



ADD                                                    M. Boucadair, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                           T. Reddy, Ed.
Expires: 14 February 2023                                          Nokia
                                                                 D. Wing
                                                                  Citrix
                                                                 N. Cook
                                                            Open-Xchange
                                                               T. Jensen
                                                               Microsoft
                                                          13 August 2022


  DHCP and Router Advertisement Options for the Discovery of Network-
                       designated Resolvers (DNR)
                         draft-ietf-add-dnr-13

Abstract

   The document specifies new DHCP and IPv6 Router Advertisement options
   to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (e.g., DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-
   TLS, DNS-over-QUIC).  Particularly, it allows a host to learn an
   authentication domain name together with a list of IP addresses and a
   set of service parameters to reach such encrypted DNS resolvers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 February 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Configuration Data for Encrypted DNS  . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  ADN as the Reference Identifier for DNS
               Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Avoiding Dependency on External Resolvers . . . . . .   4
       3.1.3.  Single vs. Multiple IP Addresses  . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.4.  Why Not Separate Options for ADN and IP Addresses?  .   5
       3.1.5.  Service Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.6.  ADN Only Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.7.  Encrypted DNS Options Ordering  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.8.  DNR Validation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.1.9.  DNR Information Using Other Provisioning
               Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Handling Configuration Data Conflicts . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Validating Discovered Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Multihoming Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  DHCPv6 Client Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  DHCPv4 Client Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  IPv6 Host Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Spoofing Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Deletion Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.4.  Wireless Security - Authentication Attacks  . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.1.  DHCPv6 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  DHCPv4 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.3.  Neighbor Discovery Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20



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   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   11. Contributing Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

1.  Introduction

   This document focuses on the discovery of encrypted DNS such as DNS-
   over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], or DNS-
   over-QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250] in local networks.

   In particular, the document specifies how a local encrypted DNS
   resolver can be discovered by connected hosts by means of DHCPv4
   [RFC2132], DHCPv6 [RFC8415], and IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA)
   [RFC4861] options.  These options are designed to convey the
   following information: the DNS Authentication Domain Name (ADN), a
   list of IP addresses, and a set of service parameters.  This
   procedure is called Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers (DNR).

   The options defined in this document can be deployed in a variety of
   deployments (e.g., local networks with Customer Premises Equipment
   (CPEs) that may or may not be managed by an Internet Service Provider
   (ISP), or local networks with or without DNS forwarders).  It is out
   of the scope of this document to provide an inventory of such
   deployments.

   Resolver selection considerations are out of scope.  Likewise,
   policies (including any interactions with users) are out of scope.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC8499].  The
   following additional terms are used:

   Do53:  refers to unencrypted DNS.

   DNR:  refers to the Discovery of Network-designated Resolvers
      procedure.

   Encrypted DNS:  refers to a scheme where DNS exchanges are



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      transported over an encrypted channel.  Examples of encrypted DNS
      are DoT, DoH, or DoQ.

   Encrypted DNS resolver:  refers to a DNS resolver that supports any
      encrypted DNS scheme.

   Encrypted DNS options:  refers to the options defined in Sections 4,
      5, and 6.

   DHCP:  refers to both DHCPv4 and DHCPv6.

3.  Overview

   This document describes how a DNS client can discover local encrypted
   DNS resolvers using DHCP (Sections 4 and 5) and Neighbor Discovery
   protocol (Section 6): Encrypted DNS options.

   These options configure an authentication domain name, a list of IP
   addresses, and a set of service parameters of the encrypted DNS
   resolver.  More information about the design of these options is
   provided in the following subsections.

3.1.  Configuration Data for Encrypted DNS


3.1.1.  ADN as the Reference Identifier for DNS Authentication

   In order to allow for PKIX-based authentication between a DNS client
   and an encrypted DNS resolver, the Encrypted DNS options are designed
   to always include an authentication domain name.  This ADN is
   presented as a reference identifier for DNS authentication purposes.
   This design accommodates the current best practices for issuing
   certificates as per Section 1.7.2 of [RFC6125]:

      |  Some certification authorities issue server certificates based
      |  on IP addresses, but preliminary evidence indicates that such
      |  certificates are a very small percentage (less than 1%) of
      |  issued certificates.

