





Network Working Group                                       J. Rosenberg
Request for Comments: 5360                                 Cisco Systems
Category: Standards Track                              G. Camarillo, Ed.
                                                                Ericsson
                                                               D. Willis
                                                            Unaffiliated
                                                            October 2008


              A Framework for Consent-Based Communications
                in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   SIP supports communications for several services, including real-time
   audio, video, text, instant messaging, and presence.  In its current
   form, it allows session invitations, instant messages, and other
   requests to be delivered from one party to another without requiring
   explicit consent of the recipient.  Without such consent, it is
   possible for SIP to be used for malicious purposes, including
   amplification and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.  This document
   identifies a framework for consent-based communications in SIP.





















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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
   2. Definitions and Terminology .....................................3
   3. Relays and Translations .........................................4
   4. Architecture ....................................................6
      4.1. Permissions at a Relay .....................................6
      4.2. Consenting Manipulations on a Relay's Translation Logic ....7
      4.3. Store-and-Forward Servers ..................................8
      4.4. Recipients Grant Permissions ...............................9
      4.5. Entities Implementing This Framework .......................9
   5. Framework Operations ............................................9
      5.1. Amplification Avoidance ...................................11
           5.1.1. Relay's Behavior ...................................12
      5.2. Subscription to the Permission Status .....................12
           5.2.1. Relay's Behavior ...................................13
      5.3. Request for Permission ....................................13
           5.3.1. Relay's Behavior ...................................13
      5.4. Permission Document Structure .............................15
      5.5. Permission Requested Notification .........................16
      5.6. Permission Grant ..........................................17
           5.6.1. Relay's Behavior ...................................17
                  5.6.1.1. SIP Identity ..............................17
                  5.6.1.2. P-Asserted-Identity .......................17
                  5.6.1.3. Return Routability ........................18
                  5.6.1.4. SIP Digest ................................19
      5.7. Permission Granted Notification ...........................19
      5.8. Permission Revocation .....................................19
      5.9. Request-Contained URI Lists ...............................20
           5.9.1. Relay's Behavior ...................................21
           5.9.2. Definition of the 470 Response Code ................21
           5.9.3. Definition of the Permission-Missing Header Field ..22
      5.10. Registrations ............................................22
      5.11. Relays Generating Traffic towards Recipients .............25
           5.11.1. Relay's Behavior ..................................25
           5.11.2. Definition of the Trigger-Consent Header Field ....25
   6. IANA Considerations ............................................26
      6.1. Registration of the 470 Response Code .....................26
      6.2. Registration of the Trigger-Consent Header Field ..........26
      6.3. Registration of the Permission-Missing Header Field .......26
      6.4. Registration of the target-uri Header Field Parameter .....26
   7. Security Considerations ........................................27
   8. Acknowledgments ................................................28
   9. References .....................................................28
      9.1. Normative References ......................................28
      9.2. Informative References ....................................29





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1.  Introduction

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] supports
   communications for several services, including real-time audio,
   video, text, instant messaging, and presence.  This communication is
   established by the transmission of various SIP requests (such as
   INVITE and MESSAGE [RFC3428]) from an initiator to the recipient with
   whom communication is desired.  Although a recipient of such a SIP
   request can reject the request, and therefore decline the session, a
   network of SIP proxy servers will deliver a SIP request to its
   recipients without their explicit consent.

   Receipt of these requests without explicit consent can cause a number
   of problems.  These include amplification and DoS (Denial of Service)
   attacks.  These problems are described in more detail in a companion
   requirements document [RFC4453].

   This specification defines a basic framework for adding consent-based
   communication to SIP.

2.  Definitions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Recipient URI:  The Request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an
      entity (e.g., a user agent or a proxy).  The sending of such
      request can have been the result of a translation operation.

   Relay:  Any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User
      Agent), or some hybrid, that receives a request, translates its
      Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs (i.e., recipient URIs),
      and delivers the request to those URIs.

   Target URI:  The Request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to a
      relay that will perform a translation operation.

   Translation logic:  The logic that defines a translation operation at
      a relay.  This logic includes the translation's target and
      recipient URIs.

   Translation operation:  Operation by which a relay translates the
      Request-URI of an incoming request (i.e., the target URI) into one
      or more URIs (i.e., recipient URIs) that are used as the Request-
      URIs of one or more outgoing requests.





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3.  Relays and Translations

   Relays play a key role in this framework.  A relay is defined as any
   SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some
   hybrid, that receives a request, translates its Request-URI into one
   or more next-hop URIs, and delivers the request to those URIs.  The
   Request-URI of the incoming request is referred to as 'target URI'
   and the destination URIs of the outgoing requests are referred to as
   'recipient URIs', as shown in Figure 1.

                       +---------------+  recipient URI
                       |               |---------------->
                       |               |
           target URI  |  Translation  |     [...]
        -------------->|   Operation   |
                       |               |  recipient URI
                       |               |---------------->
                       +---------------+

                      Figure 1: Translation Operation

   Thus, an essential aspect of a relay is that of translation.  When a
   relay receives a request, it translates the Request-URI (target URI)
   into one or more additional URIs (recipient URIs).  Through this
   translation operation, the relay can create outgoing requests to one
   or more additional recipient URIs, thus creating the consent problem.

   The consent problem is created by two types of translations:
   translations based on local data and translations that involve
   amplifications.

   Translation operations based on local policy or local data (such as
   registrations) are the vehicle by which a request is delivered
   directly to an endpoint, when it would not otherwise be possible to.
   In other words, if a spammer has the address of a user,
   'sip:user@example.com', it cannot deliver a MESSAGE request to the UA
   (user agent) of that user without having access to the registration
   data that maps 'sip:user@example.com' to the user agent on which that
   user is present.  Thus, it is the usage of this registration data,
   and more generally, the translation logic, that is expected to be
   authorized in order to prevent undesired communications.  Of course,
   if the spammer knows the address of the user agent, it will be able
   to deliver requests directly to it.

