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desc
@@


1.50
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Aug 31 17:20:44 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@
Format of "---with-colons" listings
===================================

sec::1024:17:6C7EE1B8621CC013:1998-07-07:0:::Werner Koch <werner.koch@@guug.de>:
ssb::1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:1998-07-07:0:::

 1. Field:  Type of record
	    pub = public key
	    sub = subkey (secondary key)
	    sec = secret key
	    ssb = secret subkey (secondary key)
	    uid = user id (only field 10 is used).
	    fpr = fingerprint: (fingerprint is in field 10)
	    pkd = public key data (special field format, see below)

 2. Field:  A letter describing the calculated trust. This is a single
	    letter, but be prepared that additional information may follow
	    in some future versions. (not used for secret keys)
		o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
		d = The key has been disabled
		r = The key has been revoked
		e = The key has expired
		q = Undefined (no value assigned)
		n = Don't trust this key at all
		m = There is marginal trust in this key
		f = The key is full trusted.
		u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used for
		    keys for which the secret key is also available.
 3. Field:  length of key in bits.
 4. Field:  Algorithm:	1 = RSA
		       16 = ElGamal (encrypt only)
		       17 = DSA (sometimes called DH, sign only)
		       20 = ElGamal (sign and encrypt)
	    (for other id's see include/cipher.h)
 5. Field:  KeyID
 6. Field:  Creation Date (in UTC)
 7. Field:  Key expiration date or empty if none.
 8. Field:  Local ID: record number of the dir record in the trustdb.
	    This value is only valid as long as the trustdb is not
	    deleted. You can use "#<local-id> as the user id when
	    specifying a key. This is needed because keyids may not be
	    unique - a program may use this number to access keys later.
 9. Field:  Ownertrust (primary public keys only)
	    This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
	    information may follow in some future versions.
10. Field:  User-ID.  The value is quoted like a C string to avoid
	    control characters (the colon is quoted "\x3a").

More fields may be added later.

If field 1 has the tag "pkd", a listing looks like this:
pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
    !  !   !-- the value
    !  !------ for information number of bits in the value
    !--------- index (eg. DSA goes from 0 to 3: p,q,g,y)



Format of the "--status-fd" output
==================================
Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
the type of the status line and a some arguments depending on the
type (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see
more arguments in future versions.


    GOODSIG	<long keyid>  <username>
	The signature with the keyid is good.

    BADSIG	<long keyid>  <username>
	The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay.

    ERRSIG  <long keyid>  <pubkey_algo> <hash_algo> \
	    <sig_class> <timestamp> <rc>
	It was not possible to check the signature.  This may be
	caused by a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm.
	A RC of 4 indicates unknown algorithm, a 9 indicates a missing
	public key. The other fields give more information about
	this signature.  sig_class is a 2 byte hex-value.

    VALIDSIG	<fingerprint in hex> <sig_creation_date> <sig-timestamp>
	The signature with the keyid is good. This is the same
	as GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both
	status lines ere emitted for a good signature.
	sig-timestamp is the signature creation time in seconds after
	the epoch.

    SIG_ID  <radix64_string>  <sig_creation_date>  <sig-timestamp>
	This is emitted only for signatures of class 0 or 1 which
	have been verified okay.  The string is a signature id
	and may be used in applications to detect replay attacks
	of signed messages.  Note that only DLP algorithms give
	unique ids - others may yield duplicated ones when they
	have been created in the same second.

    ENC_TO  <long keyid>  <keytype>  <keylength>
	The message is encrypted to this keyid.
	keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm,
	keylength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
	(which is currently always the case).

    NODATA  <what>
	No data has been found. Codes for what are:
	    1 - No armored data.
	    2 - Expected a packet but did not found one.
	    3 - Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP message.
	You may see more than one of these status lines.

    TRUST_UNDEFINED
    TRUST_NEVER
    TRUST_MARGINAL
    TRUST_FULLY
    TRUST_ULTIMATE
	For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted
	to indicate how trustworthy the signature is.  No arguments yet.

    SIGEXPIRED
	The signature key has expired.	No arguments yet.

    KEYREVOKED
	The used key has been revoked by his owner.  No arguments yet.

    BADARMOR
	The ASCII armor is corrupted.  No arguments yet.

    RSA_OR_IDEA
	The RSA or IDEA algorithms has been used in the data.  A
	program might want to fallback to another program to handle
	the data if GnuPG failed.

    SHM_INFO
    SHM_GET
    SHM_GET_BOOL
    SHM_GET_HIDDEN

    NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>  <keytype>  <keylength>
	Issued whenever a passphrase is needed.
	keytype is the numerical value of the public key algorithm
	or 0 if this is not applicable, keylength is the length
	of the key or 0 if it is not known (this is currently always the case).

    NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
	Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.