3.1.2.  Avoiding Dependency on External Resolvers

   To avoid adding a dependency on another server to resolve the ADN,
   the Encrypted DNS options return the IP address(es) to locate the
   encrypted DNS resolver.  These encrypted DNS resolvers may be hosted
   on the same or distinct IP addresses.  Such a decision is deployment
   specific.





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   In order to optimize the size of discovery messages when all DNS
   resolvers terminate on the same IP address, early versions of this
   document considered relying upon the discovery mechanisms specified
   in [RFC2132][RFC3646][RFC8106] to retrieve a list of IP addresses to
   reach their DNS resolvers.  Nevertheless, this approach requires a
   client that supports more than one encrypted DNS protocol (e.g., DoH
   and DoT) to probe that list of IP addresses.  To avoid such a
   probing, the options defined in Sections 4, 5, and 6 associate an
   encrypted DNS protocol with an IP address.  No probing is required in
   such a design.

3.1.3.  Single vs. Multiple IP Addresses

   A list of IP addresses to reach an encrypted DNS resolver may be
   returned in an Encrypted DNS option to accommodate current
   deployments relying upon primary and backup resolvers.  Also, DNR can
   be used in contexts where other DNS redundancy schemes (e.g., anycast
   as in BCP 126 [RFC4786]) are used.

   Whether one or more IP addresses are returned in an Encrypted DNS
   option is deployment specific.  For example, a router embedding a
   recursive server or a forwarder has to include one single IP address
   pointing to one of its LAN-facing interfaces.  Typically, this IP
   address can be a private IPv4 address, a link-local address, a Unique
   Local IPv6 unicast Address (ULA), or a Global Unicast Address (GUA).

   If multiple IP addresses are to be returned in an Encrypted DNS
   option, these addresses are ordered in the preference for use by the
   client.

3.1.4.  Why Not Separate Options for ADN and IP Addresses?

   A single option is used to convey both the ADN and IP addresses.
   Otherwise a means to correlate an IP address conveyed in an option
   with an ADN conveyed in another option will be required if, for
   example, more than one ADN is supported by the network.

3.1.5.  Service Parameters

   Because distinct encrypted DNS protocols (e.g., DoT, DoH, and DoQ)
   may be provisioned by a network and that some of these protocols may
   make use of customized port numbers instead of default ones, the
   Encrypted DNS options are designed to return a set of service
   parameters.  These parameters are encoded following the same rules
   for encoding SvcParams in Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].
   This encoding approach may increase the size of the options but it
   has the merit of relying upon an existing IANA registry and, thus,
   accommodating new encrypted DNS protocols and service parameters that



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   may be defined in the future.

   The following service parameters MUST be supported by a DNR
   implementation:

   alpn:  Used to indicate the set of supported protocols (Section 7.1
      of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).

   port:  Used to indicate the target port number for the encrypted DNS
      connection (Section 7.2 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).

   In addition, the following service parameters are RECOMMENDED to be
   supported by a DNR implementation:

   ech:  Used to enable Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) (Section 7.3 of
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]).

   dohpath:  Used to supply a relative DoH URI Template (Section 5.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).


3.1.6.  ADN Only Mode

   The provisioning mode in which an ADN, a list of IP addresses, and a
   set of service parameters of the encrypted DNS resolver are supplied
   to a host SHOULD be used because the Encrypted DNS options are self-
   contained and do not require any additional DNS queries.  The reader
   may refer to [RFC7969] for an overview of advanced capabilities that
   are supported by DHCP servers to populate configuration data (e.g.,
   issue DNS queries).

   In contexts where putting additional complexity on requesting hosts
   is acceptable, returning an ADN only can be considered.  The supplied
   ADN will be passed to a local resolution library (a DNS client,
   typically) which will then issue Service Binding (SVCB) queries
   [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns].  These SVCB queries can be sent to the
   discovered encrypted DNS resolver itself or to the network-designated
   Do53 resolver.  Note that this mode may be subject to active attacks,
   which can be mitigated by DNSSEC.

      |  How an ADN is passed to a local resolution library is
      |  implementation specific.

3.1.7.  Encrypted DNS Options Ordering

   The DHCP options defined in Sections 4 and 5 follow the option
   ordering guidelines in Section 17 of [RFC7227].




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   Likewise, the RA option (Section 6) adheres to the recommendations in
   Section 9 of [RFC4861].

3.1.8.  DNR Validation Checks

   On receipt of an Encrypted DNS option, the DHCP client (or IPv6 host)
   makes the following validation checks:

   *  The ADN is present and encoded as per Section 10 of [RFC8415].