   Translation operations that result in more than one recipient URI are
   a source of amplification.  Servers that do not perform translations,
   such as outbound proxy servers, do not cause amplification.  On the
   other hand, servers that perform translations (e.g., inbound proxies



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   authoritatively responsible for a SIP domain) may cause amplification
   if the user can be reached at multiple endpoints (thereby resulting
   in multiple recipient URIs).

   Figure 2 shows a relay that performs translations.  The user agent
   client in the figure sends a SIP request to a URI representing a
   resource in the domain 'example.com' (sip:resource@example.com).
   This request can pass through a local outbound proxy (not shown), but
   eventually arrives at a server authoritative for the domain
   'example.com'.  This server, which acts as a relay, performs a
   translation operation, translating the target URI into one or more
   recipient URIs, which can (but need not) belong to the domain
   'example.com'.  This relay can be, for instance, a proxy server or a
   URI-list service [RFC5363].

                                                    +-------+
                                                    |       |
                                                   >|  UA   |
                                                  / |       |
                                                 /  +-------+
                                                /
                                               /
                  +-----------------------+   /
                  |                       |  /
    +-----+       |         Relay         | /       +-------+
    |     |       |                       |/        |       |
    | UA  |------>|                       |-------->| Proxy |
    |     |       |+---------------------+|\        |       |
    +-----+       ||     Translation     || \       +-------+
                  ||        Logic        ||  \
                  |+---------------------+|   \       [...]
                  +-----------------------+    \
                                                \
                                                 \  +-------+
                                                  \ |       |
                                                   >| B2BUA |
                                                    |       |
                                                    +-------+

                 Figure 2: Relay Performing a Translation

   This framework allows potential recipients of a translation to agree
   to be actual recipients by giving the relay performing the
   translation permission to send them traffic.







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4.  Architecture

   Figure 3 shows the architectural elements of this framework.  The
   manipulation of a relay's translation logic typically causes the
   relay to send a permission request, which in turn causes the
   recipient to grant or deny the relay permissions for the translation.
   Section 4.1 describes the role of permissions at a relay.  Section
   4.2 discusses the actions taken by a relay when its translation logic
   is manipulated by a client.  Section 4.3 discusses store-and-forward
   servers and their functionality.  Section 4.4 describes how potential
   recipients can grant a relay permissions to add them to the relay's
   translation logic.  Section 4.5 discusses which entities need to
   implement this framework.

                  +-----------------------+ Permission +-------------+
                  |                       |  Request   |             |
   +--------+     |         Relay         |----------->| Store & Fwd |
   |        |     |                       |            |   Server    |
   | Client |     |                       |            |             |
   |        |     |+-------+ +-----------+|            +-------------+
   +--------+     ||Transl.| |Permissions||                   |
       |          ||Logic  | |           ||        Permission |
       |          |+-------+ +-----------+|         Request   |
       |          +-----------------------+                   V
       |               ^           ^                   +-------------+
       | Manipulation  |           |  Permission Grant |             |
       +---------------+           +-------------------|  Recipient  |
                                                       |             |
                                                       +-------------+

                     Figure 3: Reference Architecture

4.1.  Permissions at a Relay

   Relays implementing this framework obtain and store permissions
   associated to their translation logic.  These permissions indicate
   whether or not a particular recipient has agreed to receive traffic
   at any given time.  Recipients that have not given the relay
   permission to send them traffic are simply ignored by the relay when
   performing a translation.

   In principle, permissions are valid as long as the context where they
   were granted is valid or until they are revoked.  For example, the
   permissions obtained by a URI-list SIP service that distributes
   MESSAGE requests to a set of recipients will be valid as long as the
   URI-list SIP service exists or until the permissions are revoked.





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   Additionally, if a recipient is removed from a relay's translation
   logic, the relay SHOULD delete the permissions related to that
   recipient.  For example, if the registration of a contact URI expires
   or is otherwise terminated, the registrar deletes the permissions
   related to that contact address.

   It is also RECOMMENDED that relays request recipients to refresh
   their permissions periodically.  If a recipient fails to refresh its
   permissions for a given period of time, the relay SHOULD delete the
   permissions related to that recipient.

      This framework does not provide any guidance for the values of the
      refreshment intervals because different applications can have
      different requirements to set those values.  For example, a relay
      dealing with recipients that do not implement this framework may
      choose to use longer intervals between refreshes.  The refresh
      process in such recipients has to be performed manually by their
      users (since the recipients do not implement this framework), and
      having too short refresh intervals may become too heavy a burden
      for those users.

4.2.  Consenting Manipulations on a Relay's Translation Logic

   This framework aims to ensure that any particular relay only performs
   translations towards destinations that have given the relay
   permission to perform such a translation.  Consequently, when the
   translation logic of a relay is manipulated (e.g., a new recipient
   URI is added), the relay obtains permission from the new recipient in
   order to install the new translation logic.  Relays ask recipients
   for permission using MESSAGE [RFC3428] requests.

   For example, the relay hosting the URI-list service at
   'sip:friends@example.com' performs a translation from that target URI
   to a set of recipient URIs.  When a client (e.g., the administrator
   of that URI-list service) adds 'bob@example.org' as a new recipient
   URI, the relay sends a MESSAGE request to 'sip:bob@example.org'
   asking whether or not it is OK to perform the translation from
   'sip:friends@example.com' to 'sip:bob@example.org'.  The MESSAGE
   request carries in its message body a permission document that
   describes the translation for which permissions are being requested
   and a human-readable part that also describes the translation.  If
   the answer is positive, the new translation logic is installed at the
   relay.  That is, the new recipient URI is added.

      The human-readable part is included so that user agents that do
      not understand permission documents can still process the request
      and display it in a sensible way to the user.




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   The mechanism to be used to manipulate the translation logic of a
   particular relay depends on the relay.  Two existing mechanisms to
   manipulate translation logic are XML Configuration Access Protocol
   (XCAP) [RFC4825] and REGISTER transactions.