    MISSING_PASSPHRASE
	No passphrase was supplied.  An application which encounters this
	message may want to stop parsing immediately because the next message
	will probably be a BAD_PASSPHRASE.  However, if the application
	is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionality it might not
	make sense to stop parsing but simply ignoring the following
	PAD_PASSPHRASE.

    BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
	The supplied passphrase was wrong or not given.  In the latter case
	you may have seen a MISSING_PASSPHRASE.

    GOOD_PASSPHRASE
	The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
	is therefore usable.

    DECRYPTION_FAILED
	The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
	passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.

    DECRYPTION_OKAY
	The decryption process succeeded.  This means, that either the
	correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase
	for a conventional encrypted message was given.  The program
	itself may return an errorcode because it may not be possible to
	verify a signature for some reasons.

    NO_PUBKEY  <long keyid>
    NO_SECKEY  <long keyid>
	The key is not available

    IMPORTED   <long keyid>  <username>
	The keyid and name of the signature just imported

    IMPORTED_RES <count> <no_user_id> <imported> <imported_rsa> <unchanged>
	<n_uids> <n_subk> <n_sigs> <n_revoc> <sec_read> <sec_imported> <sec_dups>
	Final statistics on import process (this is one long line)



Key generation
==============
    Key generation shows progress by printing different characters to
    stderr:
	     "."  Last 10 Miller-Rabin tests failed
	     "+"  Miller-Rabin test succeeded
	     "!"  Reloading the pool with fresh prime numbers
	     "^"  Checking a new value for the generator
	     "<"  Size of one factor decreased
	     ">"  Size of one factor increased

    The prime number for ElGamal is generated this way:

    1) Make a prime number q of 160, 200, 240 bits (depending on the keysize)
    2) Select the length of the other prime factors to be at least the size
       of q and calculate the number of prime factors needed
    3) Make a pool of prime numbers, each of the length determined in step 2
    4) Get a new permutation out of the pool or continue with step 3
       if we have tested all permutations.
    5) Calculate a candidate prime p = 2 * q * p[1] * ... * p[n] + 1
    6) Check that this prime has the correct length (this may change q if
       it seems not to be possible to make a prime of the desired length)
    7) Check whether this is a prime using trial divisions and the
       Miller-Rabin test.
    8) Continue with step 4 if we did not find a prime in step 7.
    9) Find a generator for that prime.

    This algorithm is based on Lim and Lee's suggestion from the
    Crypto '97 proceedings p. 260.



Layout of the TrustDB
=====================
The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
describes the record type.  All numeric values are stored in network
byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first record of
the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of this type.

  Record type 0:
  --------------
    Unused record, can be reused for any purpose.

  Record type 1:
  --------------
    Version information for this TrustDB.  This is always the first
    record of the DB and the only one with type 1.
     1 byte value 1
     3 bytes 'gpg'  magic value
     1 byte Version of the TrustDB (2)
     1 byte marginals needed
     1 byte completes needed
     1 byte max_cert_depth
	    The three items are used to check whether the cached
	    validity value from the dir record can be used.
     1 u32  locked flags
     1 u32  timestamp of trustdb creation
     1 u32  timestamp of last modification which may affect the validity
	    of keys in the trustdb.  This value is checked against the
	    validity timestamp in the dir records.
     1 u32  timestamp of last validation
	    (Used to keep track of the time, when this TrustDB was checked
	     against the pubring)
     1 u32  record number of keyhashtable
     1 u32  first free record
     1 u32  record number of shadow directory hash table
	    It does not make sense to combine this table with the key table
	    because the keyid is not in every case a part of the fingerprint.
     4 bytes reserved for version extension record


  Record type 2: (directory record)
  --------------
    Informations about a public key certificate.
    These are static values which are never changed without user interaction.

     1 byte value 2
     1 byte  reserved
     1 u32   LID     .	(This is simply the record number of this record.)
     1 u32   List of key-records (the first one is the primary key)
     1 u32   List of uid-records
     1 u32   cache record
     1 byte  ownertrust
     1 byte  dirflag
     1 byte  maximum validity of all the user ids
     1 u32   time of last validity check.
     1 u32   Must check when this time has been reached.
	     (0 = no check required)


  Record type 3:  (key record)
  --------------
    Informations about a primary public key.
    (This is mainly used to lookup a trust record)

     1 byte value 3
     1 byte  reserved
     1 u32   LID
     1 u32   next   - next key record
     7 bytes reserved
     1 byte  keyflags
     1 byte  pubkey algorithm
     1 byte  length of the fingerprint (in bytes)
     20 bytes fingerprint of the public key
	      (This is the value we use to identify a key)

  Record type 4: (uid record)
  --------------
    Informations about a userid
    We do not store the userid but the hash value of the userid because that
    is sufficient.