   *  If additional data is supplied:

      -  the service parameters are encoded following the rules
         specified in Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

      -  the option includes at least one valid IP address and the
         "alpn" service parameter.

      -  the service parameters do not include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint"
         service parameters.

   If any of the checks fail, the receiver discards the received
   Encrypted DNS option.

3.1.9.  DNR Information Using Other Provisioning Mechanisms

   The provisioning mechanisms specified in this document may not be
   available in specific networks (e.g., some cellular networks
   exclusively use Protocol Configuration Options (PCOs) [TS.24008]) or
   may not be suitable in some contexts (e.g., need for a secure
   discovery).  Other mechanisms may be considered in these contexts for
   the provisioning of encrypted DNS resolvers.  It is RECOMMENDED that
   at least the following DNR information is made available to a
   requesting host:

   *  A service priority whenever the discovery mechanism does not rely
      on implicit ordering if multiple instances of the encrypted DNS
      are used.

   *  An authentication domain name.  This parameter is mandatory.

   *  A list of IP addresses to locate the encrypted DNS resolver.

   *  A set of service parameters.







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3.2.  Handling Configuration Data Conflicts

   If the encrypted DNS is discovered by a host using both RA and DHCP,
   the rules discussed in Section 5.3.1 of [RFC8106] MUST be followed.

   DHCP/RA options to discover encrypted DNS resolvers (including, DoH
   URI Templates) takes precedence over Discovery of Designated
   Resolvers (DDR) [I-D.ietf-add-ddr] since DDR uses Do53 to an external
   DNS resolver, which is susceptible to both internal and external
   attacks whereas DHCP/RA is typically protected using the mechanisms
   discussed in Section 7.1.

   If a client learns both Do53 and encrypted DNS resolvers from the
   same network, and absent explicit configuration otherwise, it is
   RECOMMENDED that the client uses the encrypted DNS resolvers for that
   network.  If the client cannot establish an authenticated and
   encrypted connection with the encrypted DNS resolver, it may fallback
   to using the Do53 resolver.

3.3.  Validating Discovered Resolvers

   This section describes a set of validation checks to confirm that an
   encrypted DNS resolver matches what is provided using DNR (e.g., DHCP
   or RA).  Such validation checks do not intend to validate the
   security of the DNR provisioning mechanisms or the user's trust
   relationship to the network.

   If the local DNS client supports one of the discovered encrypted DNS
   protocols identified by Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
   protocol identifiers, the DNS client establishes an encrypted DNS
   session following the service priority of the discovered encrypted
   resolvers.

   The DNS client verifies the connection based on PKIX validation
   [RFC5280] of the DNS resolver certificate and uses the validation
   techniques as described in [RFC6125] to compare the authentication
   domain name conveyed in the Encrypted DNS options to the certificate
   provided (see Section 8.1 of [RFC8310] for more details).  The DNS
   client uses the default system or application PKI trust anchors
   unless configured otherwise to use explicit trust anchors.  ALPN-
   related considerations can be found in Section 6.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Operation considerations to check the
   revocation status of the certificate of an encrypted DNS resolver are
   discussed in Section 10 of [RFC8484].







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3.4.  Multihoming Considerations

   Devices may be connected to multiple networks; each providing their
   own DNS configuration using the discovery mechanisms specified in
   this document.  Nevertheless, it is out of the scope of this
   specification to discuss DNS selection of multi-interface devices.
   The reader may refer to [RFC6731] for a discussion of issues and an
   example of DNS resolver selection for multi-interfaced devices.
   Also, the reader may refer to [I-D.ietf-add-split-horizon-authority]
   for a discussion on how DNR and Provisioning Domains (PvDs) Key
   "dnsZones" (Section 4.3 of [RFC8801]) can be used in Split DNS
   environments (Section 6 of [RFC8499]).

4.  DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option


4.1.  Option Format

   The format of the DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS option is shown in Figure 1.

      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       OPTION_V6_DNR           |         Option-length         |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Service Priority        |         ADN Length            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     ~                   authentication-domain-name                  ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         Addr Length           |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                        ipv6-address(es)                       ~
     |                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                 Service Parameters (SvcParams)                ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                   Figure 1: DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 1 are as follows:

   Option-code:  OPTION_V6_DNR (TBA1, see Section 9.1)

   Option-length:  Length of the enclosed data in octets.  The option
      length is ('ADN Length' + 4) when only an ADN is included in the
      option.

