xample, as the General Rapporteur
has previously explored, what are the limits to Russian concerns
with: the blizhnyeye zarubyezhye, or "near abroad"; a perceived
legitimate right to ensure if possible a "neutral" stance on the
part of its former Warsaw Pact allies;4 and "awareness of a
special responsibility" concerning peacekeeping operations in the
territory of the former Soviet Union?

6. It goes without saying that some of these latent or existing
conflicts may engage NATO or its member states in peacekeeping or
peace enforcement operations. Spillover of these conflicts may
directly affect the territory of the Allies themselves.  As a
result, our overriding, and self-interested, challenge is to
prevent the vision of the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe
from fading away out of selective disinterest with far-away
places of which we choose to know little.

II.FROM A TRANSFORMING ALLIANCE TO A NEW SECURITY ORDER

A. A PRIMARY ROLE

7. The UK Ambassador to NATO, Sir John Weston, has trenchantly
observed:5

"...as the only functioning collective defence organization on
the contemporary international stage, NATO has a particular
responsibility for, and potential contribution to make toward,
security and stability in the new undivided Europe, and that it
will be the worse for Europe as well as for NATO if this
responsibility is not taken up and actively discharged."

8. Put another way, if we accept the sobering truth that American
initiative continues to be vital for building effective
"coalitions of the willing", then the only true security
organization for the CSCE region will continue to be, both for
members and many non-members alike, NATO.  This is so for a
number of reasons that have only been reinforced by the
catastrophe of Western "policy" over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1. CSCE
-------

9. First, CSCE will remain primarily confined to useful but
limited preventive diplomacy, not peace enforcement.  Moreover,
and regrettably, its international credibility has yet to be
firmly established.  Although the nonat NATO can prove Europe's sole
policeman.  Comparative advantage does apply to preventive and
post-settlement diplomacy.  The CSCE remains the only
non-exclusive sole organization for security and co-operation in
Europe/Eurasia, and one that enables its members to hold each
other accountable in the entire Euro-Atlantic region for internal
and external policies.  The Council of Europe is a benchmark
for democratic standards, exploring pioneering steps regarding
national minority rights. The EC serves as an economic magnet and
dispenser of aid.  We may be sceptical about Russian peacekeeping
in the former Soviet Union,7 but what Western nations would be
eager to take on that task, and might the effectiveness of these
Russian operations have proved quite different had they been
undertaken as UN operations?

16. Moreover, for those who take the view that "the fundamental
requirement is preserving NATO", as Robert Hunter, subsequently
US Ambassador to NATO, told the Presidential Task Force on 21
January 1993, then "if out-of-area missions fail to attract
Allied consensus and interfere with NATO's core functions, they
should be given to others to perform", such as WEU - although the
record of the Gulf war and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
do not suggest for the foreseeable future any obvious examples of
where WEU would fill a NATO breach.

17. Nevertheless, NATO must be assigned the same priority by its
member states as it is by those who aspire to become new Allies.
This means, inter alia, that the WEU should only act when NATO is
not prepared to act. WEU also should not try to compete with
NATO when the Alliance is acting.   And in cases where not all
NATO Allies choose to perform a mission, the Alliance should
continue to be prepared to make its unique assets available to
WEU or any other ad hoc coalition.  Otherwise, if NATO is viewed
as but an insurance policy of last resort, as former US NATO
Ambassador William H. Taft put it on 3 June:  "We could find
ourselves with the worst of both worlds:  a less tha. Nevertheless, it is also true that organizations cannot serve
those governments, and the cause of peace, if institutional
obstacles are deliberately manufactured. A traditional
complication has concerned, of course, France because of the
well-known theology regarding the integrated military command and
the defence review and planning system, a preference for CSCE or
WEU when it comes to both co-operation with the Central and
Eastern Europeans and the execution of what we used to call
missions "out-of-area", and, as noted, a reluctance to permit too
close a UN-NATO or CSCE-NATO relationship.

26. There are, however, reasons to be optimistic.  The
presumption is that the new government may more closely associate
itself with the integrated military structure and preserve the
constructive spirit and substance of partnership evident since
early this year. French military officials have actively
participated in NATO peacekeeping preparations via the Military
Committee, and France consented to German wishes that tand seriously worsen the strategic situation.

Therefore, friendly relations with Eastern European states and at
the very least their neutral attitude would accord with
Russia's national interests."  Moreover, "Russia would be
completely justified in requiring the recognition by the Baltic
countries of Russia's right to free access to seaports on
commercial terms - with the condition that stationing of
'third-country' military forces on their territory or their entry
into military blocs directed against the Russian Federation would
be precluded".  Op. cit. note 1.  See also Mark Smith, Pax
Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine, Whitehall Papers (RUSI 1993).

5. Royal United Services Institute Journal (April 1993).

6. Tom Dodd, "The Maastricht Debate: The Common Foreign and
Security Policy", House of Commons Library Research Paper, 9
March 1993.

7. On 28 June, the Russian representative to the NACC distributed
an updated paper entitled "Russia's Participation in Peacekeeping
Operations in the Countries of the Former USSR". It spoke of
Russian awareness of "a special responsibility it has, along with
its neighbors, for stability and respect for human rights in the
territory of the former USSR.  Request for assistance in conflict
settlement addressed to it by other states are an important
factor....Russia is interested in cooperation in this field with
international organizations, particularly with the UN and the
CSCE.  Upon request of countries concerned they can play an
important role in supporting their efforts, in particular by
dispatching military and civilian observers and fact-finding
missions, organizing humanitarian actions, providing help in
formation of peace-keeping contingents, using the UN expertise
and by other means".  By its focusing on "special
responsibility", requests by other states as simply "an important
factor", and mere interest in co-operation with the UN and the
CSCE, the paper caused alarm among a number of NACC partners.
For example, on 9 July the Baltic NACC representatives spoke of
fears