     1 byte value 4
     1 byte reserved
     1 u32  LID  points to the directory record.
     1 u32  next   next userid
     1 u32  pointer to preference record
     1 u32  siglist  list of valid signatures
     1 byte uidflags
     1 byte validity of the key calculated over this user id
     20 bytes ripemd160 hash of the username.


  Record type 5: (pref record)
  --------------
    Informations about preferences

     1 byte value 5
     1 byte   reserved
     1 u32  LID; points to the directory record (and not to the uid record!).
	    (or 0 for standard preference record)
     1 u32  next
     30 byte preference data

  Record type 6  (sigrec)
  -------------
    Used to keep track of key signatures. Self-signatures are not
    stored.  If a public key is not in the DB, the signature points to
    a shadow dir record, which in turn has a list of records which
    might be interested in this key (and the signature record here
    is one).

     1 byte   value 6
     1 byte   reserved
     1 u32    LID	    points back to the dir record
     1 u32    next   next sigrec of this uid or 0 to indicate the
		     last sigrec.
     6 times
	1 u32  Local_id of signators dir or shadow dir record
	1 byte Flag: Bit 0 = checked: Bit 1 is valid (we have a real
			     directory record for this)
			 1 = valid is set (but my be revoked)



  Record type 8: (shadow directory record)
  --------------
    This record is used to reserved a LID for a public key.  We
    need this to create the sig records of other keys, even if we
    do not yet have the public key of the signature.
    This record (the record number to be more precise) will be reused
    as the dir record when we import the real public key.

     1 byte value 8
     1 byte  reserved
     1 u32   LID      (This is simply the record number of this record.)
     2 u32   keyid
     1 byte  pubkey algorithm
     3 byte reserved
     1 u32   hintlist	A list of records which have references to
			this key.  This is used for fast access to
			signature records which are not yet checked.
			Note, that this is only a hint and the actual records
			may not anymore hold signature records for that key
			but that the code cares about this.
    18 byte reserved



  Record Type 10 (hash table)
  --------------
    Due to the fact that we use fingerprints to lookup keys, we can
    implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid
    the overhead of gdbm.  A property of fingerprints is that they can be
    used directly as hash values.  (They can be considered as strong
    random numbers.)
      What we use is a dynamic multilevel architecture, which combines
    hashtables, record lists, and linked lists.

    This record is a hashtable of 256 entries; a special property
    is that all these records are stored consecutively to make one
    big table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of
    the fingerprint (depending on the indirection level).

    When used to hash shadow directory records, a different table is used
    and indexed by the keyid.

     1 byte value 10
     1 byte reserved
     n u32  recnum; n depends on the record length:
	    n = (reclen-2)/4  which yields 9 for the current record length
	    of 40 bytes.

    the total number of such record which makes up the table is:
	 m = (256+n-1) / n
    which is 29 for a record length of 40.

    To look up a key we use the first byte of the fingerprint to get
    the recnum from this hashtable and look up the addressed record:
       - If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd byte
	 to index this hash table and so on.
       - if this record is a hashlist, we walk all entries
	 until we found one a matching one.
       - if this record is a key record, we compare the
	 fingerprint and to decide whether it is the requested key;


  Record type 11 (hash list)
  --------------
    see hash table for an explanation.
    This is also used for other purposes.

    1 byte value 11
    1 byte reserved
    1 u32  next 	 next hash list record
    n times		 n = (reclen-5)/5
	1 u32  recnum

    For the current record length of 40, n is 7



  Record type 254 (free record)
  ---------------
    All these records form a linked list of unused records.
     1 byte  value 254
     1 byte  reserved (0)
     1 u32   next_free



Packet Headers
===============

GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understands OpenPGP packet header.
There is one enhancement used with the old style packet headers:

   CTB bits 10, the "packet-length length bits", have values listed in
   the following table:

      00 - 1-byte packet-length field
      01 - 2-byte packet-length field
      10 - 4-byte packet-length field
      11 - no packet length supplied, unknown packet length

   As indicated in this table, depending on the packet-length length
   bits, the remaining 1, 2, 4, or 0 bytes of the packet structure field
   are a "packet-length field".  The packet-length field is a whole
   number field.  The value of the packet-length field is defined to be
   the value of the whole number field.

   A value of 11 is currently used in one place: on compressed data.
   That is, a compressed data block currently looks like <A3 01 . .  .>,
   where <A3>, binary 10 1000 11, is an indefinite-length packet. The
   proper interpretation is "until the end of the enclosing structure",
   although it should never appear outermost (where the enclosing
   structure is a file).