   Service Priority:  The priority of this OPTION_V6_DNR instance



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      compared to other instances.  This 16-bit unsigned integer is
      interpreted following the rules specified in Section 2.4.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   ADN Length:  Length of the authentication-domain-name field in
      octets.

   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  A fully qualified
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].

      An example of the authentication-domain-name encoding is shown in
      Figure 2.  This example conveys the FQDN "doh1.example.com.", and
      the resulting Option-length field is 18.

       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
       | 0x04 |   d  |   o  |   h  |  1   | 0x07 |   e  |   x  |   a  |
       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
       |   m  |   p  |   l  |   e  | 0x03 |   c  |   o  |   m  | 0x00 |
       +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+

          Figure 2: An Example of the DNS authentication-domain-name
                                   Encoding

   Addr Length:  Length of enclosed IPv6 addresses in octets.  When
      present, it MUST be a multiple of 16.

   ipv6-address(es) (variable length):  Indicates one or more IPv6
      addresses to reach the encrypted DNS resolver.  An address can be
      link-local, ULA, or GUA.  The format of this field is shown in
      Figure 3.

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      |                         ipv6-address                          |
      |                                                               |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                              ...                              |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                 Figure 3: Format of the IPv6 Addresses Field

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of
      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or



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      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"
      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.  As a reminder, the default
      port number is 853 for DoT, 443 for DoH, and 853 for DoQ.

      The length of this field is ('Option-length' - 6 - 'ADN Length' -
      'Addr Length').

   Note that "Addr Length", "ipv6-address(es)", and "Service Parameters
   (SvcParams)" fields are not present if the ADN-only mode is used
   (Section 3.1.6).

4.2.  DHCPv6 Client Behavior

   To discover an encrypted DNS resolver, the DHCPv6 client MUST include
   OPTION_V6_DNR in an Option Request Option (ORO), as in Sections
   18.2.1, 18.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.5, 18.2.6, and 21.7 of [RFC8415].

   The DHCPv6 client MUST be prepared to receive multiple instances of
   the OPTION_V6_DNR option; each option is to be treated as a separate
   encrypted DNS resolver.  These instances MUST be processed following
   their service priority (i.e., smaller service priority indicates a
   higher preference).

   The DHCPv6 client MUST silently discard any OPTION_V6_DNR that fails
   to pass the validation steps defined in Section 3.1.8.

   The DHCPv6 client MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback
   addresses conveyed in OPTION_V6_DNR.

5.  DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

5.1.  Option Format

   The format of the DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS option is illustrated in
   Figure 4.











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                 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                | OPTION_V4_DNR |     Length    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                ~      DNR Instance Data #1     ~
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   ---
                .              ...              .    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ optional
                ~      DNR Instance Data #n     ~    |
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   ---

                   Figure 4: DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 4 are as follows:

   Code:  OPTION_V4_DNR (TBA2, see Section 9.2).

   Length:  Indicates the length of the enclosed data in octets.

   DNR Instance Data:  Includes the configuration data of an encrypted
      DNS resolver.  The format of this field is shown in Figure 5.

                       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |    DNR Instance Data Length   |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |       Service Priority        |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |   ADN Length  |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~  authentication-domain-name   ~
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |  Addr Length  |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~        IPv4 Address(es)       ~
                      |               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      |               |               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+               |
                      ~Service Parameters (SvcParams) ~
                      |                               |
                      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                      Figure 5: DNR Instance Data Format

      When several encrypted DNS resolvers are to be included, the "DNR
      Instance Data" field is repeated.

   The fields shown in Figure 5 are as follows:



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   DNR Instance Data Length:  Length of all following data in octets.
      This field is set to ('ADN Length' + 3) when only an ADN is
      provided for a DNR instance.

   Service Priority:  The priority of this instance compared to other
      DNR instances.  This 16-bit unsigned integer is interpreted
      following the rules specified in Section 2.4.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   ADN Length:  Length of the authentication-domain-name in octets.

   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  The authentication
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].  An example is
      provided in Figure 2.

   Addr Length:  Length of included IPv4 addresses in octets.  When
      present, it MUST be a multiple of 4.