      Section 5 uses a URI-list service whose translation logic is
      manipulated with XCAP as an example of a translation, in order to
      specify this framework.  Section 5.10 discusses how to apply this
      framework to registrations, which are a different type of
      translation.

   In any case, relays implementing this framework SHOULD have a means
   to indicate that a particular recipient URI is in the states
   specified in [RFC5362] (i.e., pending, waiting, error, denied, or
   granted).

4.3.  Store-and-Forward Servers

   When a MESSAGE request with a permission document arrives to the
   recipient URI to which it was sent by the relay, the receiving user
   can grant or deny the permission needed to perform the translation.
   However, the receiving user may not be available when the MESSAGE
   request arrives, or it may have expressed preferences to block all
   incoming requests for a certain time period.  In such cases, a
   store-and-forward server can act as a substitute for the user and
   buffer the incoming MESSAGE requests, which are subsequently
   delivered to the user when he or she is available again.

   There are several mechanisms to implement store-and-forward message
   services (e.g., with an instant message to email gateway).  Any of
   these mechanisms can be used between a user agent and its store-and-
   forward server as long as they agree on which mechanism to use.
   Therefore, this framework does not make any provision for the
   interface between user agents and their store-and-forward servers.

      Note that the same store-and-forward message service can handle
      all incoming MESSAGE requests for a user while they are offline,
      not only those MESSAGE requests with a permission document in
      their bodies.

   Even though store-and-forward servers perform a useful function and
   they are expected to be deployed in most domains, some domains will
   not deploy them from the outset.  However, user agents and relays in
   domains without store-and-forward servers can still use this consent
   framework.






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   When a relay requests permissions from an offline user agent that
   does not have an associated store-and-forward server, the relay will
   obtain an error response indicating that its MESSAGE request could
   not be delivered.  The client that attempted to add the offline user
   to the relay's translation logic will be notified about the error
   (e.g., using the Pending Additions event package [RFC5362]).  This
   client MAY attempt to add the same user at a later point, hopefully
   when the user is online.  Clients can discover whether or not a user
   is online by using a presence service, for instance.

4.4.  Recipients Grant Permissions

   Permission documents generated by a relay include URIs that can be
   used by the recipient of the document to grant or deny the relay the
   permission described in the document.  Relays always include SIP URIs
   and can include HTTP [RFC2616] URIs for this purpose.  Consequently,
   recipients provide relays with permissions using SIP PUBLISH requests
   or HTTP GET requests.

4.5.  Entities Implementing This Framework

   The goal of this framework is to keep relays from executing
   translations towards unwilling recipients.  Therefore, all relays
   MUST implement this framework in order to avoid being used to perform
   attacks (e.g., amplification attacks).

   This framework has been designed with backwards compatibility in mind
   so that legacy user agents (i.e., user agents that do not implement
   this framework) can act both as clients and recipients with an
   acceptable level of functionality.  However, it is RECOMMENDED that
   user agents implement this framework, which includes supporting the
   Pending Additions event package specified in [RFC5362], the format
   for permission documents specified in [RFC5361], and the header
   fields and response code specified in this document, in order to
   achieve full functionality.

   The only requirement that this framework places on store-and-forward
   servers is that they need to be able to deliver encrypted and
   integrity-protected messages to their user agents, as discussed in
   Section 7.  However, this is not a requirement specific to this
   framework but a general requirement for store-and-forward servers.

5.  Framework Operations

   This section specifies this consent framework using an example of the
   prototypical call flow.  The elements described in Section 4 (i.e.,
   relays, translations, and store-and-forward servers) play an
   essential role in this call flow.



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   Figure 4 shows the complete process to add a recipient URI
   ('sip:B@example.com') to the translation logic of a relay.  User A
   attempts to add 'sip:B@example.com' as a new recipient URI to the
   translation logic of the relay (1).  User A uses XCAP [RFC4825] and
   the XML (Extensible Markup Language) format for representing resource
   lists [RFC4826] to perform this addition.  Since the relay does not
   have permission from 'sip:B@example.com' to perform translations
   towards that URI, the relay places 'sip:B@example.com' in the pending
   state, as specified in [RFC5362].










































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   A@example.com        Relay       B's Store & Fwd   B@example.com
                                         Server

         |(1) Add Recipient                |                |
         |    sip:B@example.com            |                |
         |--------------->|                |                |
         |(2) HTTP 202 (Accepted)          |                |
         |<---------------|                |                |
         |                |(3) MESSAGE sip:B@example        |
         |                |    Permission Document          |
         |                |--------------->|                |
         |                |(4) 202 Accepted|                |
         |                |<---------------|                |
         |(5) SUBSCRIBE   |                |                |
         |    Event: pending-additions     |                |
         |--------------->|                |                |
         |(6) 200 OK      |                |                |
         |<---------------|                |                |
         |(7) NOTIFY      |                |                |
         |<---------------|                |                |
         |(8) 200 OK      |                |                |
         |--------------->|                |                |
         |                |                |                |User B goes
         |                |                |                |  online
         |                |                |(9) Request for |
         |                |                |  stored messages
         |                |                |<---------------|
         |                |                |(10) Delivery of|
         |                |                |  stored messages
         |                |                |--------------->|
         |                |(11) PUBLISH uri-up              |
         |                |<--------------------------------|
         |                |(12) 200 OK     |                |
         |                |-------------------------------->|
         |(13) NOTIFY     |                |                |
         |<---------------|                |                |
         |(14) 200 OK     |                |                |
         |--------------->|                |                |

                     Figure 4: Prototypical Call Flow

5.1.  Amplification Avoidance

   Once 'sip:B@example.com' is in the pending state, the relay needs to
   ask user B for permission by sending a MESSAGE request to
   'sip:B@example.com'.  However, the relay needs to ensure that it is
   not used as an amplifier to launch amplification attacks.




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   In such an attack, the attacker would add a large number of recipient
   URIs to the translation logic of a relay.  The relay would then send
   a MESSAGE request to each of those recipient URIs.  The bandwidth
   generated by the relay would be much higher than the bandwidth used
   by the attacker to add those recipient URIs to the translation logic
   of the relay.