+  This will be changed with another version, where the new meaning of
+  the value 11 (see below) will also take place.
+
+  A value of 11 for other packets enables a special length encoding,
+  which is used in case, where the length of the following packet can
+  not be determined prior to writing the packet; especially this will
+  be used if large amounts of data are processed in filter mode.
+
+  It works like this: After the CTB (with a length field of 11) a
+  marker field is used, which gives the length of the following datablock.
+  This is a simple 2 byte field (MSB first) containing the amount of data
+  following this field, not including this length field. After this datablock
+  another length field follows, which gives the size of the next datablock.
+  A value of 0 indicates the end of the packet. The maximum size of a
+  data block is limited to 65534, thereby reserving a value of 0xffff for
+  future extensions. These length markers must be inserted into the data
+  stream just before writing the data out.
+
+  This 2 byte filed is large enough, because the application must buffer
+  this amount of data to prepend the length marker before writing it out.
+  Data block sizes larger than about 32k doesn't make any sense. Note
+  that this may also be used for compressed data streams, but we must use
+  another packet version to tell the application that it can not assume,
+  that this is the last packet.


Usage of gdbm files for keyrings
================================
    The key to store the keyblock is it's fingerprint, other records
    are used for secondary keys.  fingerprints are always 20 bytes
    where 16 bit fingerprints are appended with zero.
    The first byte of the key gives some information on the type of the
    key.
      1 = key is a 20 bit fingerprint (16 bytes fpr are padded with zeroes)
	  data is the keyblock
      2 = key is the complete 8 byte keyid
	  data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints
      3 = key is the short 4 byte keyid
	  data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints
      4 = key is the email address
	  data is a list of 20 byte fingerprints

    Data is prepended with a type byte:
      1 = keyblock
      2 = list of 20 byte padded fingerprints
      3 = list of list fingerprints (but how to we key them?)




Other Notes
===========
    * For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
	RSA	:= low 64 bits of n
	ELGAMAL := build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and calculate
		   a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the
		   fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.

    * Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
      "import" knows how to handle this.  The rationale behind it is
      to keep them small.







Keyserver Message Format
=========================

The keyserver may be contacted by a Unix Domain socket or via TCP.

The format of a request is:

====
command-tag
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
=======

Where command-tag is

NOOP
GET <user-name>
PUT
DELETE <user-name>


The format of a response is:

======
"GNUPG/1.0" status-code status-text
"Content-length:" digits
CRLF
============
followed by <digits> bytes of data


Status codes are:

     o	1xx: Informational - Request received, continuing process

     o	2xx: Success - The action was successfully received, understood,
	and accepted

     o	4xx: Client Error - The request contains bad syntax or cannot be
	fulfilled

     o	5xx: Server Error - The server failed to fulfill an apparently
	valid request



Documentation on HKP (the http keyserver protocol):

A minimalistic HTTP server on port 11371 recognizes a GET for /pks/lookup.
The standard http URL encoded query parameters are this (always key=value):

- op=index (like pgp -kv), op=vindex (like pgp -kvv) and op=get (like
  pgp -kxa)

- search=<stringlist>. This is a list of words that must occur in the key.
  The words are delimited with space, points, @@ and so on. The delimiters
  are not searched for and the order of the words doesn't matter (but see
  next option).

- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact matching
  keys back. In this case the order and the "delimiters" are important.

- fingerprint=on. Also reports the fingerprints when used with 'index' or
  'vindex'

The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
keys.


A better way to to this would be a request like:

   /pks/lookup/<gnupg_formatierte_user_id>?op=<operation>

this can be implemented using Hurd's translator mechanism.
However, I think the whole key server stuff has to be re-thought;
I have some ideas and probably create a white paper.

@


1.49
log
@See ChangeLog: Wed Aug  4 10:34:46 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d55 1
a55 1
    !  !------ for infomation number of bits in the value
d100 1
a100 1
	kenlength is the length of the key or 0 if it is not known
d150 1
a150 1
	is a wrapper around the key edit menu functionalty it might not
d170 1
a170 1
	itself may return an errorcode becuase it may not be possible to
d581 1
a581 1
- exact=on. This switch tells the hkp server to only report exact mathing
d595 2
a596 2
this can be implemented using Hurd's translater mechanism.
However, I think the whole key server stuff has to be re-thougth;
@


1.48
log
@See ChangeLog: Wed Jul 14 19:42:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d35 1
a35 1
            (for other id's see include/cipher.h)
d147 6
d155 2
a156 1
	The supplied passphrase was wrong
d160 1
a160 1
	is therefore usuable.
d587 5
a591 1
New (already used by GnuPG):
d595 4
a598 2
The keyserver also recognizes http-POSTs to /pks/add. Use this to upload
keys.
@