   IPv4 Address(es) (variable length):  Indicates one or more IPv4
      addresses to reach the encrypted DNS resolver.  Both private and
      public IPv4 addresses can be included in this field.  The format
      of this field is shown in Figure 6.  This format assumes that an
      IPv4 address is encoded as a1.a2.a3.a4.

                 0     8     16    24    32    40    48
                 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--
                 |  a1 |  a2 |  a3 |  a4 |  a1 |  a2 | ...
                 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--
                   IPv4 Address 1          IPv4 Address 2 ...

                 Figure 6: Format of the IPv4 Addresses Field

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of
      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"
      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.

      The length of this field is ('DNR Instance Data Length' - 4 - 'ADN
      Length' - 'Addr Length').




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   Note that "Addr Length", "IPv4 Address(es)", and "Service Parameters
   (SvcParams)" fields are not present if the ADN-only mode is used
   (Section 3.1.6).

   OPTION_V4_DNR is a concatenation-requiring option.  As such, the
   mechanism specified in [RFC3396] MUST be used if OPTION_V4_DNR
   exceeds the maximum DHCPv4 option size of 255 octets.

5.2.  DHCPv4 Client Behavior

   To discover an encrypted DNS resolver, the DHCPv4 client requests the
   encrypted DNS resolver by including OPTION_V4_DNR in a Parameter
   Request List option [RFC2132].

   The DHCPv4 client MUST be prepared to receive multiple DNR instance
   data in the OPTION_V4_DNR option; each instance is to be treated as a
   separate encrypted DNS resolver.  These instances MUST be processed
   following their service priority (i.e., smaller service priority
   indicates a higher preference).

   The DHCPv4 client MUST silently discard any OPTION_V4_DNR that fails
   to pass the validation steps defined in Section 3.1.8.

   The DHCPv4 client MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback
   addresses conveyed in OPTION_V4_DNR.

6.  IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS Option


6.1.  Option Format

   This section defines a new Neighbor Discovery option [RFC4861]: IPv6
   RA Encrypted DNS option.  This option is useful in contexts similar
   to those discussed in Section 1.1 of [RFC8106].

   The format of the IPv6 RA Encrypted DNS option is illustrated in
   Figure 7.














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      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     TBA3      |     Length    |        Service Priority       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                           Lifetime                            |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |          ADN Length           |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                   authentication-domain-name                  ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |         Addr Length           |                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               |
     ~                        ipv6-address(es)                       ~
     |                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |     SvcParams Length          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     ~                 Service Parameters (SvcParams)                ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                     Figure 7: RA Encrypted DNS Option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 7 are as follows:

   Type:  8-bit identifier of the Encrypted DNS option as assigned by
      IANA (TBA3, see Section 9.3).

   Length:  8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option (including
      the Type and Length fields) is in units of 8 octets.

   Service Priority:  16-bit unsigned integer.  The priority of this
      Encrypted DNS option instance compared to other instances.  This
      field is interpreted following the rules specified in
      Section 2.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].

   Lifetime:  32-bit unsigned integer.  The maximum time in seconds
      (relative to the time the packet is received) over which the
      discovered Authentication Domain Name is valid.

      The value of Lifetime SHOULD by default be at least 3 *
      MaxRtrAdvInterval, where MaxRtrAdvInterval is the maximum RA
      interval as defined in [RFC4861].

      A value of all one bits (0xffffffff) represents infinity.

      A value of zero means that this Authentication Domain Name MUST no
      longer be used.




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   ADN Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of the authentication-domain-name field in octets.

   authentication-domain-name (variable length):  The authentication
      domain name of the encrypted DNS resolver.  This field is
      formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].

   Addr Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of enclosed IPv6 addresses in octets.  When present, it
      MUST be a multiple of 16.

   ipv6-address(es) (variable length):  One or more IPv6 addresses of
      the encrypted DNS resolver.  An address can be link-local, ULA, or
      GUA.

      All of the addresses share the same Lifetime value.  Similar to
      [RFC8106], if it is desirable to have different Lifetime values
      per IP address, multiple Encrypted DNS options may be used.

      The format of this field is shown in Figure 3.

   SvcParams Length:  16-bit unsigned integer.  This field indicates the
      length of the Service Parameters field in octets.

   Service Parameters (SvcParams) (variable length):  Specifies a set of
      service parameters that are encoded following the rules in
      Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https].  Service parameters
      may include, for example, a list of ALPN protocol identifiers or
      alternate port numbers.  This field MUST include at least "alpn"
      SvcParam (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]).  The service
      parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams as
      they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

      If no port service parameter is included, this indicates that
      default port numbers should be used.