   This framework uses a credit-based authorization mechanism to avoid
   the attack just described.  It requires users adding new recipient
   URIs to a translation to generate an amount of bandwidth that is
   comparable to the bandwidth the relay will generate when sending
   MESSAGE requests towards those recipient URIs.  When XCAP is used,
   this requirement is met by not allowing clients to add more than one
   URI per HTTP transaction.  When a REGISTER transaction is used, this
   requirement is met by not allowing clients to register more than one
   contact per REGISTER transaction.

5.1.1.  Relay's Behavior

   Relays implementing this framework MUST NOT allow clients to add more
   than one recipient URI per transaction.  If a client using XCAP
   attempts to add more than one recipient URI in a single HTTP
   transaction, the XCAP server SHOULD return an HTTP 409 (Conflict)
   response.  The XCAP server SHOULD describe the reason for the refusal
   in an XML body using the <constraint-failure> element, as described
   in [RFC4825].  If a client attempts to register more than one contact
   in a single REGISTER transaction, the registrar SHOULD return a SIP
   403 response and explain the reason for the refusal in its reason
   phrase (e.g., maximum one contact per registration).

5.2.  Subscription to the Permission Status

   Clients need a way to be informed about the status of the operations
   they requested.  Otherwise, users can be waiting for an operation to
   succeed when it has actually already failed.  In particular, if the
   target of the request for consent was not reachable and did not have
   an associated store-and-forward server, the client needs to know to
   retry the request later.  The Pending Additions SIP event package
   [RFC5362] is a way to provide clients with that information.

   Clients can use the Pending Additions SIP event package to be
   informed about the status of the operations they requested.  That is,
   the client will be informed when an operation (e.g., the addition of
   a recipient URI to a relay's translation logic) is authorized (and
   thus executed) or rejected.  Clients use the target URI of the SIP
   translation being manipulated to subscribe to the 'pending-additions'
   event package.




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   In our example, after receiving the response from the relay (2), user
   A subscribes to the Pending Additions event package at the relay (5).
   This subscription keeps user A informed about the status of the
   permissions (e.g., granted or denied) the relay will obtain.

5.2.1.  Relay's Behavior

   Relays SHOULD support the Pending Additions SIP event package
   specified in [RFC5362].

5.3.  Request for Permission

   A relay requests permissions from potential recipients to add them to
   its translation logic using MESSAGE requests.  In our example, on
   receiving the request to add user B to the translation logic of the
   relay (1), the relay generates a MESSAGE request (3) towards
   'sip:B@example.com'.  This MESSAGE request carries a permission
   document, which describes the translation that needs to be authorized
   and carries a set of URIs to be used by the recipient to grant or to
   deny the relay permission to perform that translation.  Since user B
   is offline, the MESSAGE request will be buffered by user B's store-
   and-forward server.  User B will later go online and authorize the
   translation by using one of those URIs, as described in Section 5.6.
   The MESSAGE request also carries a body part that contains the same
   information as the permission document but in a human-readable
   format.

   When user B uses one of the URIs in the permission document to grant
   or deny permissions, the relay needs to make sure that it was
   actually user B using that URI, and not an attacker.  The relay can
   use any of the methods described in Section 5.6 to authenticate the
   permission document.

5.3.1.  Relay's Behavior

   Relays that implement this framework MUST obtain permissions from
   potential recipients before adding them to their translation logic.
   Relays request permissions from potential recipients using MESSAGE
   requests.

   Section 5.6 describes the methods a relay can use to authenticate
   those recipients giving the relay permission to perform a particular
   translation.  These methods are SIP identity [RFC4474],
   P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325], a return routability test, or SIP
   digest.  Relays that use the method consisting of a return
   routability test have to send their MESSAGE requests to a SIPS URI,
   as specified in Section 5.6.




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   MESSAGE requests sent to request permissions MUST include a
   permission document and SHOULD include a human-readable part in their
   bodies.  The human-readable part contains the same information as the
   permission document (but in a human-readable format), including the
   URIs to grant and deny permissions.  User agents that do not
   understand permission documents can still process the request and
   display it in a sensible way to the user, as they would display any
   other instant message.  This way, even if the user agent does not
   implement this framework, the (human) user will be able to manually
   click on the correct URI in order to grant or deny permissions.  The
   following is an example of a MESSAGE request that carries a human-
   readable part and a permission document, which follows the format
   specified in [RFC5361], in its body.  Not all header fields are shown
   for simplicity reasons.

   MESSAGE sip:bob@example.org SIP/2.0
   From: <sip:alices-friends@example.com>;tag=12345678
   To: <sip:bob@example.org>
   Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary="boundary1"

   --boundary1
   Content-Type: text/plain

   If you consent to receive traffic sent to
   <sip:alices-friends@example.com>, please use one of the following
   URIs: <sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com> or
   <https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34>.  Otherwise, use one of
   the following URIs: <sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com> or
   <https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye>.
   --boundary1
   Content-Type: application/auth-policy+xml

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
        <cp:ruleset
            xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
            xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
            xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
            <cp:rule id="f1">
         <cp:conditions>
             <cp:identity>
                 <cp:many/>
             </cp:identity>
             <recipient>
                 <cp:one id="sip:bob@example.org"/>
             </recipient>
             <target>
                 <cp:one id="sip:alices-friends@example.com"/>
             </target>



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         </cp:conditions>
         <cp:actions>
             <trans-handling
                 perm-uri="sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com">
                 grant</trans-handling>
             <trans-handling
                 perm-uri="https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34">
                 grant</trans-handling>
             <trans-handling
                 perm-uri="sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com">
                 deny</trans-handling>
             <trans-handling
                 perm-uri="https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye">
                 deny</trans-handling>
         </cp:actions>
         <cp:transformations/>
     </cp:rule>
     </cp:ruleset>
   --boundary1--

5.4.  Permission Document Structure

   A permission document is the representation (e.g., encoded in XML) of
   a permission.  A permission document contains several pieces of data:

   Identity of the Sender:  A URI representing the identity of the
      sender for whom permissions are granted.