1.47
log
@See ChangeLog: Thu Jul  1 12:47:31 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d17 13
a29 4
 2. Field:  A letter describing the calculated trust, see doc/FAQ
	    This is a single letter, but be prepared that additional
	    information may follow in some future versions.
	    (not used for secret keys)
d35 1
d39 5
a43 6
 8. Field:  Local ID: record number of the dir record in the trustdb
	    this value is only valid as long as the trustdb is not
	    deleted.  May be later used to lookup the key: You will be
	    able to use "#<local-id> as the user id.  This is needed
	    because keyids may not be unique - a program may use this
	    number to access keys later.
d170 8
d216 1
a216 1
the DB is always of type 2 and this is the only record of this type.
d561 1
a561 1
Ich werde jetzt doch das HKP Protokoll implementieren:
d563 2
a564 2
Naja, die Doku ist so gut wie nichtexistent, da gebe ich Dir recht.
In kurzen Worten:
d566 15
a580 15
(Minimal-)HTTP-Server auf Port 11371, versteht ein GET auf /pks/lookup,
wobei die Query-Parameter (Key-Value-Paare mit = zwischen Key und
Value; die Paare sind hinter ? und durch & getrennt). Gltige
Operationen sind:

- - op (Operation) mit den Mglichkeiten index (gleich wie -kv bei
  PGP), vindex (-kvv) und get (-kxa)
- - search: Liste der Worte, die im Key vorkommen mssen. Worte sind
  mit Worttrennzeichen wie Space, Punkt, @@, ... getrennt, Worttrennzeichen
  werden nicht betrachtet, die Reihenfolge der Worte ist egal.
- - exact: (on=aktiv, alles andere inaktiv) Nur die Schlssel
  zurckgeben, die auch den "search"-String beinhalten (d.h.
  Wortreihenfolge und Sonderzeichen sind wichtig)
- - fingerprint (Bei [v]index auch den Fingerprint ausgeben), "on"
  fr aktiv, alles andere inaktiv
a581 1
Neu (wird von GNUPG benutzt):
d584 2
a585 3
Zustzlich versteht der Keyserver auch ein POST auf /pks/add, womit
man Keys hochladen kann.

@


1.46
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Jun 29 21:44:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d88 1
a88 1
    ENC_TO  <long keyid>
d90 3
d128 1
a128 1
    NEED_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
d130 3
@


1.45
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Jun  8 13:36:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d241 3
a243 2
     4 byte  time of last validity check.
    15 byte reserved
@


1.44
log
@See ChangeLog: Sat May 22 22:47:26 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d15 1
d42 7
@


1.43
log
@See ChangeLog: Thu May 20 14:04:08 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d57 2
a58 1
    ERRSIG  <long keyid>  <algorithm_number>
d61 3
d65 1
a65 1
    VALIDSIG	<fingerprint in hex>
d69 2
d72 1
a72 1
    SIG_ID  <radix64_string>  <sig_creation_date>
@


1.42
log
@See ChangeLog: Thu May  6 14:18:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d67 1
a67 1
	This is emitted only for signatures which
@


1.41
log
@See ChangeLog: Fri Apr  9 12:26:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d80 3
@


1.40
log
@See ChangeLog: Thu Apr  8 09:35:53 CEST 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d114 2
d119 4
d126 7
@


1.39
log
@See ChangeLog: Sat Mar 20 13:59:47 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d111 3
d116 4
@


1.38
log
@See ChangeLog: Wed Mar 17 13:09:03 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d158 2
a159 2
Record type 0:
--------------
d162 2
a163 2
Record type 1:
--------------
d190 2
a191 2
Record type 2: (directory record)
--------------
d208 2
a209 2
Record type 3:	(key record)
--------------
d224 2
a225 2
Record type 4: (uid record)
--------------
d241 2
a242 2
Record type 5: (pref record)
--------------
d252 2
a253 2
Record type 6  (sigrec)
-------------
d273 2
a274 2
Record type 8: (shadow directory record)
--------------
d297 2
a298 2
Record Type 10 (hash table)
--------------
d335 2
a336 2
Record type 11 (hash list)
--------------
d350 2
a351 2
Record type 254 (free record)
---------------
d455 1
a455 1
-------------------------
d461 1
a461 1
----
d465 1
a465 1
------
d477 1
a477 1
------
d481 1
a481 1
------------
@


1.37
log
@See ChangeLog: Thu Mar 11 16:39:46 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d57 1
a57 1
    ERRSIG
a59 1
	No argument yet.
d74 7
a106 2
    NEED_PASSPHRASE
	[Needs documentation]
d108 5
d114 3
a294 25


Record type 9:	(cache record) NOT USED
--------------
    Used to bind the trustDB to the concrete instance of keyblock in
    a pubring. This is used to cache information.