   Note that "Addr Length", "ipv6-address(es)", and "Service Parameters
   (SvcParams)" fields are not present if the ADN-only mode is used
   (Section 3.1.6).

   The option MUST be padded with zeros so that the full enclosed data
   is a multiple of 8 octets (Section 4.6 of [RFC4861]).









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6.2.  IPv6 Host Behavior

   The procedure for DNS configuration is the same as it is with any
   other Neighbor Discovery option [RFC4861].  In addition, the host
   follows the same procedure as the one described in Section 5.3.1 of
   [RFC8106] for processing received Encrypted DNS options with the
   formatting requirements in Section 6.1 and validation checks in
   Section 3.1.8 substituted for the length and fields validation.

   The host MUST be prepared to receive multiple Encrypted DNS options
   in RAs.  These instances MUST be processed following their service
   priority (i.e., smaller service priority indicates a higher
   preference).

   The host MUST silently discard multicast and host loopback addresses
   conveyed in the Encrypted DNS options.

7.  Security Considerations


7.1.  Spoofing Attacks

   DHCP/RA messages are not encrypted or protected against modification
   within the LAN.  Unless mitigated (described below), the content of
   DHCP and RA messages can be spoofed or modified by active attackers,
   such as compromised devices within the local network.  An active
   attacker (Section 3.3 of [RFC3552]) can spoof the DHCP/RA response to
   provide the attacker's encrypted DNS resolver.  Note that such an
   attacker can launch other attacks as discussed in Section 22 of
   [RFC8415].  The attacker can get a domain name with a domain-
   validated public certificate from a CA and host an encrypted DNS
   resolver.

   Attacks of spoofed or modified DHCP responses and RA messages by
   attackers within the local network may be mitigated by making use of
   the following mechanisms:

   *  DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610]: the network access node (e.g., a border
      router, a CPE, an Access Point (AP)) discards DHCP response
      messages received from any local endpoint.

   *  RA-Guard [RFC7113]: the network access node discards RAs messages
      received from any local endpoint.

   *  Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) solution for DHCP
      [RFC7513]: the network access node filters packets with forged
      source IP addresses.




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   The above mechanisms would ensure that the endpoint receives the
   correct configuration information of the encrypted DNS resolvers
   selected by the DHCP server (or RA sender), but cannot provide any
   information about the DHCP server or the entity hosting the DHCP
   server (or RA sender).

   Encrypted DNS sessions with rogue resolvers that spoof the IP address
   of a DNS resolver will fail because the DNS client will fail to
   authenticate that rogue resolver based upon PKIX authentication
   [RFC6125], particularly the authentication domain name in the
   Encrypted DNS Option.  DNS clients that ignore authentication
   failures and accept spoofed certificates will be subject to attacks
   (e.g., redirect to malicious resolvers, intercept sensitive data).

7.2.  Deletion Attacks

   If the DHCP responses or RAs are dropped by the attacker, the client
   can fall back to use a preconfigured encrypted DNS resolver.
   However, the use of policies to select resolvers is out of the scope
   of this document.

   Note that deletion attack is not specific to DHCP/RA.

7.3.  Passive Attacks

   A passive attacker (Section 3.2 of [RFC3552]) can identify a host is
   using DHCP/RA to discover an encrypted DNS resolver and can infer
   that host is capable of using DoH/DoT/DoQ to encrypt DNS messages.
   However, a passive attacker cannot spoof or modify DHCP/RA messages.

7.4.  Wireless Security - Authentication Attacks

   Wireless LAN (WLAN) as frequently deployed in local networks (e.g.,
   home networks) is vulnerable to various attacks (e.g., [Evil-Twin],
   [Krack], [Dragonblood]).  Because of these attacks, only
   cryptographically authenticated communications are trusted on WLANs.
   This means that any information (e.g., NTP server, DNS resolver,
   domain search list) provided by such networks via DHCP, DHCPv6, or RA
   is untrusted because DHCP and RA messages are not authenticated.

   If the pre-shared key (PSK) is the same for all clients that connect
   to the same WLAN (e.g., WPA-PSK), the shared key will be available to
   all nodes, including attackers.  As such, it is possible to mount an
   active on-path attack.  On-path attacks are possible within local
   networks because such a WLAN authentication lacks peer entity
   authentication.