   Identity of the Original Recipient:  A URI representing the identity
      of the original recipient, which is used as the input for the
      translation operation.  This is also called the target URI.

   Identity of the Final Recipient:  A URI representing the result of
      the translation.  The permission grants ability for the sender to
      send requests to the target URI and for a relay receiving those
      requests to forward them to this URI.  This is also called the
      recipient URI.

   URIs to Grant Permission:  URIs that recipients can use to grant the
      relay permission to perform the translation described in the
      document.  Relays MUST support the use of SIP and SIPS URIs in
      permission documents and MAY support the use of HTTP and HTTPS
      URIs.








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   URIs to Deny Permission:  URIs that recipients can use to deny the
      relay permission to perform the translation described in the
      document.  Relays MUST support the use of SIP and SIPS URIs in
      permission documents and MAY support the use of HTTP and HTTPS
      URIs.

   Permission documents can contain wildcards.  For example, a
   permission document can request permission for any relay to forward
   requests coming from a particular sender to a particular recipient.
   Such a permission document would apply to any target URI.  That is,
   the field containing the identity of the original recipient would
   match any URI.  However, the recipient URI MUST NOT be wildcarded.

   Entities implementing this framework MUST support the format for
   permission documents defined in [RFC5361] and MAY support other
   formats.

   In our example, the permission document in the MESSAGE request (3)
   sent by the relay contains the following values:

   Identity of the Sender:  Any sender

   Identity of the Original Recipient:  sip:friends@example.com

   Identity of the Final Recipient:  sip:B@example.com

   URI to Grant Permission:  sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com

   URI to Grant Permission:  https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34

   URI to Deny Permission:  sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com

   URI to Deny Permission:  https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye

   It is expected that the Sender field often contains a wildcard.
   However, scenarios involving request-contained URI lists, such as the
   one described in Section 5.9, can require permission documents that
   apply to a specific sender.  In cases where the identity of the
   sender matters, relays MUST authenticate senders.

5.5.  Permission Requested Notification

   On receiving the MESSAGE request (3), user B's store-and-forward
   server stores it because user B is offline at that point.  When user
   B goes online, user B fetches all the requests its store-and-forward
   server has stored (9).





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5.6.  Permission Grant

   A recipient gives a relay permission to execute the translation
   described in a permission document by sending a SIP PUBLISH or an
   HTTP GET request to one of the URIs to grant permissions contained in
   the document.  Similarly, a recipient denies a relay permission to
   execute the translation described in a permission document by sending
   a SIP PUBLISH or an HTTP GET request to one of the URIs to deny
   permissions contained in the document.  Requests to grant or deny
   permissions contain an empty body.

   In our example, user B obtains the permission document (10) that was
   received earlier by its store-and-forward server in the MESSAGE
   request (3).  User B authorizes the translation described in the
   permission document received by sending a PUBLISH request (11) to the
   SIP URI to grant permissions contained in the permission document.

5.6.1.  Relay's Behavior

   Relays MUST ensure that the SIP PUBLISH or the HTTP GET request
   received was generated by the recipient of the translation and not by
   an attacker.  Relays can use four methods to authenticate those
   requests: SIP identity, P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325], a return
   routability test, or SIP digest.  While return routability tests can
   be used to authenticate both SIP PUBLISH and HTTP GET requests, SIP
   identity, P-Asserted-Identity, and SIP digest can only be used to
   authenticate SIP PUBLISH requests.  SIP digest can only be used to
   authenticate recipients that share a secret with the relay (e.g.,
   recipients that are in the same domain as the relay).

5.6.1.1.  SIP Identity

   The SIP identity [RFC4474] mechanism can be used to authenticate the
   sender of a PUBLISH request.  The relay MUST check that the
   originator of the PUBLISH request is the owner of the recipient URI
   in the permission document.  Otherwise, the PUBLISH request SHOULD be
   responded with a 401 (Unauthorized) response and MUST NOT be
   processed further.

5.6.1.2.  P-Asserted-Identity

   The P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] mechanism can also be used to
   authenticate the sender of a PUBLISH request.  However, as discussed
   in [RFC3325], this mechanism is intended to be used only within
   networks of trusted SIP servers.  That is, the use of this mechanism
   is only applicable inside an administrative domain with previously
   agreed-upon policies.




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   The relay MUST check that the originator of the PUBLISH request is
   the owner of the recipient URI in the permission document.
   Otherwise, the PUBLISH request SHOULD be responded with a 401
   (Unauthorized) response and MUST NOT be processed further.

5.6.1.3.  Return Routability

   SIP identity provides a good authentication mechanism for incoming
   PUBLISH requests.  Nevertheless, SIP identity is not widely available
   on the public Internet yet.  That is why an authentication mechanism
   that can already be used at this point is needed.

   Return routability tests do not provide the same level of security as
   SIP identity, but they provide a better-than-nothing security level
   in architectures where the SIP identity mechanism is not available
   (e.g., the current Internet).  The relay generates an unguessable URI
   (i.e., with a cryptographically random user part) and places it in
   the permission document in the MESSAGE request (3).  The recipient
   needs to send a SIP PUBLISH request or an HTTP GET request to that
   URI.  Any incoming request sent to that URI SHOULD be considered
   authenticated by the relay.

      Note that the return routability method is the only one that
      allows the use of HTTP URIs in permission documents.  The other
      methods require the use of SIP URIs.

   Relays using a return routability test to perform this authentication
   MUST send the MESSAGE request with the permission document to a SIPS
   URI.  This ensures that attackers do not get access to the
   (unguessable) URI.  Thus, the only user able to use the (unguessable)
   URI is the receiver of the MESSAGE request.  Similarly, permission
   documents sent by relays using a return routability test MUST only
   contain secure URIs (i.e., SIPS and HTTPS) to grant and deny
   permissions.  A part of these URIs (e.g., the user part of a SIPS
   URI) MUST be cryptographically random with at least 32 bits of
   randomness.

