure continued progress in reducing the risks of military conflict and enhancing stability in Europe"; and, on 11 June 1993, the NACC foreign ministers urged "early, concrete progress" and specified that they would work towards "agreement on issues such as transfer of conventional arms, information exchange on defence planning, military contacts and cooperation, and stabilizing measures in crisis situations by the time of the CSCE Ministerial Council in Rome next November". They also expressed "hope" for an agreement on the Code of Conduct and on harmonization by the time of the Budapest Meeting in October-December 1994. III. SEARCHING FOR PERSONNALITE 37. The creation of the post of CSCE Secretary General was intended to support the Chairman-in-Office "in all activities aimed at fulfilling the goals of the CSCE", including the management of CSCE structures and operations, preparing CSCE meetings, ensuring implementation of CSCE decisions, overseeing the work of the CPC Secretariat, ODIHR, and the Prague Secretariat. The multiplication of CSCE missions has demonstrated the need to strengthen and improve the structure of the organization, with the agenda of the 22nd Meeting of the CSO in Prague on 29-30 June 1993 having referred to: missions of long duration to Kosovo, Sanjak, and Vojvodina; the spillover monitor mission to Skopje; the activities of the EC/CSCE sanctions co-ordinator; the pending mission to Nagorno- Karabakh; the CSCE mission to Georgia; the CSCE mission to Estonia; the recent visit by the Chairman-in-Office to the newly admitted participating states in Central Asia (and the resultant directive to ODIHR to consider ways and means to assist these states "in their efforts to establish societies based on the rule of law"; and the rapporteur mission to the FYROM. 38. Consequently, on 27 April 1993 the CSO established an open-ended ad hoc group in Vienna to prepare further recommendations on a "wide-ranging review of CSCE structures and operations, including the establishment for the Secretariats in Prague and Vienna of a single organizational structure under the direction of the Secretary General", and to submit those recommendations to the CSO before the Rome Council Meeting. According to CSCE officials and diplomats, it is possible that the Budapest CSCE Summit in 1994 could decide to centralize CSCE activity, apart from ODIHR in Warsaw, in Vienna and to eliminate the Consultative Committee. 39. However, the Secretary General's decision was also designed to provide CSCE with a missing personnalit to help elevate the status of the organization in the eyes of governments and non-state actors. The Director of the CSCE Secretariat, Ambassador Nils Eliasson, stated at the NAA Special Interparliamentary Conference that it seemed likely that the Secretary General would be vested with a "wide margin of maneuver" in assisting the Chairman-in-Office. On 27 April 1993, Ambassador Wilhelm Hoynck of Germany was appointed for a period of three years beginning 15 June 1993. In addition, the fact that CSO representatives began in 1993 to meet weekly in Vienna, as opposed to the monthly CSO meetings in Prague, and that a number of Senior Officials themselves attend the Vienna meetings, means that CSCE has acquired de facto permanent representation. 40. Nevertheless, it remains an open question as to whether CSCE can accomplish its missions of early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management if the ultimate threat of enforcement is deliberately absent. The consensus-minus-one rule is one such tool for elaboration - towards sanctions, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement. Otherwise CSCE may fall short of not only relieving the United Nations of an inadmissible burden but demonstrate that the new Europe cannot look after its own difficulties. We thus note with interest that at the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly second annual session from 6-9 July 1993, the legislators endorsed three important directions for governments to consider: - a decision-making procedure which no longer requires consensus or "consensus-minus-one" (moved by Senator Frank Swaelen of Belgium); - whether a defence counterpart to the CSO, including a subordinate permanent defence planning cell in the CPC, would promote the efficiency of CSCE conflict prevention and peacekeeping (a resolution moved by Mr. George); and - setting up a CSCE security committee, based on an annual rotation system between representatives of member states which would examine all subjects relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement (moved by Senator Swaelen and subsequently amended to avoid any specific instructions as to how many larger or smaller states should be involved). 41. These new directions for CSCE, which we fully endorse, will have to be developed in close co-operation, of course, with organizations that have the means to conduct co-ordinated operations, primarily NATO. We note, however, that consensus must still apply to new commitments, even if it may no longer be feasible for decisions regarding checking compliance with commitments already undertaken. 42. In the final analysis, the concept of mutually-reinforcing institutions for security in Europe has failed again and again over the former Yugoslavia. This is not on account of institutions but because of the inability of sovereign governments to agree on a firm course of action. The potential of CSCE, both in its own right and as an enabling institution to call upon others, has been neglected. Yet, as Vaclav Havel put it, "All are aware of the fact that its role can be irreplaceable", and new directions were set down in 1992 providing possible clues as to how CSCE may be able to maintain its tradition of being ahead of its time when events continually outpace the ability of states and organizations to manage threats to stability and to the democratic order cultivated by the CSCE process over more than two decades. CSCE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT Court of Conciliation Parliamentary and Arbitration (Geneva) Assembly (Secretariat COUNCIL Copenhagen) Chairman-in-Office (Rotates) Ad hoc Steering Groups COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS (Prague) SECRETARY GENERAL (Vienna) High Commissioner on National Minorities (The Hague) Vienna Group Security Forum CPC Secretariat ODIHR (Vienna) (Vienna) (Prague) (Warsaw) Special Committee Consultative Committee Mission Support Groups NOTES 1. Ambassador Lucius Caflisch, "Le Reglement Pacifique des Differends en Europe", presentation