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   This leads to the need for provisioning unique credentials for
   different clients.  Endpoints can be provisioned with unique
   credentials (username and password, typically) provided by the local
   network administrator to mutually authenticate to the local WLAN AP
   (e.g., 802.1x Wireless User Authentication on OpenWRT [dot1x], EAP-
   pwd [RFC8146]).  Not all endpoint devices (e.g., IoT devices) support
   802.1x supplicant and need an alternate mechanism to connect to the
   local network.  To address this limitation, unique pre-shared keys
   can be created for each such devices and WPA-PSK is used (e.g.,
   [IPSK]).

8.  Privacy Considerations

   Privacy considerations that are specific to DNR provisioning
   mechanisms are discussed in Section 23 of [RFC8415] or [RFC7824].
   Anonymity profiles for DHCP clients are discussed in [RFC7844].  The
   mechanism defined in this document can be used to infer that a DHCP
   client or IPv6 host support encrypted DNS options, but does not
   explicitly reveal whether local DNS clients are able to consume these
   options or infer their encryption capabilities.  Other than that,
   this document does not expose more privacy information compared to
   Do53 discovery options.

   As discussed in [RFC9076], the use of encrypted DNS does not reduce
   the data available in the DNS resolver.  For example, the reader may
   refer to Section 8 of [RFC8484] or Section 7 of [RFC9250] for a
   discussion on specific privacy considerations to encrypted DNS.

9.  IANA Considerations


9.1.  DHCPv6 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Option Code in
   the registry maintained in [DHCPV6].

    +=======+===============+============+===========+================+
    | Value | Description   | Client ORO | Singleton | Reference      |
    |       |               |            | Option    |                |
    +=======+===============+============+===========+================+
    | TBA1  | OPTION_V6_DNR | Yes        | No        | [ThisDocument] |
    +-------+---------------+------------+-----------+----------------+

                    Table 1: DHCPv6 Encrypted DNS Option







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9.2.  DHCPv4 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCP Option Code in the
   registry maintained in [BOOTP].

   +======+===============+=============+============+================+
   | Tag  | Name          | Data Length | Meaning    | Reference      |
   +======+===============+=============+============+================+
   | TBA2 | OPTION_V4_DNR | N           | Encrypted  | [ThisDocument] |
   |      |               |             | DNS Server |                |
   +------+---------------+-------------+------------+----------------+

                   Table 2: DHCPv4 Encrypted DNS Option

9.3.  Neighbor Discovery Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
   Option type in the "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats" sub-
   registry under the "Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
   (ICMPv6) Parameters" registry maintained in [ND].

             +======+======================+================+
             | Type | Description          | Reference      |
             +======+======================+================+
             | TBA3 | Encrypted DNS Option | [ThisDocument] |
             +------+----------------------+----------------+

             Table 3: Neighbor Discovery Encrypted DNS Option


10.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Christian Jacquenet and Michael Richardson for the
   review.

   Thanks to Stephen Farrell, Martin Thomson, Vittorio Bertola, Stephane
   Bortzmeyer, Ben Schwartz, Iain Sharp, and Chris Box for the comments.

   Thanks to Mark Nottingham for the feedback on HTTP redirection that
   was discussed in previous versions of this specification.

   The use of DHCP to retrieve an authentication domain name was
   discussed in Section 7.3.1 of [RFC8310] and
   [I-D.pusateri-dhc-dns-driu].

   Thanks to Bernie Volz for the review of the DHCP part.





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   Thanks to Andrew Campling for the Shepherd review and Eric Vyncke for
   the AD review.

   Thanks to Rich Salz for the secdir review, Joe Clarke for the ops-dir
   review, and Robert Sparks for the artart review.

   Thanks to Lars Eggert, Roman Danyliw, Erik Kline, Martin Duke, Robert
   Wilton, and Paul Wouters for the IESG review.

11.  Contributing Authors


   Nicolai Leymann
   Deutsche Telekom
   Germany
   Email: n.leymann@telekom.de


   Zhiwei Yan
   CNNIC
   No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
   Beijing
   100190
   China
   Email: yan@cnnic.cn


12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns]
              Schwartz, B., "Service Binding Mapping for DNS Servers",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-
              07, 11 August 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
              draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-07.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-svcb-https]
              Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service binding
              and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS SVCB and
              HTTPS RRs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              dnsop-svcb-https-10, 24 May 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-
              https-10.txt>.