   Relays can transition from return routability tests to SIP identity
   by simply requiring the use of SIP identity for incoming PUBLISH
   requests.  That is, such a relay would reject PUBLISH requests that
   did not use SIP identity.










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5.6.1.4.  SIP Digest

   The SIP digest mechanism can be used to authenticate the sender of a
   PUBLISH request as long as that sender shares a secret with the
   relay.  The relay MUST check that the originator of the PUBLISH
   request is the owner of the recipient URI in the permission document.
   Otherwise, the PUBLISH request SHOULD be responded with a 401
   (Unauthorized) response and MUST NOT be processed further.

5.7.  Permission Granted Notification

   On receiving the PUBLISH request (11), the relay sends a NOTIFY
   request (13) to inform user A that the permission for the translation
   has been received and that the translation logic at the relay has
   been updated.  That is, 'sip:B@example.com' has been added as a
   recipient URI.

5.8.  Permission Revocation

   At any time, if a recipient wants to revoke any permission, it uses
   the URI it received in the permission document to deny the
   permissions it previously granted.  If a recipient loses this URI for
   some reason, it needs to wait until it receives a new request
   produced by the translation.  Such a request will contain a Trigger-
   Consent header field with a URI.  That Trigger-Consent header field
   will have a target-uri header field parameter identifying the target
   URI of the translation.  The recipient needs to send a PUBLISH
   request with an empty body to the URI in the Trigger-Consent header
   field in order to receive a MESSAGE request from the relay.  Such a
   MESSAGE request will contain a permission document with a URI to
   revoke the permission that was previously granted.

   Figure 5 shows an example of how a user that lost the URI to revoke
   permissions at a relay can obtain a new URI using the Trigger-Consent
   header field of an incoming request.  The user rejects an incoming
   INVITE (1) request, which contains a Trigger-Consent header field.
   Using the URI in that header field, the user sends a PUBLISH request
   (4) to the relay.  On receiving the PUBLISH request (4), the relay
   generates a MESSAGE request (6) towards the user.  Finally, the user
   revokes the permissions by sending a PUBLISH request (8) to the
   relay.










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           Relay                     B@example.com
             |(1) INVITE                   |
             |    Trigger-Consent: sip:123@relay.example.com
             |     ;target-uri="sip:friends@relay.example.com"
             |---------------------------->|
             |(2) 603 Decline              |
             |<----------------------------|
             |(3) ACK                      |
             |---------------------------->|
             |(4) PUBLISH sip:123@relay.example.com
             |<----------------------------|
             |(5) 200 OK                   |
             |---------------------------->|
             |(6) MESSAGE sip:B@example    |
             |    Permission Document      |
             |---------------------------->|
             |(7) 200 OK                   |
             |<----------------------------|
             |(8) PUBLISH uri-deny         |
             |<----------------------------|
             |(9) 200 OK                   |
             |---------------------------->|

                      Figure 5: Permission Revocation

5.9.  Request-Contained URI Lists

   In the scenarios described so far, a user adds recipient URIs to the
   translation logic of a relay.  However, the relay does not perform
   translations towards those recipient URIs until permissions are
   obtained.

   URI-list services using request-contained URI lists are a special
   case because the selection of recipient URIs is performed at the same
   time as the communication attempt.  A user places a set of recipient
   URIs in a request and sends it to a relay so that the relay sends a
   similar request to all those recipient URIs.

   Relays implementing this consent framework and providing request-
   contained URI-list services behave in a slightly different way than
   the relays described so far.  This type of relay also maintains a
   list of recipient URIs for which permissions have been received.
   Clients also manipulate this list using a manipulation mechanism
   (e.g., XCAP).  Nevertheless, this list does not represent the
   recipient URIs of every translation performed by the relay.  This
   list just represents all the recipient URIs for which permissions
   have been received -- that is, the set of URIs that will be accepted




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   if a request containing a URI-list arrives to the relay.  This set of
   URIs is a superset of the recipient URIs of any particular
   translation the relay performs.

5.9.1.  Relay's Behavior

   On receiving a request-contained URI list, the relay checks whether
   or not it has permissions for all the URIs contained in the incoming
   URI list.  If it does, the relay performs the translation.  If it
   lacks permissions for one or more URIs, the relay MUST NOT perform
   the translation and SHOULD return an error response.

   A relay that receives a request-contained URI list with a URI for
   which the relay has no permissions SHOULD return a 470 (Consent
   Needed) response.  The relay SHOULD add a Permission-Missing header
   field with the URIs for which the relay has no permissions.

   Figure 6 shows a relay that receives a request (1) that contains URIs
   for which the relay does not have permission (the INVITE carries the
   recipient URIs in its message body).  The relay rejects the request
   with a 470 (Consent Needed) response (2).  That response contains a
   Permission-Missing header field with the URIs for which there was no
   permission.

       A@example.com               Relay

             |(1) INVITE             |
             |    sip:B@example.com  |
             |    sip:C@example.com  |
             |---------------------->|
             |(2) 470 Consent Needed |
             |    Permission-Missing: sip:C@example.com
             |<----------------------|
             |(3) ACK                |
             |---------------------->|

               Figure 6: INVITE with a URI List in Its Body

5.9.2.  Definition of the 470 Response Code

   A 470 (Consent Needed) response indicates that the request that
   triggered the response contained a URI list with at least one URI for
   which the relay had no permissions.  A user agent server generating a
   470 (Consent Needed) response SHOULD include a Permission-Missing
   header field in it.  This header field carries the URI or URIs for
   which the relay had no permissions.





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   A user agent client receiving a 470 (Consent Needed) response without
   a Permission-Missing header field needs to use an alternative
   mechanism (e.g., XCAP) to discover for which URI or URIs there were
   no permissions.