     1 byte   value 9
     1 byte   reserved
     1 u32    Local-Id.
     8 bytes  keyid of the primary key (needed?)
     1 byte   cache-is-valid the following stuff is only
	      valid if this is set.
     1 byte   reserved
     20 bytes rmd160 hash value over the complete keyblock
	      This is used to detect any changes of the keyblock with all
	      CTBs and lengths headers. Calculation is easy if the keyblock
	      is obtained from a keyserver: simply create the hash from all
	      received data bytes.

     1 byte   number of untrusted signatures.
     1 byte   number of marginal trusted signatures.
     1 byte   number of fully trusted signatures.
	      (255 is stored for all values greater than 254)
     1 byte   Trustlevel  (see trustdb.h)
@


1.36
log
@See ChangeLog: Mon Mar  8 20:47:17 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d134 3
d164 3
a166 1
     1 u32  timestamp of last modification
d191 3
a193 2
     1 byte  validity of the key calucalted over all user ids
    19 byte reserved
d256 1
a256 1
			      directory record for this)
d285 1
a285 1
Record type 9:	(cache record)
d307 1
a307 7
     1 byte   Trustlevel
		0 = undefined (not calculated)
		1 = unknown
		2 = not trusted
		3 = marginally trusted
		4 = fully trusted
		5 = ultimately trusted (have secret key too).
a459 7


Supported targets:
------------------
      powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu  (linuxppc)
      hppa1.1-hp-hpux10.20

@


1.35
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Mar  2 10:38:42 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d67 1
a67 1
    SIG_ID  <radix64_string>
d72 1
a72 1
	unique ids - others may yoild duplicated ones when they
@


1.34
log
@See ChangeLog: Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d68 6
a73 4
	This is emitted only for DSA or ElGamal signatures which
	have been verified okay.  The strings is a signature id
	and maybe used in applications to detect replay attacks
	of signed messages.
@


1.33
log
@See ChangeLog: Wed Feb 10 17:15:39 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d67 6
@


1.32
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Jan 12 11:17:18 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d82 1
a82 1
	The ascii armor is corrupted.  No arguments yet.
d178 1
a178 1
     1 byte  validity
d211 1
a211 1
     1 byte reserved
d421 1
a421 1
    where 16 bit fingerprints are appded with zero.
@


1.31
log
@See ChangeLog: Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch
@
text
@d48 1
a48 1
more argumnents in future versions.
d60 1
a60 1
	No argumens yet.
d65 1
a65 1
	status lines ere emmited for a good signature.
d73 1
a73 1
	to indicate how trustworthy the signatur is.  No arguments yet.
d161 1
a161 1
	    becuase the keyid is not in every case a part of the fingerprint.
d286 1
a286 1
	      is optained from a keyserver: simply create the hash from all
d326 1
a326 1
    the total number of surch record which makes up the table is:
d333 1
a333 1
	 to index this hast table and so on.
d401 1
a401 1
+  This is a simple 2 byte field (MSB first) containig the amount of data
d406 1
a406 1
+  future extensions. These length markers must be insereted into the data
d419 1
a419 1
    The key to store the keyblokc is it's fingerpint, other records
@


1.30
log
@See ChangeLog: Tue Dec  8 13:15:16 CET 1998  Werner Koch
@
text
@d43 56
@


1.29
log
@See ChangeLog ;-).  Key validation should now be faster
@
text
@d87 1
a87 1
     1 byte value 2
d89 1
a89 1
     1 byte Version of the TrustDB
@


1.28
log
@Epxerimenta support for GDBM keyings.
@
text
@d17 2
d35 2
d90 5
a94 1
     3 byte reserved
d121 3
a123 2
     1 byte  sigflag
    20 byte reserved
@


1.27
log
@Snapshot release 0.4.2
@
text
@d352 22
@


1.26
log
@last local commit
@
text
@d367 8
@


1.25
log
@backup
@
text
@d25 1
a25 2
 7. Field:  key expieres n days after creation.
	    (I will change this to a key exiration date)
@


1.24
log
@a new release
@
text
@d2 2
d5 31
a35 5
    * For packet version 3 we calculate the keyids this way:
	RSA	:= low 64 bits of n
	ELGAMAL := build a v3 pubkey packet (with CTB 0x99) and calculate
		   a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the
		   fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
d37 1
a37 3
    * Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
      "import" knows how to handle this.  The rationale behind it is
      to keep them small.
d40 2
a68 1

d96 4
a99 1
     8 bytes reserved
d164 5
a168 2
    Used to keep track of valid key signatures. Self-signatures are not
    stored.
d173 1
a173 1
     1 u32    next   next sigrec of this owner or 0 to indicate the
d176 28
a203 2
	1 u32  Local_id of signators dir record
	1 byte reserved
d253 3
d279 1
d289 5
a293 1
Record type 254: (free record)
d352 14
@