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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
              Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>.

   [RFC3396]  Lemon, T. and S. Cheshire, "Encoding Long Options in the
              Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)", RFC 3396,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3396, November 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3396>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC8106]  Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
              "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
              RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [BOOTP]    "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters/
              bootp-dhcp-parameters.xhtml#options>.

   [DHCPV6]   "DHCPv6 Option Codes", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
              dhcpv6-parameters/dhcpv6-parameters.xhtml#dhcpv6-
              parameters-2>.

   [dot1x]    Cisco, "Basic 802.1x Wireless User Authentication",
              <https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/wifi/
              wireless.security.8021x>.




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   [Dragonblood]
              The Unicode Consortium, "Dragonblood: Analyzing the
              Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd",
              <https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/dragonblood.pdf>.

   [Evil-Twin]
              The Unicode Consortium, "Evil twin (wireless networks)",
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
              Evil_twin_(wireless_networks)>.

   [I-D.ietf-add-ddr]
              Pauly, T., Kinnear, E., Wood, C. A., McManus, P., and T.
              Jensen, "Discovery of Designated Resolvers", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-add-ddr-10, 5 August
              2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-ddr-
              10.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-add-split-horizon-authority]
              Reddy, T., Wing, D., Smith, K., and B. Schwartz,
              "Establishing Local DNS Authority in Split-Horizon
              Environments", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-add-split-horizon-authority-00, 25 June 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-add-split-
              horizon-authority-00.txt>.

   [I-D.pusateri-dhc-dns-driu]
              Pusateri, T. and W. Toorop, "DHCPv6 Options for private
              DNS Discovery", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              pusateri-dhc-dns-driu-00, 2 July 2018,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-pusateri-dhc-dns-
              driu-00.txt>.

   [IPSK]     Cisco, "Identity PSK Feature Deployment Guide",
              <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/wireless/
              controller/technotes/8-5/
              b_Identity_PSK_Feature_Deployment_Guide.html>.

   [Krack]    The Unicode Consortium, "Key Reinstallation Attacks",
              2017, <https://www.krackattacks.com/>.

   [ND]       "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/
              icmpv6-parameters.xhtml#icmpv6-parameters-5>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.



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   [RFC3646]  Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3646>.

   [RFC4786]  Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast
              Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786,
              December 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4786>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6731]  Savolainen, T., Kato, J., and T. Lemon, "Improved
              Recursive DNS Server Selection for Multi-Interfaced
              Nodes", RFC 6731, DOI 10.17487/RFC6731, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6731>.

   [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
              Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7113>.

   [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
              S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
              BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.

   [RFC7513]  Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address
              Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP",
              RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7513>.

   [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
              Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
              RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.





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   [RFC7824]  Krishnan, S., Mrugalski, T., and S. Jiang, "Privacy
              Considerations for DHCPv6", RFC 7824,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7824, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7824>.

   [RFC7844]  Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
              Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7969]  Lemon, T. and T. Mrugalski, "Customizing DHCP
              Configuration on the Basis of Network Topology", RFC 7969,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7969, October 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7969>.

   [RFC8146]  Harkins, D., "Adding Support for Salted Password Databases
              to EAP-pwd", RFC 8146, DOI 10.17487/RFC8146, April 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8146>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

   [RFC8801]  Pfister, P., Vyncke, É., Pauly, T., Schinazi, D., and W.
              Shao, "Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data",
              RFC 8801, DOI 10.17487/RFC8801, July 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8801>.

   [RFC9076]  Wicinski, T., Ed., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 9076,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9076, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9076>.






Boucadair, et al.       Expires 14 February 2023               [Page 25]

Internet-Draft  Discovery of Network-designated Resolver     August 2022


   [RFC9250]  Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
              Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9250>.

   [TS.24008] 3GPP, "Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core
              network protocols; Stage 3 (Release 16)", December 2019,
              <http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/24008.htm>.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
   Orange
   35000 Rennes
   France
   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Tirumaleswar Reddy (editor)
   Nokia
   India
   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Dan Wing
   Citrix Systems, Inc.
   United States of America
   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com


   Neil Cook
   Open-Xchange
   United Kingdom
   Email: neil.cook@noware.co.uk


   Tommy Jensen
   Microsoft
   United States of America
   Email: tojens@microsoft.com











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