to the Second Special Interparliamentary Conference on European Security and the CSCE, Brussels, 12 February 1993. A concise history of PSD can be found in US Congressional Helsinki Commission, From Vienna To Helsinki: Reports on the Inter-Sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process, April 1992. By contrast with the previous Soviet attitude, the "Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States" adopted on 22 January 1993 in Minsk states in Article 15 that the Council of Heads of State "is empowered, at any stage of a dispute whose continuation could threaten the maintenance of peace or security in the Commonwealth, to recommend to the parties an appropriate procedure or methods for settling the dispute". The text also refers to "groups of military observers and collective forces maintaining peace in the Commonwealth", but on 18 February 1993 the CIS Chief-of-Staff, Col. General Viktor Samsonov, noted that "the mechanism of introducing peacekeeping forces in conflict regions had yet to be finalized...there was no basis for this mechanism in legislation". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Former Soviet Union, 22 February 1993, p. C2/2. On 28 February 1993 President Yeltsin, publicly resurrecting a theme advanced at the June 1992 Oslo Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, declared that "the moment has come when responsible international organizations, including the United Nations, should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former Soviet Union". Financial Times, 1 March 1993. The abandonment by June 1993 of an integrated "CIS" military structure in June 1993 leaves unclear the peacekeeping dimension. 2. Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet, 15 November 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 4 December 1992, p. 53. 3. Although the United States "agreed not to block the treaty, it has vowed not to sign, ratify, or pay for its potentially expensive operations, convinced that it was poorly drafted and, while promising much, is likely to deliver little". US Helsinki Commission, CSCE Digest (November 1992), p. 3. Ambassador Caflisch also noted that in particular it was the US Delegation in Geneva that objected "tooth and nail" to the possibility of CSCE political organs being able to ask the Court for merely consultative opinions on legal problems associated with CSCE activities, on grounds that a quasi-judicial body subscribed to by less than all of the CSCE states - even though all CSCE states negotiated the text and all CSCE states must agree amendments - could then act as a legal advisor to CSCE bodies comprising all CSCE states. It is perhaps noteworthy that in a 16 February 1993 presentation on "CSCE and European Security" the US CSCE Head of Delegation, Ambassador John C. Kornblum failed even to mention the Convention. USIS Wireless File, 18 February 1993. 4. At the same time, however, Ukraine is endeavouring to secure a "stability and security space" from the Baltic to the Black Seas in which states would pledge not to advance territorial claims, respect national minorities, and increase economic co-operation (a security dimension is not explicitly discussed, but a follow-on stage "could consider prospects of creating, including through bilateral and multilateral consultations, a particular mutual confidence system, establishing close regular contacts between states leaders of the region, foreign and defence ministries"). This follows an initiative by President Leonid Kravchuk in February 1992. It would not include Russia or, for the moment, Belarus, and has been discussed within the NACC in that Ukraine would like NATO endorsement of the concept. In this context, US Defense Secretary Les Aspin, speaking on 5 June 1993 in Garmisch, described "the growth of regional understandings and associations among neighbors" as elements of a "new security system for Europe"; "For example, the nations of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics could comprise such a group. Groupings that calm security concerns among neighbors enhance the wider security of us all." However, from the Russian perspective, would such groupings be perceived by Moscow in the same way that NATO membership for these countries might be, as what Mr. Sergei Stepashin termed at the 1993 Spring Session a "cordon sanitaire that would provoke ultranationalist arguments in Russia, and we should be clear about that risk"? Or, as Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk explained on 21 April 1993, would such a zone instead "serve as a bridge between Russia and the West"? Financial Times, 22 April 1993. 5. Although the Civilian Affairs Committee deals extensively with the High Commissioner, suffice it to recall, in considering the future of CSCE and its linking of security with intra- as well as inter-state relations, that "A small group of delegations, notably the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, expressed initial skepticism or outright opposition. Besides specific concerns about the domestic consequences of such a mechanism, which often motivate these governments' extreme caution if not hostility to minority initiatives, the United States and the United Kingdom expressed more general concerns". US Helsinki Commission, The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the Conference and Security and Co-operation in Europe (1992), p. 23. Likewise, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall's statement in Helsinki on 9 June 1992 addressed key difficulties: "Often our delegations were more concerned to reaffirm the view that the rights of minorities are collective individual rights - not group rights needing special sensitivity. Or they were trying to ensure that the new office of High Commissioner on National Minorities would have no real impact. Or pretending that what the public calls ethnic violence has nothing to do with minorities. But publics everywhere are demanding more from multilateral institutions: more action, more decisiveness, more leadership. That is why we have a special responsibility to make sure the CSCE works." As a result of the plenary deliberations of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Helsinki on 9 July 1993, it was urged that the forthcoming summit of Council of Europe Heads of State and Government, to be held on 8 and 9 October 1993 in Vienna, agree on an additional Protocol on the rights of minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, which would include the right to benefit from remedies offered by the Convention.