1.23
log
@.
@
text
@d68 2
a69 1
     12 bytes reserved
d225 5
@


1.22
log
@intermediate check in
@
text
@a43 2
FIXME: use a directory record as top node instead of the pubkey record

d47 1
a47 1
the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of this type.
d57 1
a57 1
     1 byte value 1
@


1.21
log
@edit-key is now complete
@
text
@d131 1
@


1.20
log
@changed trustdb design
@
text
@d59 1
a59 1
     1 byte value 2
d63 1
a63 1
     1 u32  locked by (pid) 0 = not locked.
d69 2
a70 7
     1 u32  reserved
     1 byte marginals needed
     1 byte completes needed
     1 byte max. cert depth
	    If any of this 3 values are changed, all cache records
	    must be invalidated.
     9 bytes reserved
d181 1
a181 1
    Due to the fact that we use the keyid to lookup keys, we can
d183 1
a183 1
    the overhead of gdbm.  A property of keyids is that they can be
d192 1
a192 1
    the keyid (depending on the indirection level).
d196 1
a196 1
     n u32  recnum; n depends on th record length:
d204 3
a206 3
    To look up a key we use its lsb to get the recnum from this
    hashtable and look up the addressed record:
       - If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd lsb
d208 5
a212 8
       - if this record is a hashlist, we walk thru the
	 reclist records until we found one whose hash field
	 matches the MSB of our keyid, and lookup this record
       - if this record is a dir record, we compare the
	 keyid and if this is correct, we get the keyrecod and compare
	 the fingerprint to decide whether it is the requested key;
	 if this is not the correct dir record, we look at the next
	 dir record which is linked by the link field.
d221 1
a221 2
    n times		 n = (reclen-6)/5
	1 byte hash
d224 1
a224 1
    For the current record length of 40, n is 6
@


1.19
log
@sync
@
text
@d103 2
a104 1
     8 bytes reserved
d122 2
a123 1
     2 byte reserved
@


1.18
log
@fixed severe exploit
@
text
@d59 1
a59 1
     1 byte value 1
d84 4
a87 4
     1 byte   reserved
     8 bytes keyid (We keep it here to speed up searching by keyid)
     1 u32   Local-Id.	This is simply the record number of this record.
     1 u32   primary public key (record number of it)
d89 3
a91 5
     1 u32   sigrecord
     1 byte  No signatures flag  (used to avoid duplicate building).
     3 byte  reserved
     1 u32   userid record
     6 byte reserved
d94 1
a94 1
Record type 3:
d97 1
a97 1
    These are static values which are never changed without user interaction.
d100 30
d131 18
a148 9
     1 u32   owner  This is used to bind all records for
	     a given certificate together. It is valid only in this TrustDB
	     and useful if we have duplicate keyids
	     It points back to the directory node.
     1 byte pubkey algorithm
     1 byte length of the fingerprint (in bytes)
     20 bytes fingerprint of the public key
     1 byte ownertrust if there is no trust defined for the userid:
     3 byte reserved
d151 1
a151 1
Record type 4:	(cache record)
d156 1
a156 1
     1 byte   value 4
a180 4
Record type 5  (sigrec)
-------------
    Used to keep track of valid key signatures. Self-signatures are not
    stored.
d182 2
a183 12
     1 byte   value 5
     1 byte   reserved
     1 u32    For Local-Id (points back to the directory record)
     1 u32    chain: next sigrec of this owner or 0 to indicate the
	      last sigrec.
     6 times
	1 u32  Local_id of signators pubkey record
	1 byte reserved


Record Type 6 (hash table)
-------------
d197 1
a197 1
     1 byte value 5
d220 2
a221 2
Record type 7  (hash list)
-------------
d224 1
a224 1
    1 byte value 6
d226 1
a226 1
    1 u32  chain	 next hash list record
a231 19

Record type 8: (userid)
--------------
    Informations about a userid
    We do not store the userid but the hash value of the userid because that
    is sufficient.

     1 byte value 8
     1 byte   reserved
     1 u32  owner; points to the directory record.
     1 u32  next userid
     1 byte subtype: 0 = a real user id
		     1 = not a real userid, but a "dummy" user of length 0
			 which is used to represent stuff that is directly
			 bound to the key.
     20 bytes ripemd160 hash of the username.
     1 u32  pointer to preference record
     1 byte ownertrust
     4 byte reserved
@


1.17
log
@intermediate release
@
text
@d87 1
a87 1
     1 u32   pubkey (record number of it)
d92 1
a92 1
     1 u32   preference record
d98 1
a98 1
    Informations about a public key certificate.
d110 1
a110 1
     1 byte ownertrust:
d209 19
@


1.16
log
@gnupg extension are now working
@
text
@d74 1
a74 1
	    muts be invalidated.
d91 3
a93 1
     13 byte reserved
d129 1
a129 1
	      is optained from a keyserved: simply create the hash from all
d167 1
a167 1
    Hashtables, record lists, and linked lists.
a208 1