   A client receiving a 470 (Consent Needed) response uses a
   manipulation mechanism (e.g., XCAP) to add those URIs to the relay's
   list of URIs.  The relay will obtain permissions for those URIs as
   usual.

5.9.3.  Definition of the Permission-Missing Header Field

   Permission-Missing header fields carry URIs for which a relay did not
   have permissions.  The following is the augmented Backus-Naur Form
   (BNF) [RFC5234] syntax of the Permission-Missing header field.  Some
   of its elements are defined in [RFC3261].

      Permission-Missing  =  "Permission-Missing" HCOLON per-miss-spec
                             *( COMMA per-miss-spec )
      per-miss-spec       =  ( name-addr / addr-spec )
                            *( SEMI generic-param )

   The following is an example of a Permission-Missing header field:

      Permission-Missing: sip:C@example.com

5.10.  Registrations

   Even though the example used to specify this framework has been a
   URI-list service, this framework applies to any type of translation
   (i.e., not only to URI-list services).  Registrations are a different
   type of translations that deserve discussion.

   Registrations are a special type of translations.  The user
   registering has a trust relationship with the registrar in its home
   domain.  This is not the case when a user gives any type of
   permissions to a relay in a different domain.

   Traditionally, REGISTER transactions have performed two operations at
   the same time: setting up a translation and authorizing the use of
   that translation.  For example, a user registering its current
   contact URI is giving permission to the registrar to forward traffic
   sent to the user's AoR (Address of Record) to the registered contact
   URI.  This works fine when the entity registering is the same as the
   one that will be receiving traffic at a later point (e.g., the entity






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   receives traffic over the same connection used for the registration
   as described in [OUTBOUND]).  However, this schema creates some
   potential attacks that relate to third-party registrations.

   An attacker binds, via a registration, his or her AoR with the
   contact URI of a victim.  Now the victim will receive unsolicited
   traffic that was originally addressed to the attacker.

   The process of authorizing a registration is shown in Figure 7.  User
   A performs a third-party registration (1) and receives a 202
   (Accepted) response (2).

   Since the relay does not have permission from
   'sip:a@ws123.example.com' to perform translations towards that
   recipient URI, the relay places 'sip:a@ws123.example.com' in the
   'pending' state.  Once 'sip:a@ws123.example.com' is in the
   'Permission Pending' state, the registrar needs to ask
   'sip:a@ws123.example.com' for permission by sending a MESSAGE request
   (3).

   After receiving the response from the relay (2), user A subscribes to
   the Pending Additions event package at the registrar (5).  This
   subscription keeps the user informed about the status of the
   permissions (e.g., granted or denied) the registrar will obtain.  The
   rest of the process is similar to the one described in Section 5.


























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   A@example.com         Registrar      a@ws123.example.com

         |(1) REGISTER       |                   |
         |    Contact: sip:a@ws123.example.com   |
         |------------------>|                   |
         |(2) 202 Accepted OK|                   |
         |<------------------|                   |
         |                   |(3) MESSAGE sip:a@ws123.example
         |                   |    Permission Document
         |                   |------------------>|
         |                   |(4) 200 OK         |
         |                   |<------------------|
         |(5) SUBSCRIBE      |                   |
         |    Event: pending-additions           |
         |------------------>|                   |
         |(6) 200 OK         |                   |
         |<------------------|                   |
         |(7) NOTIFY         |                   |
         |<------------------|                   |
         |(8) 200 OK         |                   |
         |------------------>|                   |
         |                   |(9) PUBLISH uri-up |
         |                   |<------------------|
         |                   |(10) 200 OK        |
         |                   |------------------>|
         |(11) NOTIFY        |                   |
         |<------------------|                   |
         |(12) 200 OK        |                   |
         |------------------>|                   |

                          Figure 7: Registration

   Permission documents generated by registrars are typically very
   general.  For example, in one such document a registrar can ask a
   recipient for permission to forward any request from any sender to
   the recipient's URI.  This is the type of granularity that this
   framework intends to provide for registrations.  Users who want to
   define how incoming requests are treated with a finer granularity
   (e.g., requests from user A are only accepted between 9:00 and 11:00)
   will have to use other mechanisms such as Call Processing Language
   (CPL) [RFC3880].

      Note that, as indicated previously, user agents using the same
      connection to register and to receive traffic from the registrar,
      as described in [OUTBOUND], do not need to use the mechanism
      described in this section.





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   A user agent being registered by a third party can be unable to use
   the SIP Identity, P-Asserted-Identity, or SIP digest mechanisms to
   prove to the registrar that the user agent is the owner of the URI
   being registered (e.g., sip:user@192.0.2.1), which is the recipient
   URI of the translation.  In this case, return routability MUST be
   used.

5.11.  Relays Generating Traffic towards Recipients

   Relays generating traffic towards recipients need to make sure that
   those recipients can revoke the permissions they gave at any time.
   The Trigger-Consent helps achieve this.

5.11.1.  Relay's Behavior

   A relay executing a translation that involves sending a request to a
   URI from which permissions were obtained previously SHOULD add a
   Trigger-Consent header field to the request.  The URI in the
   Trigger-Consent header field MUST have a target-uri header field
   parameter identifying the target URI of the translation.

   On receiving a PUBLISH request addressed to the URI that a relay
   previously placed in a Trigger-Consent header field, the relay SHOULD
   send a MESSAGE request to the corresponding recipient URI with a
   permission document.  Therefore, the relay needs to be able to
   correlate the URI it places in the Trigger-Consent header field with
   the recipient URI of the translation.

5.11.2.  Definition of the Trigger-Consent Header Field

   The following is the augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) [RFC5234]
   syntax of the Trigger-Consent header field.  Some of its elements are
   defined in [RFC3261].

      Trigger-Consent     =  "Trigger-Consent" HCOLON trigger-cons-spec
                             *( COMMA trigger-cons-spec )
      trigger-cons-spec   =  ( SIP-URI / SIPS-URI )
                             *( SEMI trigger-param )
      trigger-param       =  target-uri / generic-param
      target-uri          =  "target-uri" EQUAL
                                 LDQUOT *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) RDQUOT

   The target-uri header field parameter MUST contain a URI.