@


1.15
log
@Sicherung
@
text
@d106 1
a106 1
     1 byte reserved
@


1.14
log
@*** empty log message ***
@
text
@d267 2
@


1.13
log
@add-key works
@
text
@d14 26
@


1.12
log
@vor muenchen
@
text
@d287 27
@


1.11
log
@applied Mathews typo and grammar fixes
@
text
@d246 1
a246 1
The Format of a request is:
d256 1
@


1.10
log
@cast5 does now work
@
text
@d9 1
a9 1
    * Revocation certificates consists only of the signature packet;
d20 1
a20 1
The TrustDB is build from fixed length records, where the first bytes
d32 1
a32 1
    record of the DB and the onyl one with type 1.
d77 1
a77 1
	     and usefull if we have duplicate keyids
d89 1
a89 1
    a pubring. This is used to cache informations.
d135 3
a137 3
    the overhead gdbm.	A property of keyids is that they can be
    used directly as hash value (They can be considered as strong
    random numbers.
d139 1
a139 1
    Hashtables, record lists, and linked list.
d142 1
a142 1
    is, that all these records are adjacent stored to make up one
d157 1
a157 1
    hashtable and look up this addressed record:
d160 2
a161 2
       - if this record is of hashlist, we lwalk thru these
	 reclist record until we found one whos hash fields
d165 1
a165 1
	 the fingerprint to decide wether it is the requested key;
d188 2
a189 2
GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understand OpenPGP packet header.
There is one enhavement used ith the old style packet headers:
@


1.9
log
@Renamed to GNUPG
@
text
@d237 49
@


1.8
log
@added revcation stuff and fixed a couple of bugs
@
text
@d34 1
a34 1
     3 bytes 'g10'  magic value
d188 1
a188 1
G10 uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understand OpenPGP packet header.
@


1.7
log
@auf tobold
@
text
@d9 4
d169 1
a169 1
Record type 7  (hast list)
d181 55
@


1.6
log
@*** empty log message ***
@
text
@d127 51
@


1.5
log
@Ready to test version 0.2.0
@
text
@d39 1
a39 5
     1 u32  Local-Id-Counter.  Used to keep track of Local-IDs.
	    32 bits are enough numbers for all practial purposes; if this
	    counter rolls over (due to deleted keyblock and new ones),
	    the software should reassign new Local-Ids to the whole
	    database (not expected to ever occur).
d47 2
a48 1
Record type 2:
d55 17
a71 1
     1 u32   Local-Id.	This is used to bind all records for
d74 1
a74 4
	     It is not defined, how an implementaion selects such
	     a Local-Id, but it may use the local-ID counter from
	     record type 1, or simply use the offset of Record type 2
     8 bytes keyid (of the primary key)
d79 1
a79 13
	      Bits 2-0:
	       0 = undefined (not yet initialized)
	       1 = unknown owner (could not initialize it)
	       2 = do not trust this owner
	       4 = usually trust this owner
	       5 = always trust this owner
	       7 = ultimately trust this owner.  This can only be set if
		   we have control over the secret key too.
	      Bit 3: set if key is revoked; do not use it.
	      Bit 7-4: reserved
     1 byte  No signatures (used to avoid duplicate building).
	     FIXME: this should be moved to the cahce record
     2 byte reserved
d82 1
a82 1
Record type 3:	(cache record)
d87 1
a87 1
     1 byte   value 3
d112 1
a112 1
Record type 4  (sigrec)
d117 1
a117 1
     1 byte   value 4
d119 1
a119 1
     1 u32    Local-Id of owners (pubkey record)
a125 8
Record type 5  (next-sigrec)
-------------
    This is the same as record type 4 but the record type is 5 and the
    local-id is only used to verify the internal db structure. You can
    not search for such a record; access is done based on the chain field
    in segrec or netx-sigrec.  This is, so that we can handle sigrecords
    more easier - there is no need to handle multiple sigrecs when searching
    for such a record.
@


1.4
log
@*** empty log message ***
@
text
@d14 2
d79 3
a81 1
     3 byte reserved
@


1.3
log
@*** empty log message ***
@
text
@d88 1
a88 1
     8 bytes  keyid of the primary key
d109 23
@


1.2
log
@started with trust stuff
@
text
@d39 1
a39 1
	    counter rolls over (due to deleted keyblock,an d new ones),
d52 1
d61 1
a61 1
	     record type 1
d71 3
a73 3
	       3 = usually trust this owner
	       4 = always trust this owner
	       5 = ultimately trust this owner.  This can only be set if
@


1.1
log
@ElGamal funktioniert und ist default
@
text
@d5 3
a7 1
	ELGAMAL := low 64 bits of y
d9 99
@