   The following is an example of a Trigger-Consent header field:

      Trigger-Consent: sip:123@relay.example.com
                       ;target-uri="sip:friends@relay.example.com"



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6.  IANA Considerations

   Per the following sections, IANA has registered a SIP response code,
   two SIP header fields, and a SIP header field parameter.

6.1.  Registration of the 470 Response Code

   IANA has added the following new response code to the Methods and
   Response Codes subregistry under the SIP Parameters registry.

      Response Code Number:   470
      Default Reason Phrase:  Consent Needed
      Reference:              [RFC5360]

6.2.  Registration of the Trigger-Consent Header Field

   IANA has added the following new SIP header field to the Header
   Fields subregistry under the SIP Parameters registry.

      Header Name:   Trigger-Consent
      Compact Form:  (none)
      Reference:     [RFC5360]

6.3.  Registration of the Permission-Missing Header Field

   IANA has added the following new SIP header field to the Header
   Fields subregistry under the SIP Parameters registry.

      Header Name:   Permission-Missing
      Compact Form:  (none)
      Reference:     [RFC5360]

6.4.  Registration of the target-uri Header Field Parameter

   IANA has registered the 'target-uri' Trigger-Consent header field
   parameter under the Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values
   subregistry within the SIP Parameters registry:

                                                  Predefined
   Header Field                  Parameter Name     Values     Reference
   ----------------------------  ---------------   ---------   ---------
   Trigger-Consent               target-uri           No       [RFC5360]









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7.  Security Considerations

   Security has been discussed throughout the whole document.  However,
   there are some issues that deserve special attention.

   Relays generally implement several security mechanisms that relate to
   client authentication and authorization.  Clients are typically
   authenticated before they can manipulate a relay's translation logic.
   Additionally, clients are typically also authenticated and sometimes
   need to perform SPAM prevention tasks [RFC5039] when they send
   traffic to a relay.  It is important that relays implement these
   types of security mechanisms.  However, they fall out of the scope of
   this framework.  Even with these mechanisms in place, there is still
   a need for relays to implement this framework because the use of
   these mechanisms does not prevent authorized clients to add
   recipients to a translation without their consent.  Consequently,
   relays performing translations MUST implement this framework.

      Note that, as indicated previously, user agents using the same
      connection to register and to receive traffic from the registrar,
      as described in [OUTBOUND], do not need to use this framework.
      Therefore, a registrar that did not accept third-party
      registrations would not need to implement this framework.

   As pointed out in Section 5.6.1.3, when return routability tests are
   used to authenticate recipients granting or denying permissions, the
   URIs used to grant or deny permissions need to be protected from
   attackers.  SIPS URIs provide a good tool to meet this requirement,
   as described in [RFC5361].  When store-and-forward servers are used,
   the interface between a user agent and its store-and-forward server
   is frequently not based on SIP.  In such a case, SIPS cannot be used
   to secure those URIs.  Implementations of store-and-forward servers
   MUST provide a mechanism for delivering encrypted and integrity-
   protected messages to their user agents.

   The information provided by the Pending Additions event package can
   be sensitive.  For this reason, as described in [RFC5362], relays
   need to use strong means for authentication and information
   confidentiality.  SIPS URIs are a good mechanism to meet this
   requirement.

   Permission documents can reveal sensitive information.  Attackers may
   attempt to modify them in order to have clients grant or deny
   permissions different from the ones they think they are granting or
   denying.  For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that relays use strong
   means for information integrity protection and confidentiality when
   sending permission documents to clients.




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   The mechanism used for conveying information to clients SHOULD ensure
   the integrity and confidentially of the information.  In order to
   achieve these, an end-to-end SIP encryption mechanism, such as
   S/MIME, as described in [RFC3261], SHOULD be used.

   If strong end-to-end security means (such as above) are not
   available, it is RECOMMENDED that hop-by-hop security based on TLS
   and SIPS URIs, as described in [RFC3261], is used.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Henning Schulzrinne, Jon Peterson, and Cullen Jennings provided
   useful ideas on this document.  Ben Campbell, AC Mahendran, Keith
   Drage, and Mary Barnes performed a thorough review of this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC3428]  Campbell, B., Ed., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H.,
              Huitema, C., and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol
              (SIP) Extension for Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December
              2002.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
              Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January
              2008.

   [RFC5361]  Camarillo, G., "A Document Format for Requesting Consent",
              RFC 5361, October 2008.

   [RFC5362]  Camarillo, G., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
              Pending Additions Event Package", RFC 5362, October 2008.






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   [RFC5363]  Camarillo, G. and A.B. Roach, "Framework and Security
              Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) URI-
              List Services", RFC 5363, October 2008.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3325]  Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
              Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
              Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
              November 2002.

   [RFC3880]  Lennox, J., Wu, X., and H. Schulzrinne, "Call Processing
              Language (CPL): A Language for User Control of Internet
              Telephony Services", RFC 3880, October 2004.

   [RFC4453]  Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., Ed., and D. Willis,
              "Requirements for Consent-Based Communications in the
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4453, April 2006.

   [RFC4474]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.

   [RFC4825]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
              Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.

   [RFC4826]  Rosenberg, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) Formats
              for Representing Resource Lists", RFC 4826, May 2007.

   [RFC5039]  Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, "The Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP) and Spam", RFC 5039, January 2008.

   [OUTBOUND] Jennings, C. and R. Mahy, "Managing Client Initiated
              Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol  (SIP)",
              Work in Progress, June 2007.
















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Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan Rosenberg
   Cisco
   Iselin, NJ 08830
   USA

   EMail: jdrosen@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.jdrosen.net


   Gonzalo Camarillo (editor)
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com


   Dean Willis
   Unaffiliated
   3100 Independence Pkwy #311-164
   Plano, TX  75075
   USA

   EMail: dean.willis@softarmor.com
























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